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PREFACE 
Social Sciences and Humanities (SSH) do not usually take a preeminent role in technical research 
projects. Sister projects arise as part of Horizon 2020 Framework Programme as a way to address 
this historical constraint and to allow SSH make a meaningful contribution to the shaping of the 
research agenda. To this regard, Sister projects are created to go beside the mainstream research in 
order to challenge existing biases in the research agendas and trying out more daring alternatives 
through the widening of imaginaries and by taking into account the SSH perspective. 
CIFRA, as a Sister project, does not take the current status quo in the ICT patent ecosystem for 
granted, but on the contrary, explores the impact that potential new framings could have in ICT 
innovation and the value they could provide to the society. 
Moreover, CIFRA project has addressed the ICT Patent ecosystem from the perspective of the 
Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI), thus with the aim of determining the way it can be 
better aligned with the values, needs and expectations of society. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The importance of patents for the promotion of responsible innovation in ICT is in general 
acknowledged. There is an awareness of the various business models of the stakeholders 
involved in the development and commercialization of ICT-related technologies and the 
different role ICT patents and other intellectual property rights (IPR) play. Consequently, 
there is no single first best solution available. It is further acknowledged that the patent 
system is an integral legal framework, which tries to meet – being respectful of IPR – the 
requirements of both 'innovative step' and 'novelty' – regardless of the technology, industry 
or sector. 
The objective of this study is to review the issues and possible improvements related to 
current framework for ICT patents to promote responsible innovation taking ethical aspects 
in particular of patents into account. 
Among the different intellectual property rights, the CIFRA project chose to focus on patents 
because patents are particularly relevant in ICT. We acknowledge upfront that findings 
might not be generalizable to other IPRs or industrial contexts. 
While the identification and analysis of the existing patent regime in WP2 is based on an 
assessment of the status-quo, WP3 provides an ex ante perspective focused on the 
assessment of future challenges and possible changes of the current patent regime relevant 
for ICT industries. Stakeholders having different positions in the various value chains of the 
ICT industries. To conduct an in depth analysis of the existing patent regime from a future 
perspective the compilation of more detailed information as well as qualitative assessments 
from the relevant communities is essential. A mix of qualitative and semi-quantitative 
assessment methods is applied in order to identify possible impacts of the proposed 
changes of the patent regime on innovation. 
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Information collected in WP2 about problems and shortcomings of the current patent 
regime are enriched by an in-depth evaluation of existing foresight studies and ex-ante 
impact assessments of possible future scenarios, including studies on technological 
development trends, future market growth and investments and existing foresight activities.  
Then, all important stakeholders are consulted to capture their views on the present 
challenges and future economic and societal trends surrounding ICT related patents. Semi-
structured interviews with stakeholders are conducted and complemented by focus group 
exercises with targeted industry experts. The identification of experts is closely coordinated 
with the identification of companies owning ICT related patents in WP2, but also extended 
to Open Source organizations and societal groups, like consumer organizations, affected by 
ICT-related patents. As a result of the interviews, a preliminary assessment of the proposed 
changes of the patent regime and challenges was reached.  
Based on the literature review and the interviews, a stakeholder consultation has been 
implemented with the aim of identifying the most important challenges and prioritizing the 
main elements of possible changes of the current patent regime based on their impacts on 
innovation. In addition, the relevance of the various dimensions of responsible research and 
innovation regarding ICT patents is covered by the survey. 
Finally, the outcome of the survey is compared to the results of the literature survey and the 
empirical analysis of WP2 and eventually integrated into an assessment of the impact on 
innovation focusing on three major topics and possible options.  
2 PROBLEMS, SOLUTIONS AND FUTURE TRENDS FROM LITERATURE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents current problems with the patent system and possible solutions, as well as the 
possible future scenarios of the patent  system found in relevant literature.  
2.2 METHODOLOGY 
In contrast to the literature reviews conducted in WP 2, which are mainly focused on academic 
studies published in peer-reviewed journals, the identification of foresight and impact studies 
related to the IPRs in general and patents in particular cannot only be focused on searches in the 
Web of Science, ScienceDirect and Scopus, because the majority of such studies are not published in 
scientific papers. Therefore, our approach is mainly based on searches in the Internet, including at 
the webpages of the European Commission and its Joint Research Centers, but also the patent 
offices. In addition, the citations of major studies have also been screened. Nevertheless, the 
number of studies and publications is quite limited. Finally, some of the experts, e.g. from the OECD 
or the JRC, interviewed have also been asked for relevant studies in order to validate our findings. 
However, our approach did not miss any significant study. 
2.3 OVERVIEW OF IMPACT AND FORESIGHT STUDIES    
The findings of our literature review of relevant foresight or impact studies, but also of position 
papers,  are presented in the following table:  
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Table 1 Relevant studies 
Author/year Title 
Halbert (2001) Intellectual Property in the Year 2025, Journal of Futures Studies, vol. 6, no. 1, 
pp. 25–60. 
EPO (2007) SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE: How might IP regimes evolve by 2025? What 
global legitimacy might such regimes have? 
OECD (2008) The Economic Impact of Counterfeiting and Piracy, OECD, Paris  
EPO and OHIM (2013) Intellectual Property Rights Intensive Industries: Contribution to Economic 
Performance and Employment in the European Union.  
Maxwell and Riker (2014)   The Economic Implications of Strengthening Intellectual Property Rights in 
Developing Countries. Journal of International Commerce and Economics, pp. 2-
9. 
EC JRC (2014a) International Protection of ICT Intellectual Property and the Internationalization 
of ICT R&D  
EC JRC (2014b) How will standards facilitate new production systems in the context of EU 
innovation and competitiveness in 2025? 
ECSIP (2014) Patents and Standards: A modern framework for IPR-based standardization. A 
study prepared for the European Commission Directorate-General for 
Enterprise and Industry. 
Lemley (2015) IP in a world without scarcity, New York University Law Review pp. 460-515 
EARTO (2015) EARTO Answer to EC Consultation on Patent & Standards. 
EC (2015) Report of the expert group on patent aggregation. Directorate-General for 
Research and Innovation. 
EC JRC (2015a) Innovation in the European Digital Single Market: The Role of Patents  
EC JRC (2015b) Intellectual Property and Innovation in Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT)  
EPO and EUIPO (2016) Intellectual property rights intensive industries and economic performance in 
the European Union Industry-Level Analysis Report, Oct. 2016 Second edition.  
DG GROW (2016) Modernizing the enforcement of intellectual property rights.  
EC JRC (2016) Patent Assertion Entities in Europe 
FTC (2016) Patent Assertion Entity Activity – A Report of the Federal Trade Commission, 
Oct. 2016 
OECD (2016) OECD Science, Technology and Innovation Outlook 2016, OECD Publishing, 
Paris. 
OECD/EUIPO 
(2016) 
Trade in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods: Mapping the Economic Impact, OECD 
Publishing, Paris. 
EC (2016) Putting intellectual property at the service of SMEs to foster innovation and 
growth {COM(2016) 733 final}  
AVANCI (2016) Accelerating IoT Connectivity - Report 
CRA (2016) Transparency, Predictability and Efficiency of SSO-Based Standardization and 
SEP Licensing. A Report for the European Commission 
EARTO (2017) For Globally Competitive Standardization in the Digital Single Market: EARTO 
Voting Recommendations to Support Innovation in Europe (2017) 
2.4 PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 
The patent system was developed during a time where interoperability of technologies did not exist, 
nor were there costless to create and share knowledge. With the development of Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICT), the patent system is struggling to find the right setting to 
provide appropriate incentives for innovation, research and development (R&D), while 
simultaneously enabling the efficient reuse and diffusion of technological knowledge. Moreover, the 
gaps of the patent system in regards to the requirements of ICT technologies have transformed the 
patent landscape for ICT into a volatile landscape, whose dynamics involve a series of problems for 
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all players. In this part of the Deliverable D3.2, some of the most relevant problems and potential 
solutions identified in the literature are presented. A more detailed list of the identified problems 
and potential solutions is presented as Annex 1 to this document. This part complements the work 
of the D3.1 of this project, which focused on the – theoretically available – solutions.  
2.4.1 Identified problems 
2.4.1.1 Identified problems regarding patent application and granting  
 
Technological complexity: ICT technologies are highly complex. Due to their nature, it is to combine 
various components to one complex product. As consequence, ICT technologies are built from many 
parts developed my multiple actors (EC JRC 2015b). The combination of technological complexity 
with the cumulativeness of the innovation process creates problems such as technology 
fragmentation and fragmentation of patent rights in general and patent tickets in particular (EC JRC 
2015b). The rising complexity of technologies has made it easier to patent block several technology 
providers with one single patent. In addition, there is an increase in probability of accidental 
infringement for companies. This is because the detection of possible infringements is made difficult 
by the complexity of the technologies (EPO 2007). 
Low quality of the patent: One of the main concerns is the increasing challenge to maintain a 
satisfactory level of patent quality. The patent quality which is defined as “the degree to which a 
patent satisfies the statutory patentability requirements, leaves little doubt as to its breadth and 
discloses information that enables a person skilled in the art to implement that protected invention” 
(EPO 2012, p. 8). This pressure on quality is due to the challenges of the patent examination process 
and the inappropriate patent office policies, which also encourage the application of trivial and 
underdeveloped inventions (EC JRC 2015a). 
The low-quality patent is also an issue regarding assertions. Assertions of low-quality patents might 
have negative welfare implications, such as, the encouragement of rent-seeking behavior. This might 
lead to a reduction of R&D resources by innovators threatened by patent assertion entities (PAEs). 
To counter the activities of PAEs will be likely made only by large companies having the sufficient 
financial resources and expertise. For the case of patents on computer-implemented inventions or 
“software patents”, quality is of particular concern (EC JRC 2016). 
Large number of patent filings in the ICT field: Particularly with digital communication and computer 
technology there is a continuous increase in the number of patent filings with the EPO and EUIPO 
(2016). A large number of patent applications increases the probability of granting patents 
potentially facilitated by insufficient quality checks. This expectation might again increase the 
number patent applications EPO (2007). The large number of patents in this field is due to the 
complex technologies and combinatory innovations. Currently, there is an exponential increase in 
the number of patent filings from the Asian economies in Europe (EC 2015a). 
Computer-implemented inventions: With the current patent granting process, it is difficult to 
evaluate the patentability requirements of computer-implemented inventions consisting of a high 
degree of abstraction of the software algorithms. Furthermore, many applications end up being 
considered of a low quality. However, the increasing number of software applications demands a 
solution to properly assess them (EC JRC 2015b).  
Open source software: In the ICT industry, there is an increasing coexistence between the acquisition 
of software patents to protect the products and the usage of open source software in the industry. 
The possible legal conflicts due to patent infringement by open source software are a concern in the 
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long-term, especially because of the hybrid software products in which open and proprietary 
software are combined (EC JRC 2015b). 
Limited access to patent information: The restricted access to relevant patents information such as 
patents disclosure, changes in patent ownership, transactions, links to standards, prior art, patent 
licensing and other technical information related to new technologies generates a lack of market 
transparency (EC JRC 2015a). This lack of transparency leads to high operative and transaction costs 
EC (2015). 
Additionally, intellectual property registers present problems such as, the lack of harmonized names 
of the patent applicants. As a result, the same applicant may have several separate register accounts 
derived from each filing. The lack of comprehensive information leads to limited information about 
the applicants additional to the contact information. These issues complicate the tracking of the 
total files belonging to one single applicant. 
Lack of market transparency: As a consequence of the limited access to patent information, there is 
a lack of information about the market participants and their intentions EC JRC (2015b). Another 
cause for the lack of transparency is the lack of links between all existing data collections on 
technical knowledge and data on patents, which creates a shortage of market transparency. Many 
managers of this information have limited skills in defining how to create these links, and on defining 
a set of criteria and incentives for stakeholders to open their data while ensuring control over the 
assets (EC JRC 2015a). 
In the case of patents, there is a variety of different collectors and managers of this information. 
These include patent authorities, public institutions, companies, patent pools, IPR brokers, open 
source and other platforms in which collaboration, exchange and licensing are enabled (EC JRC 
2015a). 
Lack of transparency regarding standard-essential patents (SEPs): Efficient SEP licensing is restrained 
by the lack of transparency on SEPs regarding patent´s information, its scope, validity, ownership, 
and enforceability. Regarding subsequent owners of SEP, there is a lack of information since 
subsequent owners are not obliged to declare patent as essential, as only the initial patent owner in 
the case of licensing on FRAND terms has to. In addition, there is an absence of concrete licensing 
practices of SEPs. An inefficient licensing of SEPs affects standards and thus obstructs their economic 
and societal benefits.  
The rules adopted by SSO to improve transparency on SEPs, such as an ex ante disclosure of SEPs 
and the databases on these disclosures have constraints such as patent declarations missing details, 
e.g. of validity, essentiality, and up-to-datedness of their legal status (ECSIP 2014).  
Polarization on the debate of the fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory licensing terms (FRAND): 
There is a lack of clarity on the definition of FRAND ECSIP (2014). The specifications of what 
comprises FRAND is not determined by the IPR policies of SSOs. Rather, are these left to the bilateral 
negotiation or the courts. The outcome of bilateral FRAND negotiations are determined by factors 
that are unclear and consequently, have to be studied in more detail. In addition, the absence of 
relevant and solid empirical evidence on royalty stacking and hold-up problems related to SEPs 
makes the debate on FRAND merely theoretical (EC JRC 2015a).  
The role of patents in cumulativeness innovation: Patents seem to have difficulties creating solid 
innovation incentives in industries based on high cumulative innovation such as in ICT. Patent 
protection might increase the cost of developing work from existing ones because of the various 
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permissions the follow-on creators have to obtain. In addition, these inventors might face hold-up 
problems EC JRC (2015b). 
SMEs and the patent system: The use of the patent system by SMEs is not fully exploited. This is due 
to the high cost of the procedures, such as pre-grant costs and patent attorney fees, which are a 
barrier for the products and services of the SMEs and start-ups attempting to enter the market. In 
addition, most of the SMEs do not see the benefit of using the patent system, do not have the 
required expertise to use it and lack the necessary finance to legally protect their patents and to 
tackle possible infringing activities by other ‘larger’ companies EC (2015), EC (2016). The few SMEs 
that use the patent system mostly stay local and do not dare go international, for instance by 
registering EU trademarks (EC 2016). 
High transaction costs: The transactions costs are costs related to a) search and information (over 
the patentability of a technology and/or relating licensee costs); b) bargaining and contracting 
(including negotiation); and c) policing and enforcement (control processes, such as payments and 
conditions of contract met) (ECSIP 2014). For the ICT sector, the costs are even higher in the 
searching stage, due to the large number of patents that are required to be assessed by companies 
to avoid infringement (EC 2015a). The transaction costs are increased by market failures such as 
information shortage, information asymmetry, and abuse of market power as well as by the 
opportunistic behavior from patent owners ECSIP (2014). 
2.4.1.2 Identified problems regarding enforcing and implementing patents 
High litigation rates: The high litigation rates are caused by various factors, such as lack of 
transparency in the patent system, opportunistic business behavior; unclear conditions of FRAND 
and its transfer conditions (change of SEP owner); litigation PAEs. In addition, the increase in the 
number of patents in the ICT sector is causing an increase in the number of legal battles regarding 
patent validity and infringement. In the US, software-related patents were involved in 50 % of the 
lawsuits between 2007-2011 (GAO (2013) in EC JRC (2015b)).  
Royalty stacking: Royalty stacking is a constellation when royalties are stacked, one on top of 
another. It occurs when a single product contains multiple patents, and each patent owner, in 
particular of SEPs, sets a high individual royalty to the licensee without considering the other 
royalties that also needs to be paid by the licensee to the other patent owners in order to 
commercialize a product (ECSIP 2014). In theory, the cumulative payable royalties discourage new 
investments in R&D hampering innovation as a whole (EPO 2007), but sound empirical evidence is 
missing.  
Patent thickets: Patent thickets are defined as an overlapping set of patent rights, which requires 
innovators to reach licensing deals for multiple patents from multiple sources. They often lead to 
hold-up or even royalty stacking. Companies are motivated to use their patents as bargaining tools 
and to increase the number of patents they hold, thus increasing the number of patent filings (EPO 
2007). 
Thickets place barriers in searching for prior art, which causes a decreasing in the quality of patents 
granted by patent and offices. Patent thickets are often seen in the ICT sector and often harm the 
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and companies that need to in-license technologies (EC JRC 
2015b). 
Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs) and patent pools seek to cope with patent thickets through 
the adoption of IPR policies to regulate the licensing of the relevant patents. However, controversies 
on these IPR policies exist. For instance, the royalties of the Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory 
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licensing terms (FRAND), which are adopted by various SSO, need to improve its definition of fair and 
reasonable to improve the transparency of the royalties (EC JRC 2015b). 
Disruptive or litigious activities of Patent Assertion Entities (PAE): PAEs are the most controversial 
type of patent intermediaries (EC JRC 2015b). They are considered as businesses that collect third 
parties´ patents and try to obtain benefits (revenues) against alleged infringers (FTC 2016). They 
strategically concentrate on high-tech patents, especially of companies in the ICT industry, and hold 
large portfolios, often containing hundreds or thousands of patents (FTC 2016). An increasing 
number of patent lawsuits are due to PAE ‘patent trolls’, counting for three out of four of 
accusations of infringing a PAE patent in the UK (Helmers et al. (2013) in EC JCR (2015b)). PAEs 
assertions target primarily the more vulnerable and often lower segment of the supply chain such as 
telecom operators EC JRC (2016). Also known as ‘patent trolls’ are patent holders who attempt to 
obtain profits from patent infringers far beyond the actual value of the patent, and often do not 
manufacture or produce any product or service based on the owned patents. PAE focused on ex post 
patent transactions target businesses that already (alleged) use within their products the patented 
technologies (FTC 2016).    
The uncertain usability of patent bundles in the ICT sector: Patent bundles are thought to be used in 
order to exploit the aggregated value driven by cost and the market. However, it is unclear how ICT 
companies can mix the different IPRs: patents, copyright, and trademarks in an effective manner (EC 
JCR 2015b). 
SEPs problems: Standards based on patents could present favorable circumstances for the rise of 
opportunistic business behaviors from SEPs. In the last years, the number of SEPs has increased 
primarily as a consequence of the increased number of patented technologies that are included in 
standards, and of the patents declared as SEPs. The rise in the number of patents declared as SEPs 
are part of the strategic behavior of companies in owning as many SEP as possible. This strategic 
behavior leads to over- disclosure and over-inclusion of patented technology in standards (ECSIP 
2014). Some of the opportunistic business behaviors from SEPs include: patent ambushes and 
submarining, hold-up and reverse hold-up, categorical discrimination against new entrants, 
unsolicited bundling of SEPs with other patents. 
 Patent ambushes and submarining: It happens during the standardization development 
process, when standardizers are not aware of patented technology being included into the 
standard under development. For instance, when a participant does not reveal in advance 
the information on a current/or future ownership of a patent that is relevant to the standard 
in question. This information would be only revealed after the standard has been adopted, 
threatening the implementation of the standard and creating the risk of negotiating licenses 
under unfair conditions. 
 Patent hold-up:  Patent hold-up happens ex post, when patent holders have a greater 
bargaining power over implementers who have at that point used resources specific to the 
questioned patent. The patent holders use its advantageous position to set high and many 
times unreasonable royalties (ECSIP 2014). The high royalty is also set to cover the possibility 
of the licensing negotiation failing due to an accusation of patent infringement e.g. as 
‘patent trolls‘ and ‘patent privateers‘, and the subsequent injunction. In addition, patent 
owners have the power to discriminate between licensees. In the context of standards, firms 
manufacturing standard-compliant products run the risk of implementing standards 
involving intellectual property rights (hence hold-up). In addition, a distortion of the market 
could occur due to the categorical discrimination. For instance, the patent owner could 
discriminate against new entrants, established manufacturers, or parties not holding SEPs. 
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 Patent reverse hold-up: In this case, the implementer has a greater bargaining power over 
patent holders during licensing negotiations. Thus, the royalties received by patent holders 
could be reduced to a rate lower than the value of the patent (CRA 2016). 
2.4.2 Identified solutions 
2.4.2.1 Identified solutions patent application and granting 
 
Quality of patents: Patent quality should have appropriate policies and examination procedures in 
the patent offices to discourage trivial, insufficient or underdeveloped patent applications (EC JRC 
2015a). The patent system requires a harmonized approach to high-quality patents through a set of 
examination criteria for patents applications (EC JRC 2015a). The measures to be taken in order to 
improve patent quality should be cost efficient and should not extend the patent procedure (EC 
2015a). The following actions EC JRC (2016) are suggested in order to limit large-scale assertion of 
low quality patents: to ensure that the standards maintained in patent granting procedures are also 
of the highest quality by continuously promoting effective ways of conducting prior art search that 
fully utilizes technological advancements, and to use patent fees as a market-based mechanism 
which acts as a screening device to “raise the quality bar”. 
Improvements in the transparency of patent availability and ownership: In order to increase 
transparency in the patent market, the patent offices should consider the possibility of requesting 
the registration of patent ownership and changes in ownership (EC 2015a). Transparency related to 
SEPs would be improved through different measures (CRA 2016) such as developing random 
independent tests of essentiality, making public the royalty rates determined through arbitration, 
forbid unilaterally imposed confidentiality clauses by one of the contracting parties, and making ex 
post specific declarations in order to link those relevant parts of the standard to the families of 
declared patent.  
Augmented patent databases: The patent database could be augmented with a ‘crawler-based’ 
approach, in which content would be automatically generated and presented into a unified format, 
and additional functionalities such as inter alia alerts, links, and the grouping of patents would be 
added (ECSIP 2014). 
Crowd-sourced validity checks: The costs of validity checks could be reduced for instance, by 
incentivizing the larger expert community to perform these checks (ECSIP 2014). 
Improvement of the measures to support the use of patents by Start-ups and SMEs: For the case of 
Europe, some of the possible improvements suggested by the European Commission (EC 2016) are: 
Streamlining European IPR awareness schemes for SMEs and providing a cooperation platform for 
Member States; Developing an EU IPR mediation and arbitration network for SMEs; Encouraging the 
creation of European-level insurance schemes for litigation and IP theft, building on a common IP 
valuation method; Improving coordination of IPR support funding schemes, including by means of a 
possible guidance to Member States and by developing monitoring methods their impact; and 
Improving and developing IPR pre-diagnosis services, so SMEs can include IPR in their business 
strategy.  
2.4.2.2 Identified solutions related to enforcing and implementing patents 
Patent pools: Patent pools aim at mitigating transaction costs, avoid royalty stacking, improve 
market transparency, speed-up the access to technologies, offering non-discriminatory and equal 
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access to all potential licensees. They are perceived as licensing model that successfully allows the 
arrangement for patent collaboration and benefits the patent market as a whole (ECSIP 2014). 
Technology transfer in the ICT field could be further facilitated if relevant benchmarks are drawn 
from examples of efficient patent pooling and their effects on patenting incentives (EC JCR 2015a). 
For the case of SEPs, patents pools could be improved by strengthening the relationship between 
SSOs and pools; creating incentives to attract the participation of SEP holders in patent pools; 
encouraging the participation in patent pools of other institutions e.g. universities and SMEs (EC JRC 
2015b). 
Patent supermarkets: Patent supermarkets are a way to facilitate patent licensing. Patent 
supermarkets standardize the way in which patents are offered and enable an easy choice of what to 
license (ECSIP 2014). Patent supermarkets are similar to patent pools in the sense that they are 
based on multiparty agreements, and they serve as ‘agents’ between licensees and patent owners. 
However, in patent supermarkets mainly individual patents chosen by the licensees instead of 
patent packages offered by the patent owners are marketed. 
Clearing houses: Clearing houses are usually two-sided markets that attract licensors and allow them 
to identify potential licensees. According to Van Zimmeren et al. (2006) in ECSIP (2014), there are 
different types of clearing houses classified by means of the service they offer. Firstly, Information 
clearing house, which is the basic concept offering access to (protected) information, like a database. 
Secondly, technology exchange clearing house, which adds to the database service a platform for 
negotiation between licensors and licenses. Thirdly, open access clearing house, which offers access 
and use on open access royalty-free basis. Fourthly, royalty collection clearing house, which offers a 
access and use of standardized licenses, royalty collection, monitoring of the patent rights transfer 
to clearing houses, independent dispute resolution mechanisms ECSIP (2014). 
To minimize the legal uncertainty to minimize PAEs questionable activities: Some PAEs take 
advantage of the legal uncertainty of the system, thus minimizing these uncertainties by directing 
the policies towards this objective, will reduce these behaviors from PAEs. As suggested by the ‘EC 
JRC (2016) Patent Assertion Entities in Europe report’, this can be achieved by increasing patent 
ownership transparency. This ensures that the UPC courts strive for the highest quality, supported 
by highly technical, specialized judges who have substantial experience in the subject matter, and 
increasing the clarity of FRAND licensing commitment for SEPs. 
Improvements to SEP: The role of SEPs could be improved if relevant and solid empirical evidence on 
the licensing of SEPs is produced and there is a further support from SSOs, policymakers, and/or the 
companies involved in the standards setting and in the licensing of SEP (EC JRC 2015a). Additional 
improvements regarding SEPs issues are: 
 Improvements to the patent declaration system for SEP: Improvements to the patent 
declaration system for SEP could be done by updating key events of patent declarations, 
such as the standard´s adoption, SEP´s granting, SEP´s invalidation or expiry, ownership 
transfer; more precise and informative patent declaration, such as information to 
substantiate essentiality; routine checking of essentiality of declared patents; adding of 
information on licensing in SSO database; restricting usage of blanket disclosures; notifying 
transfer of SEP ownership; linking the databases SSOs and patent offices; improvement in 
the efficacy of the SSO databases in a cost efficient manner; and improvement in the access 
to prior art material by patent examiners (ECSIP 2014).  
 Concrete licensing practices of SEPs: The study and definition of concrete licensing practices 
of SEPs and their impact on the transparency of patent markets, competition, and 
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innovation in the field of ICT in Europe will help to avoid difficulties on SEP-licensing 
negotiations and the resulting litigation (ECSIP 2014). 
 Efficient dispute resolution mechanisms for SEP: Some possible efficient mechanisms to 
resolve disputes are arbitration, mediation, "med-arb", and mini-trials (ECSIP 2014).  
 Clear commitments in case of transfer of SEP ownership: Subsequent owners of SEPs could 
be bound to declare the patent by re-defining the FRAND commitments, in a way to bind the 
subsequent owners of SEPs to the initial FRAND commitments, to tie the commitments to 
license SEPs on a reasonable and non-exclusive basis to the patent itself by using a License-
of-Right system (ECSIP 2014).  
 SEPs and FRAND: The FRAND commitments aim at tackling the hold-up issue and even at 
alleviating the royalty-stacking problem (CRA 2016). Clarifying FRAND royalty rate and 
royalty base would benefit negotiating parties as well as adjudicators. Some improvement 
proposed are: “The royalty rate could be defined in relation to its economic value, its ex ante 
value before standard adoption or the incremental value over competing technologies; The 
royalty base could refer to the final product or to the component implementing the patent 
and the related question on the step in the value chain where licensing occurs.” (EC 2014). 
 Royalty-stacking clauses: Improvement of the royalty-stacking clauses for patent licensee on 
the first license agreement, in which it states that the royalties payable by the licensee 
under the first license agreement are to be reduced in the case of further royalty payment to 
other patent owners. 
 Improvement of the guidance on the inclusion of patented technologies: For those adopting 
standards, a better guidance on the inclusion of patented technologies in their respective 
standard could help to lower the number of SEPs and to increases the quality of the 
remaining SEPs. The benefits of better guidance could be an increase in the number of 
innovators eager to engage in R&D, a reduction of unnecessary costs associated with over-
inclusion of technologies and complexity of standards such as royalties, a better promotion 
of the standard, a reduction of costs associated with oligopolistic competition in the 
upstream market for necessary technologies (ECSIP 2014). 
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2.5 FUTURE TRENDS 
The uncertain future development of the IPR system has been addressed in a number of studies. In 
this part, a summary of the most relevant foresight studies is presented.  
In 2001, Halbert (2001) predicted three possible future scenarios for the IPR system (in 2025). The 
first scenario is the ‘Chinese and Indian Hegemony – the Rise of the East’. Here, Asia specifically 
China and India rises as a hegemonic force in IPR and technology, due to their already strategic 
position as the world´s technology manufacturers. The second scenario ‘When Corporations Rule the 
World – Globalization and Western Hegemony’ is when the power of IPR is retained by multilateral 
corporations and their Western hosts. The third scenario ‘The Open Source Revolution and the 
Demise of Intellectual Property’ is in which exchange is done in a more democratic way and the 
public good is placed over the private. In this scenario, the creative work is protected by sharing 
another alternative protection system to the property ownership systems. For Halbert (2001), the 
third scenario is the most desired one, because through collaborative models the centralization of 
IPR assets and the IPR ownership by few ones are avoided. The open source movement is taken as 
an example of this scenario. Halbert (2001) also calls out for an active participation of the people to 
create alternatives to the current IPR system, in order to prevent perhaps a less favorable future 
scenario in which the IPR rules the world.  
Six years after the study by Halbert (2001), one of the most relevant foresight studies was published: 
“The EPO (2007): Scenarios for the Future”. The study outlined the key factors and significant 
challenges anticipated by experts that are likely to influence the future of patenting and IPR at the 
global level. The study describes the evolvement of the IPR regime by 2025 in four scenarios. These 
four hypothetical scenarios are the result of the influence of five driving forces identified as the most 
important trends affecting the IPR system. The IPR system is described as being impacted by multiple 
strains such as political, economic, societal, environmental, technological and historical 
developments, over which there is no control from stakeholders nor IPR protectors. The five 
identified driving forces are ‘power’, ‘global jungle’, ‘rate of change’, ‘systemic risks’, and ‘knowledge 
paradox’.  
The ‘power’ refers to the redefinition of power caused by globalization. New powers are built from 
alliances across national boundaries like multinational corporations, civil society organizations and 
global networks of political and special interest movements, regional trade blocs etc., which 
challenge the traditional governments´ power.  
The ‘global jungle’ is characterized by competition among countries, regions, global companies, 
markets and workforces, business and universities etc. caused by the faster pace of change and 
economies of scale resulting from globalization. In this scenario, it is difficult to predict which of 
these players will survive and for how long.   
The ‘rate of change’ has to do with the growing divide of rates of change between global economic 
markets, technology, political cycles, which are short-term, and those of legal institutions such as the 
IPR system, human psychology, and the environment, which are long term. This divide challenges 
the interaction of these areas and the institution´s capability to cope with the rapid rates of change.   
The ‘systemic risk’ is about the high dependence of today´s humanity ‘a global society’, on complex 
natural and man-made systems. Those risks have turned from traditional natural hazards to complex 
systemic risks, in which the tipping points threatening them are unknown.  
The ‘knowledge paradox’ refers to the paradox that today´s information society places by facilitating 
the access to information, thus increasing the knowledge acquisition. Thus, the ability of the patent 
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system to remain as the framework to protect and exploit knowledge is jeopardized by the search of 
new cheaper and faster methods.     
These five forces are driving the IPR world, and depending on how each of these forces evolves, the 
future direction of the IPR world will be shaped, creating each a different scenario. The EPO (2007) 
investigated four of these possible scenarios: ‘Market rules’; ‘Who´s game?’ ‘Three of knowledge’; 
‘Blue skies’.  
‘Market rules’ concerns the world where business is the dominant driver. Multinational corporations 
build powerful patent portfolios containing key technologies enabled by new patentable subject 
matters and services, they also enforce the use of patents, and patents become financial assets.  
‘Who´s game?’ refers to the world where geopolitics is the dominant driver. The place of current 
dominant players in the developed world is taken by new entrants from the developing world, due 
to the insufficiency of the established ones in using IPR to keep their technological superiority and 
the ability of the new ones in implementing new methods to shape the evolution of the system.     
‘Three of knowledge’ is about the world where society is the dominant driver. The IPR system is 
defeated by social movements such as the ‘access to knowledge movement’. The main challenge is 
to be able to acknowledge the legitimacy of a certain reward for innovation while ensuring that 
knowledge remains a common good 
‘Blue skies’ refers to the world where technology is the dominant driver. The society´s dependency 
on technology and growing systemic risks force the IPR system to change from its one-size-fits-all 
model to a customized model, which considers the specific needs of these new technologies, and 
others for the classic technologies.  
These four potential future scenarios for the IPR system are complex and they show the uncertainty 
surrounding the future of the IPR system, which will be the consequence of the decisions made 
today by governments, business and societies.     
A more recent study is Lemley (2015) called “IP in a World without Scarcity”. The author argues that 
the current world is a world of scarcity “Economics is based on scarcity. Things are valuable because 
they are scarce. The more abundant they become, the cheaper they become.” (Lemley 2015, p.461). 
Moreover, that “The IP laws were created in a world of scarcity. They sought to take ideas that were 
public goods—things that by their nature were not scarce—and artificially make them scarce by 
designating them as owned by someone” (Lemley 2015, p.504). 
The author analyses IPR in a post-scarcity world. For instance, in this world, high-
cost products will be the exception and cheap or free goods the norm. IPR-driven content will be 
limited compared to the vast number of content created without IPR. This world will require a 
rethinking and reshaping of the economy as a whole. In a post-scarcity economy, IPR will still exist 
but not as the main driver of innovation and creation.  
These arguments are based on recent technological development, especially ICT technologies, which 
are allowing the reproduction of scarce goods in inexpensive ways. For instance, the internet has 
allowed for free or for a low-cost, the production and distribution of information content across 
borders.  
For the case of information, the traditional IPR system is imperfect. The Internet has shown that 
openness and accessibility drive innovation and creativity, which undermines the classic theory 
behind IPR rights. In addition, the traditional economic theory of goods was thought for things that 
consume resources, and are tangible and unique. However, since information consumes few 
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resources, is not tangible and can be reproduced many times and used by many at the same time. Its 
scarcity is artificially set by IPR.  However, the IPR are strong in those technologies that are 
expensive to produce but cheap to copy. 
The government as a form to regulate market entry and market prices uses the IPR. However, similar 
to the last century´s economic markets, the IPR system might go through a ‘deregulation’ of the 
market, i.e. the ‘free market’, that might allow the market to grow without necessarily losing 
completely the control of the market, thus allowing the post-scarcity world to develop. 
A summary of the potential future scenarios is presented in Table 2. 
Table 2 Future scenarios of the IPR system 
 Geopolitics rules Business rules Society/openness 
rules 
Technology rules 
Halbert (2001)  ‘Chinese and Indian 
Hegemony – the 
Rise of the East’. 
Here Asia 
specifically China 
and India rise as a 
hegemonic force in 
IPR and technology.   
  
  
 
‘When 
Corporations Rule 
the World  
 
The Open Source 
Revolution and the 
Demise of 
Intellectual 
Property’ is in 
which exchange is 
done in a more 
democratic way 
and the public good 
is placed over the 
private. 
 
EPO (2007): 
Scenarios for the 
Future 
Who´s game? refers 
to a world where 
geopolitics is the 
dominant driver.  
 
Market rules refers 
to a world where 
business is the 
dominant driver.  
 
Three of 
knowledge, refers 
to a world where 
society is the 
dominant driver.  
 
Blue skies, refers to 
a world where 
technology is the 
dominant driver.  
 
Lemley (2015) IP in 
a World without 
Scarcity 
  In a post-scarcity 
world, high-
cost products will t
urn out to be the 
exception and the 
cheap or free will 
be the norm. IP-
driven content will 
be few compared 
to the vast number 
of content created 
without IP. This 
world will require a 
rethinking and 
reshaping of the 
economy as a 
whole. In a post-
scarcity economy 
IPR will still exist 
but not as a main 
driver of innovation 
and creation.  
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3 EXPERT INTERVIEWS AND FOCUS GROUPS 
3.1 METHODOLOGY 
The structure of the guideline for the expert interviews and the focus groups have been derived 
from the literature review of WP2, but also from the insights of D3.1 of WP3 and in particularly the 
findings from the foresight and impact studies summarized in Chapter 2. 
The identification of stakeholders for the interviews is not only guided by the value chain of ICT 
ranging from research to services, but also from the requirement to involve a broad range of 
stakeholders to identify and analyse ethical issues, like proposed by Oppenheimer et al. (2015) for 
analyzing ethical issues of IPR in pharmaceuticals and Stahl et al. (2017) for emerging ICT 
technologies in the context of Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI).  
Finally, for the interviews, we contacted more than  70 stakeholders by email or telephone, which 
eventually led to  34 interviews performed between March 17 2017 and May 8 2017 lasting between 
thirty minutes to two hours including three written statements. These included companies operating 
in a number of different ICT fields, representatives of public and private organizations and 
academics. The experts were approached as a result of contacts with Telefónica and Fraunhofer.  
Two focus groups sessions were performed. One focus group took place with more than 20 
participants of the ‘Fair Standards Alliance’ in the context of one of their regular meetings with in 
Brussels in the afternoon March 15 2017 lasting around one hour. Due to confidentiality reasons, the 
participants did not allow the recording of the meeting. The other focus with five ‘Open Sources’ 
experts was organized in Berlin at the premises of Fraunhofer FOKUS in the afternoon of April 4 2017 
lasting almost three hours. It was also recorded. 
Table 3 summarizes the composition of respondents, which were interviewed. The interviews took 
place via telephone or by Skype. They followed a semi-open format (see Annex 2). Interviewees 
were first asked to assess the relevance of patents for ICT in general, and then to mention what they 
saw as the most important challenges faced by ICT patents. Finally, the interviewer presented  policy 
proposals that had been mentioned in previous studies and publications in order to collect the views 
of the experts.  
Table 3: Interviewed Types of Organizations and Number of Interviews 
DGs of the European Commission 3 
Research  organizations  2 
IPR Support Services  2 
Patent offices  2 
ICT patent owning companies  6 
Telecom operators  2 
Other ICT patent implementing companies  2 
Patent pools  3 
Academic experts  2 
Open Source Software (OSS) ecosystem  3 
SME organizations 2 
Patent attorneys  2 
Consumer organization 1 
OECD 2 
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The analyses of the results of the interviews are presented in an absolute confidential manner, 
because almost no interviewees wanted to disclose their names or even the specific organization 
they are working for in this report. Due to confidentiality reasons, it was also not possible to record 
the interviews, i.e. only summaries of the interviews are used to produce the following summary of 
the interviews. As an explicit disclaimer, it has to be noted that the following statements are not 
representing the individual or collective views of the CIFRA consortium partners, being the 
Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft, Telefónica Investigación y Desarrollo SA, Universita Commerciale Luigi 
Bocconi or Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. These individual expressions or any propositions 
included herein are without prejudice to the recognized state of the law and binding international 
and intergovernmental treaties and norms. 
3.2 IDENTIFIED CHALLENGES 
3.2.1 Effectiveness of the patent system 
The assessment of the interviewees related to the general effectiveness and efficiency of the patent 
system for ICT is highly dependent on the stakeholder group they belong to. The majority of the 
stakeholder groups view the role of patents positively in terms of promoting innovation in ICT, 
especially for ICT hardware, which is not different to any other hardware.  In contrast to traditional 
utility models, ICT patents are used not only as a tool for protection but also to ensure that the 
inventor receives just compensation. 
 Patent owners or organizations commercializing patents without producing products claim that 
patents can be used by anybody without giving anybody a specific advantage. This perspective is not 
shared by organisations representing small and medium sized companies (SMEs). The companies 
owning patents claim that patents play an even more important role in telecommunications, 
because they provide even stronger incentives for investments in research and developments, 
especially in relation to standards. However, it is also pointed out – especially be the implementers – 
which the interests and rights held by the inventors and the implementers should be balanced. 
Furthermore, the increasing division of labour between technology developers and implementers 
increases the relevance of patents as bartering chips. Furthermore, patents should also ensure that 
they are an effective source for the sharing of knowledge about innovation.  
In comparison to other protection instruments, e.g. utility models, the strength of patents is 
mentioned as advantage. However, the limited protection period of twenty years is perceived as 
more appropriate as the much longer protection period of copyright for software. 
In contrast to the in general positive assessment of patents in ICT-related technologies 
acknowledging the critical perceptions, the members of the open source community in addition to 
the SME representative are very critical about the effectiveness of patents for ICT-related 
technologies. The main argument is the existence and effectiveness of copyright as a protection 
instrument related to software, which itself is becoming more and more important for ICT in general. 
Furthermore, patents in ICT are increasingly misused for legal and commercial disputes, which also 
explains their growing number. Besides this vicious circle, patents on software are – due to the 
missing code – not able to disclose details about the inventions, but only performance criteria. 
Finally, abolishing patents for ICT-related technologies would solve all possible conflicts with open 
source software.   
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3.2.2 Functions of ICT patents 
3.2.2.1 Preventing imitation of inventions 
The majority of stakeholders supporting patents in ICT highlight their function to prevent imitation 
of inventions, which allows inventors and investors to secure revenue from their efforts and 
investments. Without the existence of patents, companies owning patents would not have sufficient 
incentives to invest in R&D. Despite the expectation, that patent protected technologies will be 
outdated rather early in technologically dynamic environments, they argue that short product cycles 
require even more patents to re-appropriate their investments into R&D.    
3.2.2.2 Securing own freedom to operate  
In contrast to the protection function, only very few interviewees mention that ICT patents are also 
used to secure companies’ freedom to operate, i.e. preventing the risk of infringements or litigations 
from third parties. Furthermore, patents are also in general not bought for defensive purposes.  
3.2.2.3 Blocking competitors 
In line with the limited defensive use, only one interviewee mentions that patents are used for 
blocking competitors. However, the representatives of the OSS community perceive patents as 
barriers for their innovation activities. 
3.2.2.4 Knowledge sharing function  
As intended by the system, patents should reveal also the content of the inventions. However, the 
information revealing power of patents does not obviously play a very significant role related to ICT 
patents, because any expert does not mention it.   
3.2.2.5 Assets in negotiations  
Whereas patents are neither used for defensive nor offensive purposes, at least some interviewees 
mention the role of patents as barter chips in negotiations in general, but also for cross licensing in 
particular. 
3.2.2.6 Generating licensing revenues  
The role of ICT patents to generate licensing revenues is perceived in general as rather limited, 
because the market for licensing has – despite the high expectations in markets for technologies, the 
reduction of transaction costs as a result of  platforms  – not yet very well developed. However, very 
few companies are focusing their business models on generating licensing revenues. Furthermore, 
linking patents to ICT standards is obviously promising and a successful strategy for some 
companies. However, it is also criticized that the effort of integrating patented technologies into 
standards is rather high and wasting many resources.  
3.2.2.7 Enhancing reputation, measuring performance and rewarding employees 
Finally, the interviewees do not mention the role of ICT patents to promote the reputation of the 
company or even of the single inventor. Consequently, patents in ICT are not used to measure their 
performance or as basis for rewarding inventors.   
3.2.3 Challenges for ICT patents regarding patent application and granting 
3.2.3.1 Technological dynamics in the ICT sector 
Despite the higher dynamics in the ICT technologies and markets, patents are still a very attractive 
instrument for companies. This is not only supported by the high and still increasing number of 
patent applications, but also by the fact that many of them are renewed to the maximum protection 
period and even further prolonged via follow-up patents. These phenomena also reflect the intensity 
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of competition in the ICT sector. However, critical voices question the effectiveness of patents if they 
are valid for only a few years due to very dynamic technological progress. Here, already concerns 
related to the lengthy processes in the patent offices are raised which often lead to a final grant 
decision after half of the protection period has passed. 
3.2.3.2 Technological convergence and fragmentation in the ICT sector 
The pervasiveness of ICT technologies is increasing and ICT companies invest in R&D in other areas, 
as companies outside the ICT sector increasingly invest in ICT technologies. Consequently, the 
complexity of technologies and the related patents increase in contrast to the past, where one or 
very few patents could be attributed to a single product, such as in the pharmaceutical industry. 
Furthermore, the accumulation of technologies or consequential innovation is a further raising 
phenomenon, which requires the coordination between the owners of past and developers of new 
technologies. Especially, the role of interoperability is increasing significantly and expected to 
become more relevant with the Internet of Things.  The fragmentation in the ICT sector and the 
patent landscape is perceived of being ambivalent. On the one hand, only a few large companies are 
responsible for the majority of patents, which is an indication that for them patents are still a very 
attractive tool. On the other hand, many small companies and start-ups own very few or even no 
patents at all. Besides this dichotomy the traditional closed innovation paradigm and their strong 
focus on proprietary strategies by making use of patents is confronted with both new paradigms of 
open innovation and other collaborative and sharing forms of innovation, including open source.  
Overall, the increasing complexity of ICT technologies including a further increasing number of 
patents and the progressing dynamics in ICT technologies is challenging the existing system and 
require more integrative and flexible solutions. 
3.2.3.3 Consideration of prior art in patent examination practices 
Both the increasing number of patents and the progressing dynamics of the technological change in 
ICT technologies are assumed to challenge the patent examination, because it may not adequately 
address the relevant existing prior art. However, the interviewees do not address this challenge. 
Very few request more time for prior art searches to avoid trivial patents. It is also pointed out that 
the quality of the examination process at the EPO (European Patent Office) is higher compared to 
that of the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). The representatives of the OSS community 
question in general the feasibility of an effective prior art search in software.  
3.2.3.4 Cost for applying for ICT patents   
The cost for applying patents in ICT related technologies is for the majority of the interviewees not 
perceived to be a problem. Although the costs for large companies are quite high, they have 
resources reserved for these expenses. However, the follow-up cost, e.g. for translations, are critical. 
Finally, SMEs and single inventors might have problems with the high application costs. 
Nevertheless, a certain threshold might prohibit a larger number of trivial patents. 
3.2.3.5 Speed of the granting process for ICT patents   
Whereas the application costs are in general not perceived as a problem, the granting process for 
ICT patents is obviously more complex and faces a trade-off. On the one hand, according to the 
patent owning companies the technological dynamics is challenging the speed of the granting 
process at the patent offices. On the other hand, speeding up the granting decision is challenging the 
quality of the granted patents, which is also in the interest of the patent holder. Consequently, 
pushing towards a reduction of the period between initially applying for and eventually granting a 
patent within the framework of the available resources is not supported. However, delayed granting 
processes limit the opportunities to commercialize patents, especially via licensing. Finally, courts 
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might be able to correct inappropriately granted patents due to accelerated processes.  It is also 
argued that patent offices offer fast track procedures, which are rarely used by the applicants. 
Consequently, the speed of the granting process is obviously not really a problem, in particular in the 
examination phase. In addition, companies make use of various options, like amendments, to delay 
the final decision or to withdraw their applications at all.  
3.2.3.6 Language of ICT patents as a source of information  
The language of ICT patents is perceived as problematic for the majority of the interviewees. Again, 
there is on the one hand a tension between the interest of the applicant of keeping the claims as 
generic as possible and the examiners objective to reach a high level of concreteness. On the other 
hand, inventors are not interested to disclose too many details, which is a counter force to language 
profusion in patent applications. In general, a specific expertise is needed to read and understand 
patents, especially since a common terminology is missing, which is a special problem of Standard-
Essential-Patents SEPs. In addition, it is mentioned – in particular by the representatives of the OSS 
community – that the descriptions in patents are insufficient to understand the technology to be 
protected, which requires a direct interaction with the inventor. Finally, there is a tension between 
the engineers drafting the technical content of patents and patent attorneys translating them into 
legally effective documents. 
However, drafting and reading patents is the profession of a whole community of experts, who are 
especially trained and experienced.   
3.2.3.7 Quality of granted ICT patents granted  
The quality of ICT patents is the most intensively debated topic among the interviewees. The 
majority of the interviewees, especially representing patent implementers, complain about the 
quality of patents. There are several reasons for this. On the one hand, incremental innovations are 
dominating in ICT related technologies. On the other hand, the current state of the art is more 
difficult to identify the dynamic ICT technologies. In addition to the limited resources in patent 
examination in general, the examination of patents in ICT is challenged by the rapidly volume of 
literature defining prior art and the need to recur on additional sources of prior art, like standards 
and the minutes of standardization processes. Overall, the large share of invalid patents decided in 
court cases confirms the low quality of patents. However, it is also pointed that the patent offices 
alone cannot assure a high quality of patents and the courts have to play an important role as final 
decision.  
However, the majority of the interviewees also point to differences between patent offices. In 
general, the Europe Patent Office is granting patents of higher quality both compared to the USPTO, 
but also in relation to patent offices in Asia. Furthermore, the patent owners in particular observe a 
trend towards a higher patent quality, whereas others see even a deteriorating patent quality also 
generated by the further raising number of patent applications.    
3.2.3.8 The statutory patentability standards for ICT patents (e.g. technicality, etc.)  
The discussion about patenting of computer-implemented inventions or software patents is for the 
majority of the interviewees – with the exception of the representative of the open source software 
community – not any more intensively debated. However, since software is invading other areas of 
technologies, inclusive ICT hardware, the relevance of software patents is increasing. In general, 
there is the perception that it is still easier – despite some restrictive court decisions – to receive 
patents on software as such, but also for business patents in the USPTO, whereas in Europe software 
has to be embedded in technologies or suffice the criteria of technicality. The assessment of 
effectiveness of patents on software is ambivalent. Few voices remark that patents might not be 
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strong enough to protect software inventions effectively enough. However, it is widely agreed that 
patents should be awarded for innovative functions despite the in general incremental character of 
the innovations, whereas copyright should be used for the form.  
3.2.3.9 Protection period of twenty years  
The assessment of the adequate length of the protection period for ICT patents reveals a large 
variety of opinions. A relative majority supports the current maximum length of twenty years yet 
admit that this is not the first best choice. However, the technology-specific determination and 
implementation of the optimal patent protection period is not a real option due to many operational 
concerns and problems. Furthermore, the increasing renewal fees are a further instrument towards 
a first best solution. Nevertheless, interviewees representing patent owning and commercializing 
organizations argue even for a longer protection period due to the extended time from research to 
the final commercialization especially of hardware-based technologies. Few voices plead for the 
reduction of patent length to, for example, ten years for software-related inventions. In this context, 
the even longer protection period of copyright is also mentioned to be inadequate for software.  
3.2.3.10 The scope of granted ICT patents is too broad 
The scope of granted ICT patents is for the majority of the interviewees no problem at all or no 
specific ICT problem. However, the scope of patents granted in the US is obviously broader and 
perceived as more problematic compared to Europe. Furthermore, court decisions can correct for 
possibly too broad patents.  
3.2.3.11 Problems of patent protection due to Open Source licenses  
Open Source licenses are not mentioned to be a problem for patenting. 
3.2.4 Challenges for ICT patents regarding enforcing and implementing patents 
Moving to the problems after the granting of ICT patents, the costs and risks have to be considered. 
In general, only a few interviewees perceive a serious problem both for patent owners and for 
accused infringers. However, several interviewees point particularly to the relatively high costs for 
SMEs, which might explain their limited interest in using patents for protecting their inventions. 
Furthermore, there are significant differences in enforcement costs depending on the jurisdiction. In 
addition, high quality patents face lower enforcement costs and risks. Finally, their raise is also an 
expression of a high intensity of completion and the further development of markets of technology, 
e.g. via licensing and patent trade.    
3.2.4.1 Litigation (infringement) of ICT patents 
Parallel to the development of enforcement costs and risks related to ICT patents the likelihood of 
litigation or infringement should have been developed. Consequently, the ambivalence in the 
assessment observed related to the enforcement cost is reflected also in the statement of the 
interviewees related to litigation and infringement. On the one hand, several interviewees confirm 
an increase in litigation driven by the phenomenon of overlapping claims in ICT, but also due to 
many new entrants in the market confronted with infringement claims of incumbents. Again, the 
consequences for SMEs also as plaintiff are perceived as much more detrimental than for larger 
companies, especially in the US. Besides the general differentiation between large and small 
companies, the governance of the jurisdictions matter, i.e.  SMEs are disadvantaged if the plaintiffs 
have to bear their own costs irrespective of the outcome of the court case. Furthermore, the 
likelihood of winning an infringement case, i.e. issuing an injunction, is relevant for plaintiffs’ 
strategies. Consequently, interviewees point to the increasing number of litigations especially in 
Germany (DART-IP 2017) compared to rather stable of even decreasing numbers in the US. 
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Furthermore, the increase in litigation cases pushes the expectations related to licensing revenues, 
which make licensing negotiations more complicated and less likely to be successful. However, it is 
perceived by many interviewees that the majority of patent owning companies are not asserting 
their patents, because in some other constellations they are in the position of implementation 
others’ patents.   
3.2.4.2 Injunctions  
Following the issue of litigation, injunctions as one extreme outcome has been discussed. The 
majority of the interviewees perceive an increase in injunction requests, especially since the interest 
in compromise between patent owners and implementers has been reduced and the inclination 
towards confrontation has instead been increased due to stronger interests in commercializing 
instead of implementing patents. The increased complexity of technology and products would 
prevent the use of 100 patents within a product, if just the use of one patent were blocked via an 
injunction. Due to this large leverage effect of one injunction, the plaintiffs are interested in 
selecting the court with the highest likelihood of success and largest impact in case of success, which 
leads to kind of forum shopping including the initiation of multiple courts cases searching for 
injunctions. So far, public interest reasons have prevented so far injunctions on telecommunication 
networks. Moreover, injunctions tend to be more restricted for SEPs, due to the licensing 
commitments under the corresponding SDO IPR policy. However, some guidelines (Huawei vs. ZTE 
case) have been issued lately that rule the circumstances under which they are allowable even for 
SEPs. Some voices argue that, courts have to issue – if at all – ‘smart injunctions’ considering both 
the complexity of the technology, the public interests, e.g. in case of network technologies, and the 
proportionality related to the damages. Here, again the economic consequences of injunctions for 
SMEs are in general detrimental.  
The ambivalence of injunctions is further stressed by the governance of the patent system in few 
countries, i.e. the bifurcation of courts in which the issue of patent infringement and of patent 
validity are dealt with by different courts. The governance of the Unified Patent Court (UPC) does 
not rule out bifurcation, which is an attractive opportunity for Patent Assertion Entities, because 
infringement cases are dealt with in courts without a specific expertise.    
3.2.4.3 Expected legal cost for resolution of conflicts regarding ICT patents  
The expected legal cost are currently not an issue in Europe, because we have a culture of non-
litigation and costs are low in Europe. This might change in the future to the implications of the 
Unitary Patent Court. However, here the expectations diverge. Nevertheless, currently SMEs face 
already significant challenges, because they have not as much capacity as big enterprises for patent 
searches, risk management and legal defense.  
3.2.4.4 Legal uncertainty for companies creating or implementing ICT patents  
In general, the interviewees raise concerns about the increasing legal uncertainty they face in 
creating and implementing ICT patents. Aside from the aforementioned increasing complexity 
accompanied by a larger number of patents owned by many more different organizations with 
different business models, the upcoming UPC creates some additional dimension of uncertainty. 
However, there are some expectations that the guidelines produced by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in HUAWEI vs. ZTE case will provide some guidance for licensing negotiations. 
3.2.4.5 Licensors are not willing to license ICT patents covering their technologies (hold-up)  
Licensors and licensees might follow two rather extreme strategies in order to maximize their 
profits. Licensors may threaten licensees not willing to accept the requested licensing fees for their 
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patents with injunctive reliefs. This threat is especially credible, when the licensees have already 
made large investments based on the patented technologies or even implemented them in their 
products. The assessments of the interviewees related to hold-up are very diverging. On the one 
hand, the representatives of patent owners question its existence due to missing incentives and 
empirical evidence. On the other hand, patent implementers point to the relevance of hold-up, e.g. 
by being forced to license in large complete patent portfolios world-wide although they are only 
interested in a very few patents valid in specific jurisdictions. Furthermore, they complain that 
licensors are not willing to license their patents to all suppliers in complex value chains, but only to 
the producers of the final product. Furthermore, the hold-up problem gains in relevance by the entry 
of organizations following new business models, i.e. the pure commercialization of patents. This 
further differentiation of the value chain from technology development to implementation reduces 
the options for cross licensing and hence, most patent owners depend on technologies and patents 
of others and subsequently, their business models dissolves. There are further countervailing 
external factors influencing the likelihood of hold-up. The already mentioned likelihood of 
injunctions increases the negotiation power of patent owners especially related to hold-up. 
However, the further increase of the relevance of software will make opportunities to invent around 
the withheld patented technologies easier. This is also the case, when the protected technologies 
have a rather narrow scope.          
3.2.4.6 Implementers of ICT patents are not willing to licensing in the third-party ICT patents covering 
their implemented technologies (hold-out) 
On the opposing side of the assessments related to holdup is the perception of hold-out, i.e. 
implementers are not willing to license the external patents needed for producing their products in 
order to save licensing payments. Whereas the licensees observe hold-out only in single cases and 
argue that eventually, licensing fees will be paid for patents of high quality, the licensors however, 
perceive a serious problem. They argue that companies implementing technologies protected by 
patents owned by others do not face serious problems if they do not pay the requested license fees, 
even after agreeing on common licensing contracts.  Consequently, litigation occurs, which is 
challenging in case of potential infringers with large market power, because they might try to 
invalidate the relevant patents or buy patents as a counterbalance. Here again, SMEs implementing 
patented technologies are at a disadvantage. One solution, especially for SMEs owning patents, 
could be the formation of patent pools to reduce the likelihood of hold-out, because licensees face 
lower transaction costs and eventually lower accumulated licensing fees. Finally, both patent owners 
and implementers raise some expectations that the decision of the European Court of Justice (EJC) in 
the Huawei-ZTE case will provide some guidance in case of conflicts in order to avoid litigation and 
injunctions.    
3.2.4.7 Licensing agreements for standard-essential ICT patents (SEPs)  
The previously raised problems related to licensing are further exacerbated in case of standard-
essential patents. Due to the often missing opportunities to invent around or use an alternative to 
an established standard, the related patents give their owners a stronger market power. 
Consequently, hold-up of their owners has stronger implications for interested licensees. This 
increases the incentives of patent owners to invest in R&D close to existing and expecting standards, 
declare their patents to be standard-essential despite the restriction on agreeing to license them 
according to fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) conditions. Consequently, several 
problems arise. First, many patents are applied just before or during the standardization process and 
further changed via amendments. Consequently, the pool of patents relevant for the 
implementation of a standard is already very dynamic. Secondly, the declarations of patents being 
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essential are likely to be higher and made in a strategic manner in order to maximize the own share 
of a standardized technology, i.e. declarations are kept vague and made even after the publication of 
the standard. Since the pool of patents potentially relevant for a standard is dynamic and the patent 
owners behave very strategically in their declaring their essentiality, it is very challenging and costly 
to finally decide about their essentiality even after the publication of the final standard, because also 
the concrete implementation matters.  
Even after a possible agreement on the essential patents, their pricing is challenging, which is crucial 
for the diffusion of the technology and the related standards, but also for the incentives related to 
the future investments into R&D related to ICT standards. The question is whether there should be a 
royalty cap for the sum of all relevant patents, although price fixing might raise anti-trust concerns. 
Furthermore, it remains open whether the specific implementation of the standard should be taken 
into account, i.e. does it matter whether a standard is implemented in a mobile phone or in car, or 
the smallest tradable component should be the reference for the license. In the production of very 
complex products many suppliers are involved, which raises the question in which stage the licensing 
in of a standard should take place, i.e. more upstream, e.g. with the chipmaker, or more 
downstream in the production of the final product. Finally, changing business models and new 
business models, i.e. PAE, challenge the whole ecosystem, because of their strong interest in 
commercializing instead of implementing patents in final products, which increases their intention 
towards litigation with injunctions as possible outcomes. Further challenge will create the expansion 
of the Internet of Things.  
3.2.4.8 Pools of ICT patents  
Patent pools are often proposed as solution in case of complex technologies including many patents 
owned by a large group of owners. Firstly, pools reduce the transaction cost for implementers. 
Secondly, they increase transparency regarding licensing terms. Thirdly, they might tackle both the 
problem of over-declaration of SEPs via own essentiality checks and the problem of royalty stacking 
via reducing the problem of “double marginalization”. However, large manufacturers may be 
advantaged by pools, because SMEs have to pay higher rates per unit.  
However, the effectiveness of patent pools is challenged if companies owning large patent portfolios 
do not join. The majority of interviewees shares this limitation. It is even mentioned that large 
manufacturers are avoiding pools because of their market power. 
However, patent pools have been and are successful especially, for specific and often niche 
technologies. Nevertheless, the increasing complexity of technologies, especially in connection with 
the Internet of Things, and the entrance of new actors, e.g. the verticals, is challenging the function 
of patent pools in the future. However, a new organization called Avanci, “a new, open marketplace 
where those with essential wireless patents to share can license their innovations, and companies 
creating connected products for the Internet of Things can access the patented wireless 
technologies”, may be able to get all major patent owners on board. However, it is too early to 
speculate about the success of Avanci.  
Furthermore, concerns are raised that some patent pools might change towards patent assertion 
entities not hesitating to use injunctions to enforce their rights. This might happen if the participants 
have no own R&D and related patents anymore, because then the pressure of entering cross-
licensing deals with other entities is also not working. However, pools might be an option for SMEs 
without the necessary negotiation power to commercialize their technologies and enforce their 
rights effectively.  
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Implementers complain both about several pools to negotiate with and about already about high 
prices for pooled licenses, especially if they are referring to specific implementations, e.g. cars. 
Another idea raised is that the increasing number of licensees might set up and promote an 
implementers driven pool. In general, the future development of pools in ICT and their effectiveness 
to tackle the various challenges. 
3.2.4.9 Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs)  
New business models, like those of patent assertion entities (PAEs), challenge incumbents and the 
implementation of ICT related technologies. A general challenge is the definition of PAEs, which are 
divided in good ones fostering licensing for the re-appropriation of R&D investments and bad ones 
using the cost of litigations to push the price for licenses. Furthermore, they might also develop over 
time from a patent pool to a troll. On the one hand, a significant share of the interviewees complain 
that PAEs focus in their business on the commercialization of patents, but not necessarily on their 
implementation in innovative technologies and products. Both SMEs, but also incumbents are using 
PAEs to enforce their rights. Since the corrective of cross-licensing does not work anymore, because 
of the further differentiation of business models, PAEs are more likely to sue potential infringers in 
courts and to use injunction as further threats to strengthen their negotiation power. This strong 
position is also used to expand licensing contracts to whole patent portfolios often including high 
shares of patents of low value, which are at large not interesting for potential licensees. On the 
other hand, PAEs are also perceived as a phenomenon reacting to market efficiencies, like hold-out, 
and especially SMEs and technology providers may get their fair market share based on their 
investments in R&D due to the business activities of PAEs.    
The empirical relevance is ambivalent. PAEs are still much more relevant in the US confirmed by the 
number of court cases. However, recent developments show an increase of litigations driven by 
NPEs in Europe (e.g. Dart-IP 2017) and the governance of the UPC might increase the attractiveness 
of the EU for PAEs.  
3.2.4.10 Commercialization of technologies protected by ICT patents  
The commercialization of ICT technologies protected by patents is assessed quite ambivalent. On the 
one hand, the lower grant and opposition rates indicate a lower commercialization. On the other 
hand, the high and increasing numbers of patents and licensing activities present a high level of 
commercialization. However, the further division of labor between technology developer and 
implementors mean that the former are not necessarily use the technology they have developed 
and patented. Furthermore, patents have various functions. Besides the protection of technology 
from imitation, patents are also used – especially in ICT – for strategic reasons, e.g. securing freedom 
to operate or blocking competitors, which is an indirect form of commercialization.   
3.2.4.11 Patents on computer-implemented inventions (CII)   
The dispute related to patents on computer-implemented inventions (CII) in Europe, which already 
started in the last century, neither went down nor was it arranged. On the one hand, the 
representatives of the open source community, but also of SMEs, question the effectiveness of 
patents related to CII, often wrongly named “software patents”. On the other hand, companies 
active in patenting support in any case the granting of patents for CII, if they are embedded in 
hardware technologies.  However, the majority of them does not support software patents as such 
and patents on business models and admit that the demarcation of patents on CII is challenging and 
not harmonized between the patent offices. Finally, some interviewees see no reasons for a special 
treatment of patents on CII, especially if they account for 60% of all patents according to a recent 
study (Frietsch et al. 2015).     
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In contrast, the OSS representatives see in general no need for patents having their origins in science 
and industrialization, because copyrights are sufficient for computer programs. By the way, the 
success of the software industry was not based on patents, but on secrecy as protection instrument. 
Furthermore, changes in mechanical technologies are rather transparent, which is different for 
computer programs dominated by many small – and often difficult to trace – incremental changes, 
which are no significant inventions. These representatives argue no additional need for protection 
for computer programs through patents, which would allow due to the high dynamics only a short 
period of protection, but a long period of barriers for other innovators. Finally, the need for patents 
to protect innovation will be reduced the more software will be integrated in innovative products in 
the future. 
3.2.4.12 Interactions between ICT patents and Open Source Software 
In general, the majority of the interviewed stakeholders – with the exception of the OSS community 
– perceives little problems for OSS by the existence of ICT patents. Most important, it is mentioned 
that OSS addresses copyright not patent right, which allows in principle a co-existence. Furthermore, 
within OSS one has to distinguish between ownership and access rights, which promotes its 
exploitation. In contrast, patents are dominated by the principle of ownership and protection, 
although their enforcement is more challenging in contrast to the more aggregated contents 
protected by copyrights. Finally, it has been noted that the copyright protection period is much 
longer than the twenty years for patents. Consequently, OSS and patents relate to different types of 
innovation and approaches to recover the investments into R&D, which are much higher and riskier 
in case of patents. The availability of both options generates some kind of healthy competition. 
Overall, OSS has certainly some advantages in dynamic environments and will achieve a higher 
relevance due the increasing importance of interoperability. 
Many OSS licenses, like GPL, or Apache include patent clauses, requiring the contributors to abide 
certain restrictions with regards to the enforcement of their patents. Several interviewees including 
the representatives of the OSS community support this strict commitment. However, some of the 
OSS licenses do not impose any restriction related to patents and thus the use of any patented 
technology embedded in the software may be bound to a license.  
In addition, there are options of dual licensing, in which case an OSS license is provided for a first 
version and a proprietary license for a second version, e.g. for new functionalities protected by 
patents. This approach can also be the other way for patent protected technology to coexist with 
OSS. 
However, other interviewees perceive a challenge in integrating OSS and patents, because it is 
difficult to find a consensus, especially since patents generate property rights to be respected and 
even monopoly power, which might be misused, e.g. by trying to monetizing them via their inclusion 
in OSS. The representatives of OSS would see only a solution in general royalty free licensing of 
patents following the rules of the OSS licenses.  Furthermore, despite the rather short life cycles in 
ICT many patents are applied for, which are in general challenging the more dynamic OSS 
developments.    
Finally, the relationship between patents and OSS is perceived as similar to the tension between 
patents and standards. Like for SEPs, patents can protect the technology, but licenses have to be 
issued according to FRAND conditions, whereas OSS requires strictly an open source license. The 
next complication is generated by the development of OSS reference implementations of standards, 
which are in addition based on patents. Consequently, there is the tension that some implementers 
expect the OSS reference implementations of standards to be used royalty free and not according 
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FRAND rules, whereas the SEP owners are not willing to give away their patents for royalty free and 
therefore ready to sue the users of said OSS reference implementations. Another challenge is the 
potential legal incompatibility of OSS licenses use in said reference implementations and FRAND IPR 
policies of the associated SDO. One suggestion is to select an OSS license without patent clauses for 
the reference implementation of the standard, so the implementers would benefit from the 
software but still would have to take care of the necessary patent licenses. It is currently being 
discussed in some standardization bodies to develop OSS reference implementations under their 
umbrella to increase consistency and minimize these tensions. Nevertheless, there are no obvious 
and easy solutions for these conflicts and tensions, which are expected to increase in the future.  
3.2.4.13 Others challenges 
In addition to the above mentioned challenges, the experts mentioned the speed of court decisions 
as current challenge. Related to the future, open innovation is expected to generate further 
challenges because of the actors involved in the innovation process. From the technological 
perspective, the Internet of Things and the related increase in data will raise questions about data 
ownership, which might become more relevant than patents. Finally, SMEs will be challenged from 
all these future trends. 
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3.3 PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
3.3.1 Solutions for ICT patents promoting innovation related to patent application and granting 
3.3.1.1 Application fees  
Although according to some interviewees, higher application fees would distract patents of low 
quality, the majority of the experts perceive this instrument as not being effective in raising patent 
quality, because other costs associated with attorneys are much more relevant.  In contrast, higher 
applications fees would generate higher costs especially for SMEs, whereas for large companies they 
do not matter. Overall, this instrument would further disadvantage SMEs. Therefore, some experts 
propose to reduce the application fees for this type of applicant. However, it was suggested that the 
increased revenues are could be used by the patent offices to increase their efforts in the 
examination processes and eventually patent quality. 
3.3.1.2 Degree of novelty 
In contrast to the limited effectiveness of raising the application fees, the quality of ICT patents can 
be increased by raising the required degree of novelty. Here, this requirement is – according to the 
majority of the experts – satisfactory fulfilled by the European Patent Office, but not necessarily in 
the US and only to a lower degree in China. However, the representatives of the OSS community 
suggest significantly increasing the novelty requirements. 
3.3.1.3 Inventive step  
Raising the required inventive step is certainly another option. However, the proof of the inventive 
steps is rather challenging. Therefore, most of the interviewees did not comment on this measure. 
However, the representatives of the OSS suggest that patent offices require more information from 
the applicants to make better decisions regarding the inventive steps eventually, leading to a much 
lower number of granted patents.  
3.3.1.4 Patent scope 
Narrowing the scope of patents is another alternative to raise their quality. However, the majority of 
the interviewees either is satisfied with the current scope of patents or sees no possibility to narrow 
it further without utilizing heavy investments. Some also did not comment on this measure. 
3.3.1.5 Crowd-sourced validity checks support the patent validity checks by patent offices  
One expert suggested that crowd-sourced validity checks could support the examination process of 
the patent offices.  
3.3.1.6 Granting an ICT patent requires already the implementation of the invention  
In some countries, there is the requirement of exploiting an invention, as otherwise lapse of the 
patent may be imposed as penalty. However, the majority of the experts do not support this 
approach as it leads to additional administrative costs both for the patent offices and for the 
applicants. Especially, research organisations, which are not interested in developing technology 
catered towards marketable products, would have limited chances to get their patents granted 
under such a system. Furthermore, if all details of the invention have to be disclosed, it would 
challenge the use of trade secrets. Finally, this requirement is not foreseen in TRIPS. However, the 
representatives of the OSS community are in favour of this proposal in order to eventually only grant 
patents with a commercial applicability.   
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3.3.1.7 Raising and specifying (e.g. related to technicality) the bar for patents on computer-
implemented inventions  
Raising the requirements for patents on computer-implemented inventions (CII) is supported, e.g. by 
disclosing more and more specific criteria. However, patents on CII are already a significant share of 
all patents, because many inventions already implement or rely on computer software. Furthermore, 
incremental inventions within a software, questions the necessary inventive step, although these 
small changes can lead to significant improvements in the performance of the software and 
consequently, the final products.  The representatives of the OSS community favor an approach, 
which allows no patenting both of software as such, but also software in combination with technical 
inventions. Moreover, some of them even propose that all existing patents on CII should become 
invalid. 
3.3.1.8 Software is excluded from patenting both for the program listing and the technical content 
underlying the software  
The option is only supported from the representatives of OSS community. 
3.3.1.9 Patents for “Software as such” are granted, i.e. the program listing is patentable  
The general patentability of software was not mentioned as a possible solution. 
3.3.1.10 ICT patents are granted within five years  
Since the dynamics in ICT is rather high and the granting process by patent offices is rather slow, 
some experts propose introducing the requirement that patents have to be granted within five years 
to increase legal security for all other actors in the industry. If the granting process is further delayed 
(this also includes measures of the applicant), the application should become invalid 
3.3.1.11 Renewal fees for granted ICT patents  
In contrast to the ineffectiveness of raising the application fees for patents, higher renewal fees 
towards the end of the protection period are perceived as being effective by a significant share of 
the experts. The current structure of the renewal fees allows SMEs to enter the patent system and in 
case of success, provides them with the resources to pay the higher fees in later periods. 
Nevertheless, it also proposed by some experts that lower renewal fees might be an effective 
instrument to support SMEs.  
3.3.1.12 The protection period for ICT patents  
Despite the high dynamics in ICT the majority of the experts see no need to restrict the protection 
period as the applicants can determine when to terminate the patent protection. However, the 
representatives of the OSS would favor a drastic reduction of the protection period for ICT patents 
corresponding to the lifecycle of technologies and markets in ICT, because they perceive granted 
patents as long-lasting barriers for innovation. 
3.3.2 Solutions for ICT patents promoting innovation related to enforcing and implementing 
3.3.2.1 A declaration of willingness to grant a license for commercial use to anyone (license of right 
L.O.R.)  
The declaration of willingness to grant a license for commercial use to anyone (L.O.R.) is considered 
as an interesting additional instrument, especially for companies using patents as defensive 
instrument or even as an element of an open source strategy. It is proposed to reward companies 
following this step by reducing the renewable fees, especially for older patents, and by expanding 
the patent protection period.   
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The FRAND declaration related to standard-essential patents is considered as a specific, but also a 
complementary form of a license of right. However, it is also pointed out that in case of patents of 
high public interest, the government should buy them and provide a license of right.  
Nevertheless, there are serious concerns among the majority of the interviewees. First, it is pointed 
out that providing a license of rights depends on the specific framework conditions. The ambivalent 
discussions about the effectiveness and efficiency of FRAND as a specific form of license of rights 
confirms the challenging complexity of this approach, i.e. its effective implementation does not only 
require the declaration itself, but also further negotiations are necessary. Despite some support for 
this option, critical voices claim that the patent owners and licensors should still have the 
opportunity to decide about the licenses and the licensees. In particular, patent owners perceive a 
license of right as a too serious intervention and point to exclusivity as a major incentive for 
patenting, especially in the first years after application.   
3.3.2.2 Patent pledges  
Patent pledges are – like licenses of right – not well known to the majority of the interviewed 
experts. The informed experts confirm the effectiveness and efficiency of the instrument, because 
no specific contracts are needed. However, they do not perceive a need to support it further via 
public initiatives, because it is already well implemented by the informed users. Nevertheless, this 
might be an argument for initiatives to raise its public awareness, especially in combination with the 
promotion of specific technologies and eventually, in combination with Open Source.  Consequently, 
critical voices, in particular patent owners, question the general applicability of the approach. First, 
the incentives of companies to register their patents in pledges might be limited because they are 
using patents for competitive purposes. Secondly and more importantly, the legal treatment of 
patent pledges differ between territories, especially between Europe and the United States, which 
challenges their effectiveness within a global market. 
3.3.2.3 Technology exchange clearing houses  
‘Technology exchange clearing houses’ are well known and established institutions in the 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry. However, they are not yet well established in the ICT 
sector. Consequently, the majority of the experts has either no opinion or no qualified assessment 
about their effectiveness or efficiency in ICT. Nevertheless, a significant share of experts confirms 
that clearing houses could have the potential to facilitate the licensing of ICT patents. The Open 
Invention Network was mentioned as a specific and successful example of a clearing house.  
However, it was criticized, that the large and growing numbers of ICT patents might challenge the 
effective and efficient functioning of clearing houses. Furthermore, it was mentioned that – in 
contrast to pharmaceutical patents – ICT technologies are immediately implemented, which 
challenges the mechanisms of clearing houses. Finally, some examples of models similar to clearing 
houses failed in ICT.    
3.3.2.4 Regulations of Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs)   
The ambivalent activities of Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs) are intensively discussed among the 
interviewed experts. However, the assessment of the interviewed experts related to initiatives trying 
to restrict their activities and businesses differs. On the one hand, the majority of the experts 
promote the regulation of PAEs especially, by restricting their options to ask for injunctive reliefs. 
Furthermore, PAEs should be not allowed to shop around in different courts to achieve injunctions. 
However, concerns were raised that this might be possible in Europe in the future within the Unified 
Patent Court. Finally, it is proposed to let PAEs pay for the court costs. However, the major difficulty 
-even faced by the supporters- of these policies is the appropriate definition of PAEs. It is proposed 
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to define PAEs as organizations, which do not own any patents, they applied for, or do not perform 
own R&D. Nevertheless, implementing this definition effectively is challenging. 
Aside from the challenge to agree upon and implement an appropriate definition of PAEs, there are 
also experts who perceive PAEs not only as institutions and as part of the system to increase market 
transparency and efficiency, but also a source to generate revenues for financing R&D. Since 
antitrust laws also apply to PAEs, few experts argue that there already exists – at least in theory – a 
regulatory framework in case of misuse. Therefore, existing loopholes in the court system should be 
closed instead of establishing new regulations that target PAEs.     
3.3.2.5 Information incl. product specifications and licensing fees for Standard-Essential ICT patents  
Standard-Essential patents (SEPs) are an intensively discussed topic in the context of ICT patents in 
general. In particular, their essentiality and their licensing conditions are challenging the 
implementers of technologies and standards. Therefore, more transparency related to SEPs is 
demanded via the publication of information about technical details relevant for their 
implementation as well as the licensing fees, which can be justified by the non-discrimination 
requirement of FRAND. However, some interviewees, in particular licensors, question a general 
definition of FRAND and therefore do not support the publication of further licensing details about 
SEPs.  Further proposals include the improvement of the declaration databases, including the timely 
update of changes, e.g. of ownership, but  even also a complete disclosure of claim charts of all SEPs, 
which is perceived as additional burden by the patent owners. Furthermore, essentiality tests are 
proposed without providing details about their concrete implementation. In addition, it remains 
open which organisation has to pay for these checks. In general, the practical steps to be taken by 
SEP holders before seeking injunctions proposed by the decision of the EU Court of Justice Judgment 
in Huawei v ZTE are appreciated, but also criticized as being not flexible enough.  
3.3.2.6 ICT patent pools  
Another proposal especially related to SEPs, but also appropriate for ICT patents in general, is the 
formation of patent pools.  There is some limited endorsement among the interviewees to publicly 
support patent pools in general via public interventions, but also with the support of standardization 
bodies. Patent pools are particularly supported in case of patents as outcome of public research 
projects, especially related to new technological infrastructures or standards. The objectives are 
either to promote the diffusion of their technologies, but also securing freedom to operate 
especially for SMEs relying on these infrastructure technologies. Furthermore, patent pools increase 
the requested transparency of licensing rates, but may be also performing the mentioned 
essentiality tests, especially in the case of SEPs.      
In contrast to the supportive attitude towards patent pools, a significant number of experts do not 
perceive a need to support the formation of patent pools actively. First, large companies have 
sufficient incentives to join patent pools as licensors including disclosing rules of royalty sharing. 
Second, licensees are interested in taking licenses through patent pools in order to reduce their risks 
related to infringement and licensing payments. Therefore, both licensors and licensees, which will 
increase significantly in number due to IoT, should have sufficient incentives to form patent pools as 
one-stop-shops. Public interventions might create a bias in the markets, unintended negative side 
effects- especially in dynamic contexts- and form additional intermediaries. They are difficult to 
monitor and to guide and interested in seeking rents, which is negative both for licensors, but 
especially licensees. Here, it is criticized that some patent pools ask for high entry fees. In addition, 
public policies supporting the formation and development of bilateral or joint licensing programs, 
incl. providing incentives for organizations to develop these, are not supported. Therefore, policy 
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makers should restrict themselves to setting favorable framework conditions for the stakeholder-
driven development of patent pools and not intervene further into the market and definitively 
abstain from compulsory licenses via patent pools.     
3.3.2.7 Compatible licensing solutions for Open Source Software and ICT patents  
Achieving compatibility between Open Source Software (OSS) and ICT patents is a challenge. A few 
interviewees suggest that government intervention could promote such a compatibility. However, 
the majority of the experts sees either no justification for such an intervention – expect in areas with 
public interest – or questions its effectiveness. Firstly, it is claimed that there is no or even little 
interaction between OSS and patents. Consequently, the transparency related to this interaction is 
sufficient. Furthermore, those market actors interested to find a solution are able to do so with 
public support.  Secondly, compatibility between OSS and patents is only achieved – especially 
expressed by the representatives of the OSS community – if patents are registered in patent pledges 
or can be used royalty free. This solution would also be consistent with the FRAND requirement for 
SEPs. The alternative would be that the relevant source code could not be claimed to be OSS. 
However, a significant share of the experts are not convinced about a compatible solution between 
OSS and FRAND currently been investigated by some standardization organisations, like ETSI. Finally, 
there is also limited expertise about the interactions between OSS and patents. 
3.3.2.8 Transparency of licensing terms of bilateral licensing agreements   
In order to facilitate the licensing of patents there are on the one hand strong forces, which support 
initiatives the publications of bilateral licensing terms, especially from the side of the implementers. 
Therefore, the approach, e.g. used by Avanci and Via Licensing, to publish the licensing fees for using 
mobile telecommunication technologies differentiated by the various applications is appreciated. 
Furthermore, the already mentioned improved transparency of the licensing terms for SEPs is 
supported, which is further promoted by the activities of patent pools. However, the majority of the 
experts, especially from the patent owning companies, do not see a need or benefit from disclosing 
the conditions of bilateral licensing terms, because they should be confidential and restricted to the 
involved parties. In addition, even in the case of one specific patented technology the licensing 
terms may vary due to the negotiation power and the business models of the involved parties. 
Finally, forcing companies to disclose these terms might lead to an increasing use of trade secrets, 
which further reduces transparency. Therefore, the majority of the experts perceive the current 
rules of competition law to be sufficient as a framework for licensing of ICT patents. And some stock 
markets, e.g. in the US, require the disclosure of licensing deals having  an influence on the 
companies’ performance in order to secure transparency for the shareholders.  
3.3.2.9 Defensive ICT patent aggregators  
Defensive patent aggregators are perceived as valuable organizations, especially for SMEs. However, 
specific public support is not recommended. On the one hand, the existing defensive patent 
aggregators work well. Furthermore, it is difficult to support their foundation effectively. On the 
other hand, it is also mentioned that patent aggregators per se are not supporting competition and 
might collaborate with PAEs or even turn their business models into PAEs, which is critically 
perceived (including the representatives of the OSS community). Overall, the majority of experts 
supports the existence and function of patent aggregators, but provides no proposals related to 
specific public interventions.  
3.3.2.10 Insurances against ICT patent litigations  
Insurances against patent litigations have been discussed for a long time. However, it is not a very 
convincing approach for the interviewed experts. On the one hand, the demand for such insurances 
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is probably limited to small and young companies. Large companies have the resources to handle 
patent litigation or infringement cases without the involvement of an insurance company. On the 
other hand, the suppliers of such insurance schemes are challenged by adverse selection and moral 
hazard, the typical market failures in the insurance market. In detail, companies having higher 
likelihood of being accused of infringing the patent rights of others might ask for such insurance. In 
addition, companies might change their behavior after having such an insurance protection towards 
more strategies increasing the risk of infringement. Consequently, the insurance premiums are 
difficult to calculate, which will lead eventually to rather high insurance fees making the policies less 
attractive for potential customers. Overall, a public or publicly supported insurance scheme might be 
the only solution.  
3.3.2.11 Trade secret regulation  
The implementation of the new European Trade Secrets Directive aiming to standardise the national 
trade secret laws in EU countries against the unlawful acquisition, disclosure and use of trade secrets 
might have implications on the incentive to file patents also in ICT. Some experts expect no 
implications at all on patenting, especially for ICT, because interoperability requires the disclosure, 
e.g. of interfaces. However, others expect some impacts. On the one hand, there might be a shift 
towards trade secrets, especially for process inventions, because of lower costs, which is attractive 
for SMEs, despite the higher risks. Eventually, trade secrets will reduce incentives for contributions 
to open solutions leading to more proprietary technologies, which explains the rather critical 
position of the OSS community. On the other hand, trade secrets are often complementary to 
patents, which might then even generate a push for patents. In summary, the common regulatory 
framework related to trade secrets is appreciated, whereas the implications for ICT patents might be 
quite heterogeneous depending on the characteristics of technologies and the inventors.  
3.3.2.12 Mediation and arbitration procedures  
Mediation and arbitration procedures are voluntary options to reach mutually satisfactory 
settlements in case of patent disputes in order to avoid decisions by courts. Sometimes courts 
recommend mediation, which is more flexible, even allowing one partner to leave the negotiations. 
In general, mediation and arbitration are rarely used exceptions, but more relevant in systems with 
weak courts. However, they are more often used in Europe than in the US, where companies are 
more likely to follow litigation strategies.  
It is suggested, that the negotiations should take place on portfolio and not on patent level and 
question of patent validity and infringement. Overall, mediation and arbitration are perceived by the 
experts as effective and efficient approaches for conflict resolution, which requires sufficient 
expertise by mediators and arbitrators, but also resources and trust. However, the majority has no 
or only little experience with these approaches. Single experts report some dissatisfaction with 
WIPO guidelines related to mediation and arbitration. 
Despite its confidential character, mediation and arbitration require and foster the internal sharing 
of information between the involved parties. It is criticized that the confidential procedures do not 
allow for the free sharing of information, especially by the representatives of the OSS community, 
and therefore the reliance on experiences of previous mediation and arbitration procedures. 
Although they are voluntary mechanisms, large companies might enforce them, e.g. large customers 
might prohibit suppliers to go to court or sell patents to PAEs. It also reported that arbitration 
between large players can be quite difficult and the identified compromises are not always 
satisfactory. Therefore, companies have incentives to shop around between various mediators and 
arbitrators in order to find one that is most favorable, e.g. from the perspective of licensors. 
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Furthermore, mediation and arbitration should be avoided in case of SEPs, which require more 
transparency regarding licensing terms.   
3.3.2.13 Legal costs for ICT patent disputes   
Whereas the court fees as such are perceived as of little relevance, it is suggested to promote faster 
and less expensive dispute solution mechanisms at courts. Therefore, there should be strong 
incentives to attract only the most valuable patents to the courts. The sharing of court costs 
between plaintiff and defendant should be shaped accordingly. For example, sharing the cost in the 
US puts sufficient pressure on the potential infringer to pay licensing fees in order to avoid high 
penalties, e.g. the double or triple of licensing fees, or damages for the company value. If injunctions 
cannot be avoided, “smart injunctions” are suggested, which do not endanger the survival of the 
infringers and even the functioning of whole markets and technologies. Similarly, the companies that 
win the case should be compensated in order to restore their financial position to that prior to the 
court case. Finally, companies misusing the court system should be forced to disclose all the relevant 
details about their patents up to the option of making their patents invalid.  
3.3.2.14 Court System 
Specialized courts are proposed, which deal only with patent disputes including both questions of 
patent validity and infringement. In some jurisdictions it is possible to decide about infringement 
and validity in different courts. This bifurcation is perceived a quite dangerous, especially for SMEs 
faced with higher costs and risks. Therefore, it is recommended that regarding infringement, i.e. 
injunctive relief, and validity, i.e. nullity, should be decided before the same court. Taking account 
that a significant share of patents is invalid, then the risks created and the resources needed for 
decisions on infringement could be saved within one court case. However, according to the 
Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, this bifurcation which is already an option in some 
jurisdictions, e.g. in Germany, will also be possible on a European level in the future. If one decides 
about a separation, then a very effective and efficient interface between the two courts should be 
established.      
3.3.2.15 Others solutions 
Finally, many interviewees suggest support for SMEs in patent application and implementation, but 
also in court disputes. However, there are also concerns about the need and the effectiveness of 
such SME-specific measures. First, they can decide themselves about getting involved in patenting. 
Secondly, SMEs are often owned by large companies, which would benefit from such supporting 
policies. However, raising the awareness and understanding of the whole patent system starting 
from R&D projects, but also including the opportunities of OSS is certainly an effective and efficient 
approach. 
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3.4 DIMENSIONS OF RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 
In the final part of the interview, the interviewees have been asked for the relevance of patents in 
ICT for the dimensions of responsible research and innovation.  
According to the European Commission (https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/h2020-
section/responsible-research-innovation), “Responsible research and innovation (RRI) is an approach 
that anticipates and assesses potential implications and societal expectations with regard to 
research and innovation, with the aim to foster the design of inclusive and sustainable research and 
innovation.” In practice, RRI is implemented as a package that includes multi-actor and public 
engagement in research and innovation, enabling easier access to scientific results, the take up of 
gender and ethics in the research and innovation content and process, and formal and informal 
science education. 
In general, the vast majority of the experts has yet not been confronted with RRI and consequently 
no in-depth understanding of RRI, which is in line with the conclusion by Stahl et al. (2017) of the 
need to involve and sensitize stakeholders related to the ethics of emerging fields of ICT. They also 
find that it is not always clear what are the incentives of companies to consider RRI at all and how to 
integrate them into their existing organizational structures and processes. 
3.4.1 Open Access to Scientific Results 
In general, the understanding of access to scientific results is both quite heterogeneous and 
conflicting. First, some interviewees understand within the open access to scientific results as the 
option to use these royalty free or like open source. However, others understand that OSS is only 
one specific way of open access. There is still a significant reluctance among the interviewees to 
support open access, also related to the results of research projects and regarding to the unclear 
implications for patent portfolios of universities and research institutes. The trend towards open 
access might create tensions between research organizations and companies in common research 
projects, because the pressure to publish for researchers restricts the option to patent. Some 
suggest even a grace period before open access should be applied. Moreover, the relevance of 
secrecy for companies is pointed out. However, there is also a significant support for open access, 
especially from the OSS community, because it is expected to foster the diffusion of content – in 
contrast to patents – and consequently innovation endorsing the position claimed by Stallman 
(1992).  
The relationship between open access and patents is assessed quite differently. On the one hand, 
some experts see no links between patents and open access to scientific results at all, because the 
patent offices have already today access to more or less all scientific results in their searches for 
prior art. On the other hand, it is also expected that the unrestricted access to all research results via 
open access will both reduce the likelihood of patents to be granted and increase the chances of 
invalidity cases.    
In summary, the expected implications of the trend towards open access of scientific results on 
patenting are perceived differently by the interviewees ranging from no impacts at all to rather 
negative impacts. However, the open and easy access to scientific contents might push innovation 
supporting the position of the OSS community. 
3.4.2 Ethical aspects 
Similar to the topic of open access, the majority of experts perceive no ethical issues related to ICT 
patents. The representatives from industry do not mentioned ethical issues, because they relate ICT 
in general not with life-threatening technologies. However, ICT-based medical devices directly 
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related to health and indirectly threats by autonomous driving and other security related 
applications, like drones, are explicitly mentioned as exceptions. Furthermore, artificial intelligence 
has an ethical dimension, because its results should be available for everybody. However, the 
question is also raised whether artificial intelligence might own patents itself.  
Telecom operators in particular mention that infrastructure is in the public interest, which has an 
ethical dimension. Therefore, patents should be not misused to restrict the access to or to block the 
functioning, including the security, of networks. This concern was also raised by patent pools.  
Furthermore, the access of developing countries to ICT technologies via lowering licensing costs 
could satisfy ethical concerns. 
Companies implementing ICT patents mention the trade-off that the results of publicly funded 
research should be available for free for the society, whereas ICT patents should still provide 
adequate incentives for conducting private R&D. 
Organizations representing the interests of SMEs complain that patents hinder the democratizing of 
innovation, especially for SMEs. Research organizations also mention this threat for SMEs. This 
request is in line with the position of the OSS community pointing to the fact that OSS is already 
based on democratic principles. Consequently, ICT patents should restrict neither industry, 
government (e.g. software for elections) nor society (“code is law”). Especially, the access to the 
Internet has an ethical dimension discussed in the context of digital divide and inclusion, e.g. 
mentioned by Rogerson (2011) and Stahl et al. (2014) as future challenge. Consequently, nobody 
should restrict others via software in general, and patents on software in particular, because they 
might restrict the freedom to access the right information and the Internet. In addition, software 
can, for instance, change political views, e.g. via fake news, and influence the process of political 
decisions.  
Research organizations claim that assuring high patent quality is an ethical issue. However, the 
incentive function of patents has to be assured in order to promote technical progress.  
The representatives of the European Commission perceive little similarity to pharmaceutical patents, 
because ICT is in general no life-saving technology. However, indirect ethical concerns related to 
privacy and data protection already defined as major topics in the literature review by Stahl et al. 
(2016), but also to AI and robotics are mentioned.  
A representative of a patent office sees ethical issues only indirect depending on the type of 
technology and the perspective. Since technology is more dynamic than the legal frameworks, e.g. 
for autonomous weapons (drones) or cars, new laws have to consider  existing ethical values 
(Rogerson 2011)in order to tackle upcoming ethical issues, e.g. via foresight exercises like conducted 
by Markus and Mentzer (2014) or Stahl et al. (2017). Finally, the privacy implications of ICT have 
obviously an ethical dimension, which has been mentioned by some experts reflecting its prominent 
role in the literature revealed by Stahl et al. (2016). In particular, the consumer organization 
complain that patent offices do not consider ethical issues related to granting patents in ICT, e.g.  on 
technologies affecting data protection or privacy. Explicitly, the Facebook patent on credit rating 
based on Facebook friends is mentioned. 
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3.4.3 Overall, the interviews with the experts confirm the results of the literature review. In contrast 
to the ethical debate of pharmaceutical patents, there is no specific ethical debate on ICT 
patents, but on the ethics of ICT in general. However, the intensive discussion about 
pharmaceutical patents could serve as a starting point for a more rigorous ethical debate on ICT 
patents, because of the existence of some immediate life-threatening ICT technologies, of the 
generic character of ICT infrastructure and of the impacts of ICT on privacy and data protection, 
which are intensively discussed in the general discourse about the ethics of ICT (Rogerson 
2011) and computers (Stahl et al. 2016) . Finally, the inclusive function of ICT for societies, 
especially  in developing countries, could contribute to achieve responsible research and 
innovation (e.g. De Keersmaecker 2017). Other Dimensions of Responsible Research and 
Innovation:  
The other dimensions of responsible research and innovation, i.e. engaging society (public 
engagement), gender aspects, and promoting (in)formal science education, are in general not 
mentioned by the interviewees. Only, the strong gender bias is observed, but perceived as difficult 
to change. In addition, the involvement of users via open innovation could be seen as a way to 
engage society in innovation. Finally, a better education also in patenting could help to improve the 
changes to tackle the various challenges.  
3.5 SUMMARY 
Overall, the interviews provided a broad and rather comprehensive spectrum of the challenges for 
patents in ICT, but also revealed that the current system is able to tackle the various challenges. 
Obviously, there is a significant disagreement about the relevance of the various problems raised 
between the various stakeholders interviewed. Consequently, they interviewees are also in general 
not agreeing about the effectiveness of the various approaches to tackle the challenges. These 
findings are in line with the insights from the literature reviews. This is also the case for the various 
dimensions of responsible research and innovations, which have tackled only as ethics in ICT in 
general in the literature (see D2.3), but very limited in focusing of the ethics of patents in ICT. 
However, here the level of disagreement is rather low between the experts, who have obviously not 
yet been confronted with this perspective.   
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4 STAKEHOLDER SURVEY 
The questionnaire of the survey is based on the review of the literature and the interviews with 
stakeholders including the input from the focus group exercises summarized in the previous chapter. 
It aimed to collect the opinions and attitudes of stakeholders involved in or connected with the ICT 
sector towards the current patent regime framework relevant for responsible innovation.  
The answers to the questions of the survey are interpreted as personal opinions and not necessarily 
as the organizations’ official position. The answers have been treated with absolute confidentiality.  
The co-operation and opinion from the experts have been deeply appreciated by the CIFRA project, 
since they support the further development of an innovation-friendly patent regime for ICT in the 
European Union. 
4.1 METHODOLOGY 
The stakeholder survey has been structured according to the guideline used for the expert 
interviews, but contains in detail the following sections. After defining both ICT patents and 
responsible research and innovation, the experts are asked for their opinions on the subject as well 
as to provide some information about their organization including, their innovation activities. These 
generic sections are followed by questions regarding the use of Intellectual Property Rights by the 
organization and the effectiveness of ICT patents in achieving specific objectives. These include, 
preventing the imitation of inventions or blocking competitors.  
The first major part of the survey includes the assessment of challenges for ICT patents related to 
innovation in the experts’ organization. This part is built on the challenges identified in WP2, the 
literature review and the interviews incl. the focus groups performed in WP3.  The second major 
part of the survey includes proposals for specific changes of the current patent regime in order to 
make it more conducive to innovation. Both sections are divided into challenges and solutions 
regarding: 
 patent application and granting to effectively promote innovation including research and 
development in ICT.  
 enforcing and implementing patents to effectively promote innovation including research 
and development in ICT. 
The last question is on the relevance of the five dimensions of implementing Responsible Research 
and Innovation (RRI) regarding ICT patents. In addition, the experts are asked to specify the role of 
ICT patents related to the five dimensions of implementing RRI.  
In the disclaimer of the questionnaire, we highlight our very broad understanding of ICT patents 
following the OECD STI working paper on ICT-related technologies (Inaba and Squicciarini  2017) 
including both traditional telecommunication and Internet related technologies, such as the Internet 
of Things (IoT) and their various applications, e.g. electronic payment systems, imaging and sound 
technologies, and gaming, and also in vertical industries, incl. automotive or energy. 
Furthermore, we also consider patents on computer-implemented inventions (CII), being aware that 
under the European Patent Convention "programs for computers" are not regarded as inventions for 
the purpose of granting European patents. 
A copy of the survey can be found in the Annex 3. 
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After completion of the majority of the interviews, the questionnaire has been drafted and 
distributed to several experts representing different stakeholder groups asking for their feedback in 
May 2017. Based on these responses, the final questionnaire has been shortened and optimized in 
various feedback loops in order to assure a better comprehensibility. It has been openly distributed 
online via the link https://inno.limequery.com/228186 between June and August 2017. The target 
audience were the members of the ETSI IPR Special Committee, which have been directly 
approached twice via their mailing list. The Free Software Foundation Europe FSFE, the mobile 
operators organization GSMA,  the Open Invention Network OIN, the European Association of 
Research and Technology Organization EARTO, the European DIGITAL SME Alliance, the largest 
network ICT small and medium sized enterprises in Europe, of the Bundesverband IT-Mittelstand 
BITMI, the German member association of DIGITAL SME, of the European Patent Lawyers 
Association EPLAW distributed emails to their members including a link to the online survey. In 
addition, both the European IPR Helpdesk and the German Patent and Trademark Office DPMA 
posted information about the survey as well as the link to the survey on their homepages. Finally, 
representatives of the companies identified in WP2 as being responsible for the majority of the 
patent applications were invited in person via email to participate in the survey. 
Consequently, the approached groups covered all main stakeholder groups already covered in the 
interview. Due missing information about the number of members in the mailing lists of the above-
mentioned organizations, it is not possible to exactly determine the number of organizations or 
individual experts, which have received an email with the link to the survey. In addition, the 
recipients have been invited to forward the email to further experts. Consequently, it can be 
assumed that way above one thousand individuals or organizations have received the email with the 
link to the survey. This very open approach is in general applied in the open consultations of the 
European Commission or the impact assessments performed on behalf of the European Commission 
in order to allow all interested stakeholders to participate. Furthermore, the debate about the ethics 
of ICT also ask for a broad involvement of all directly or indirectly impacted stakeholders (Rogerson 
2011). Recently, Stahl et al. (2017) emphasize in their foresight study about ethical issues in 
emerging fields of ICT the important role of all stakeholders in order implement Responsible 
Research and Innovation (RRI) in practice. This broad coverage of stakeholders has been already 
realized by the composition of the interviewees and has been applied in the stakeholder 
consultation via a broad an open survey. Indeed, such a procedure is in contrast to approaches in 
academic studies, which draw from a homogeneous universe, e.g. of companies, a specific closed 
random sample in order to calculate response rates and check for response biases. However, since 
we cover both ICT companies in the widest sense, legal and other services, independent software 
developers and research organizations, both defining the universe, drawing random samples and 
calculating response rates is not feasible. 
Finally, due to the support from some interviewees and their contacts plus the support of the above-
mentioned organizations, it was possible to receive 839 feedbacks in total. Despite the length and 
complexity of the questionnaire, 167 respondents answered the questionnaire from the beginning to 
the very end. This is a rather high number compared to the just one hundred respondents to the 
official public consultation of the European Commission on patents and standards closed in 2015.1 
Therefore, we conclude that the topic of ICT patents is relevant and our approach accepted by the 
addressed stakeholders.    
                                                          
1 http://ec.europa.eu/growth/content/public-consultation-patents-and-standards-modern-framework-
standardisation-involving_en 
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4.2 SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
The sample of the respondents to the survey can be described according to the several information 
about their individual position, but mainly about the characteristics of their organization.  
The respondents are active at the top management level, in the legal department, in research and 
development and in IT or the software department. 
Table 4 Position of Respondents 
Chief Executive Officer (top management)  110 
Member of Legal/Patent Department  84 
Member of Research and Development Department  101 
Member of IT/Software Department  154 
Independent Software Developer  87 
Other 46 
 
More important than the position of the respondents is the business model of the organization they 
work for. Table 5 reveals the large number of answers from the software, but also the service sector. 
Respondents represent the entire ICT value chain from R&D to individual component manufacturers 
as well as the producers of the end products and even lawyers, i.e. companies providing IPR services. 
Therefore, all the important stakeholders identified via the literature review and the interviews have 
responded to the survey.  
Table 5 Organizations’ Core Business Model (multiple answers possible) 
Company producing final consumer products  85 
Company supplying components  63 
Network operator  34 
Software supplier  141 
Independent Open Source Developer 43 
Research institute (Private)  21 
Research institute (Semi-Public and Public)  33 
Service company  120 
Company providing IPR services  32 
Other 28 
 
However, the option to tick several business models allow us to reveal that around half of the 
respondents work in an organization with one business model.  A quarter has a business model 
based on a mixture of two and another quarter based on even three different business models.  
© CIFRA Consortium 2016-2018                                                                    Page 42 of 138 
Figure 1 Number of Organizations’ Core Business Model 
 
Related to the business model is the size of the organization or company. Roughly, two thirds of our 
sample are SMEs with up to 249 employees and one third are large companies. Consequently, the 
representation of the interests of SMEs is assured by this size distribution of the respondents. 
Figure 2 Number of Employees 
 
Finally, it is worth considering the country of origin. Here, we observe that only around one hundred 
respondents provide information about their country of origin. However, there is rather strong bias 
to answers from Germany. This is justified by Germany as the country with the highest share of 
patent applications at the European Patent Office. Nevertheless, according to the shares of patents 
more answers from France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands have been expected. Overall, 
we observe a country bias probably as a result of Fraunhofer hosting the survey and where the 
German Patent and Trademark Office and other German institutions were promoting it.   
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Figure 3 Country of Origin 
 
Finally, the innovation activities provide interesting background information, because they might 
explain both the use of various Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and the assessments of problems 
and solutions, the main part of the questionnaire. The share of more than 80% of the respondents 
claiming to have introduced a product innovation is higher than the average numbers calculated 
based on the Community Innovation Survery CIS (e.g. Rammer et al. 2016). Therefore, we have a 
rather innovative sample of companies introducing product innovations to the market. In contrast, 
the share of process innovators is significantly lower. The same is true for marketing and 
organizational innovations.   
Table 6 Type of Innovation 
 Product Process Marketing Organization 
No 48 100 178 170 
Yes 232 170 76 92 
 
Driven by the high share of product innovators, more than one third of the respondents have 
applied for patents. Consequently, this share is even higher than the ratios reported in the 
Community Innovation Survey (which are around 20%). The reason is that more than 80% of the 
large companies have applied for patents, which is similar to the shares reported in the Community 
Innovation Survey. In contrast, this is the case for less than 20% of the responding SMEs. We observe 
a high correlation between company size and the inclination towards patenting. 
However, besides the high share of respondents having applied for patents it has to be pointed out 
that almost half of them registered trademarks and claimed copyright. Therefore, one major finding 
is that patents – even for this sample of companies does not play in the sense of usage – the most 
important role among the set of IPRs.    
Table 7 Use of Intellectual Property Rights 
 Patent Utility Models Industrial Designs Trademarks Copyright 
No 158 186 181 130 119 
Yes  84 47 54 108 115 
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However, the high licensing activities both inward and outward, which are more than quadruple the 
number found in the German Community Innovation Survey (Rammer et al. 2016), are in line both 
with the high patent intensity of the sample and the need of the complex ICT industry to integrate 
technologies from producers of complementary products. This is confirmed by the fact that the 
higher share of more than one quarter of the respondents is licensing in, whereas less than on fifth is 
licensing out. Surprisingly, only 10% of the respondents is involved in cross licensing. This is an 
indication of the further differentiation of value chain in ICT, which increases the need to license in, 
but reduces the opportunities for cross licensing. 
Table 8 Licensing activities 
 Own patents rights 
licensed out or sold to 
third parties  
Patents of third 
parties licensed in or 
bought 
Others, incl. Cross-
licensing 
No 191 172 191 
Yes 45 62 22 
 
The differentiation of the value chain in the ICT sector and the role of patents can also be seen in the 
shares of patenting companies. For example, almost two thirds of the semi-public or public research 
institutes and the companies supplying components have applied for patents, whereas less than half 
of the companies producing final consumer products and the network operators own patents. These 
figures reveal the flows of patent protected technologies towards downstream stages, but also that 
cross licensing among companies active in this stage is less likely, because less than half of them 
owns patents.   
Overall, the assessments of the respondents to the main parts of the questionnaire will be 
differentiated according whether their organizations own patents or not, according to company size, 
business models and eventually the country they are located in. These analyses will help to test the 
robustness and validity of the results.  
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Table 9 Business models and patenting 
 Application for patents 
Organization’s core business model Yes No 
Company producing final consumer products 28 41 
Company supplying components 27 17 
Network operator 12 15 
Software supplier 31 84 
Independent Open Source Developer  7 30 
Research Institute (Private) 6 11 
Research Institute (Semi-Public and Public) 13 8 
Service Company 23 74 
Company providing IPR services  12 11 
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4.3 SURVEY RESULTS 
In the following section, we are presenting the results of the stakeholder consultations. Since we 
have addressed a very broad range of stakeholders, we are in general not displaying overall average 
but differentiated by different groups. Due to numerous options to differentiate the answers, we 
present in the chapter the results differentiated between respondents working in organizations 
owning patents and those not owning patents, because here the most significant differences can 
due to their diverging interests be expected, which is in general confirmed. In addition, the results 
have been further differentiated according to the position of the respondents within his or her 
organization, the size of the organization, the business model of the organization and eventually the 
answers from Germany as an jurisdiction with a strong support of the patent system to the answers 
from respondents frm other countries. However, the most relevant insights are integrated in the 
text, but all the figures of these analyses can be found in Annex 4.  
 
4.3.1 Effectiveness of ICT patents 
In order to establish a reference point for the assessment of the problems, the participants have 
been asked for their assessment of ICT patents in achieving specific patent-related objectives 
identified by Blind et al. (2006).   
Overall, for none of the objectives is the effectiveness of patents rated high, even by the patent 
owners. The limited effectiveness of patents in comparison with other protection strategies was 
already revealed the Cohen et al. (2000) survey.  However, the ranking of the effectiveness is 
different compared to Cohen et al. (2000). Firstly, the protection from imitation of invention 
achieves only a medium effectiveness. Secondly, patents are mostly used as barter chips in 
negotiations, which has already been revealed by Blind et al. (2006). Thirdly, using patents by 
securing freedom to operate is surprisingly important for the respondents. However, the survey 
targeting the owners of standard-essential patent owners by Blind et al. (2011) reveals freedom to 
operate already as the most important motive to patent. Finally, using patents to enhance the own 
reputation is ranked above medium effectiveness. This is also in line with the finding of Blind et al. 
(2011) of using patents for signaling own technological competencies. Surprisingly, the licensing 
generating revenues via patents is ranked lowest.  Analysing the assessment of the respondents not 
owning patents, which is quite similar to SMEs’ perception, it becomes obvious that they see the 
highest effectiveness of patents in blocking competitors.  
Furthermore, the differentiation of the responses depending on a company’s business model reveals 
further details. Firstly, independent software developers are most critical regarding the effectiveness 
of patents in all dimensions, in particular, to their – relatively unfamiliar – coordination function in 
research processes. However, they consider patents as being effective to block competitors. 
Secondly, companies supplying components are very positive about the effectiveness of patents in 
most of the dimensions. Thirdly, network operators are asides from the independent software 
developers, the most threatened by the blocking function of patents but in contrast, are positive 
related to using them as assets in negotiations.     
Finally, the perception of the differences in the national patent laws and in particular in their 
implementation can be analyzed by differentiating the answers of the patent owners in Germany 
from those outside Germany. Interestingly, the respondents from Germany perceive patents in ICT 
more effective in securing their freedom to operate, which might be due to higher quality, whereas 
they are – compared to the respondents outside Germany – less convinced about ICT patents for 
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measuring performance in R&D or rewarding employees. These are interesting differences, which 
reflect a variety of patent cultures and strategies framed by different legal framework conditions and 
their implementation.     
Figure 4: Effectiveness of ICT patents ranging from very low (1) to very high (5) 
 
 
 
1.?Preventing imitation of inventions, e.g. for securing the 
means to obtain a return on the R&D investment 
2.?Securing own freedom to operate by disclosing prior art 
(e.g. to prevent legal conflicts) 
3.?Blocking competitors 
4.?Using the coordination function in research processes 
and collaborations incl. open innovation 
5.?Using as asset in negotiations (incl. cross licensing) 
6.?Generating licensing revenues 
7.?Enhancing reputation 
8.?Measuring performance of research and development 
9.?Rewarding employees 
 
 
4.3.2? Challenges for ICT patents 
After providing the general background of the respondents, their usage of patents and their 
assessment of the effectiveness of patents, we now move to the first major objective of the impact 
assessment namely, the evaluation of the challenges related to ICT patents. Here, we divide the 
challenges between those related to patent application and granting on the one hand and those 
related to enforcing and implementing patents on the other hand. The rating revolves around five 
possible answers ranging from “totally disagree” to “totally agree”.  
Not surprisingly, the companies not owning patents and consequently, the SMEs face to a larger 
extent the identified challenges. However, there are a few exceptions, which shall be further 
elaborated later.   
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The statement that received the highest level of agreement was “The scope of granted ICT patents is 
too broad”, which is particularly criticized by those companies that do not own patents. However, 
not only the broad scope, but also the length of patent protection is criticized as being too long. 
Furthermore, the quality of ICT patents granted is perceived to be low, which might be closely 
related to the critique that “patent examination practices do not adequately consider relevant 
existing prior art”. These skeptical assessments are in particular driven by the answers of the 
independent software developers. Due to their general skeptical attitude towards patents, they 
perceive the differences of “the statutory patentability standards for ICT patents (e.g. technicality, 
etc.)” among patent offices not so much as a problem. Regarding this statement, there is also no 
significant differences between the answers of the patent owners and the other respondents, but 
also between large companies and SMEs. However, a rather high share of more than one quarter of 
respondents, most of them SMEs, is unable to provide any assessment.   
Overall, the challenge that “Implementations cannot be effectively protected by patents because 
they include code under an Open Source license that includes patent licenses” is perceived only as 
ambivalent as well as the high cost for applying for ICT patents. In the latter, the significant 
differences between patent owners and the other respondents even disappear. The same is true for 
the assessment of the speed of the granting process for ICT patents, which could also not assessed 
by a quarter of the respondents. 
Finally, the patent owners perceive significantly less problems for ICT patents due to the 
technological dynamics or technological convergence and fragmentation in the ICT sector compared 
to the other respondents, in particular the independent software developers. For the latter, “the 
language of ICT patents is too complicated to qualify as a good source of information” is also 
perceived as a major problem, which has already been expressed by the interviewees of the OSS 
community.  
Figure 5 Assessment of the challenges for ICT patents regarding patent application and granting ranging from totally 
disagree (1) to totally agree (5)  
1.? Due to the technological dynamics in the ICT sector, 
patents are not effective to protect innovation 
2.? Due to technological convergence and fragmentation 
in the ICT sector, patents are not effective to protect 
innovation 
3.? Patent examination practices do not adequately 
consider relevant existing prior art 
4.? The cost for applying for ICT patents is too high 
5.? The granting process for ICT patents is too slow 
6.? The language of ICT patents is too complicated to 
qualify as a good source of information 
7.? The quality of ICT patents granted is low 
8.? The statutory patentability standards for ICT patents 
(e.g. technicality, etc.) differ among patent offices 
9.? The maximum protection period of 20 years is long 
for ICT patents 
10.? The scope of granted ICT patents is too broad 
11.? Implementations cannot be effectively protected by 
patents because they include code under an Open 
Source license that includes patent licenses 
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Figure 6 Assessment of the challenges for ICT patents regarding patent application and granting ranging from totally 
disagree (1) to totally agree (5)  (patent owners vs non-patent owners )  
1.? Due to the technological dynamics in the ICT sector, 
patents are not effective to protect innovation 
2.? Due to technological convergence and fragmentation 
in the ICT sector, patents are not effective to protect 
innovation 
3.? Patent examination practices do not adequately 
consider relevant existing prior art 
4.? The cost for applying for ICT patents is too high 
5.? The granting process for ICT patents is too slow 
6.? The language of ICT patents is too complicated to 
qualify as a good source of information 
7.? The quality of ICT patents granted is low 
8.? The statutory patentability standards for ICT patents 
(e.g. technicality, etc.) differ among patent offices 
9.? The maximum protection period of 20 years is long 
for ICT patents 
10.? The scope of granted ICT patents is too broad 
11.? Implementations cannot be effectively protected by 
patents because they include code under an Open 
Source license that includes patent licenses 
 
 
In comparison to the level of agreement to the challenges in the application and granting of ICT 
patents, we observe an even higher support to the problems related to the enforcement and 
implementation of ICT patents. In addition, there is only a minority of problems where the patent 
owners and the other respondents disagree significantly. Obviously, the patent owners perceive 
much more difficulties in enforcing and implementing their patents compared to the application and 
granting phase. Finally, a large share of respondents also have problems assessing the various 
challenges. 
The top three challenges according to the respondents’ assessments are the following. In contrast to 
most other challenges, the patent owners agree significantly less to these three statements. Firstly, 
the expected legal cost for resolution of conflicts regarding ICT patents are considered as rather 
high, whereas the cost for enforcing granted ICT patents are less of a problem. Secondly, it is feared 
that ICT patents owned by Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs) will increase the legal uncertainty for the 
implementers of ICT related technologies, whereas the general legal uncertainty for companies 
creating or implementing ICT patents is rated significantly lower. Thirdly, the use of ICT patents 
protected technology generates problems for the use of Open Source Software, which is in particular 
stressed by the independent software developers and is in line with the fear already expressed in 
the interviews. They are also most critical against patents on computer-implemented inventions 
(CII), in brief, software patents, because they might create difficulties for innovation of ICT-related 
technologies. Consequently, they, but also all other respondents, perceive the least problems for ICT 
patents by using Open Source Software. 
In contrast to the interviews expressed in the literature, the rated second least problem is the threat 
of courts granting an injunction to prevent infringements of ICT patents. Here, the fear of the 
independent software developers is still highest, whereas the companies providing IPR services, i.e. 
patent lawyers and attorneys, perceive the least difficulties. However, the general likelihood of 
litigation (infringement) of ICT patents is considered to be higher, again explicitly expressed by the 
independent software developers. 
Focusing on hold-up’s, i.e. licensors’ unwillingness to license ICT patents, and hold-out’s, i.e. 
implementers’ unwillingness to license in third-party ICT, we observe no significant differences. 
Surprisingly, patent owners do not agree significantly more to the hold-out problem as the others, 
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i.e. potential licensees, who perceive hold-up as the more severe problem. However, looking at the 
differences between business models, the companies producing final consumer products as well as 
the network operators, -often accused for hold-out- consider this less a problem compared to hold-
up. In contrast, companies supplying components, sometimes accused for hold-up, regard it to a 
lesser degrees as a problem. Finally, almost one quarter of respondents were not able to give an 
assessment both for hold-up and hold-out underlining the difficulty in identifying the real extent of 
the problem, which has already been expressed in the interviews.  
Closely related to the intertwined problems of hold-up and hold-out are the negotiations of the 
licensing agreements for standard-essential ICT patents (SEPs). Overall, this is rated higher as a 
challenge than hold-up and hold-out. However, the major opponents in these negotiations, the 
companies supplying components and the companies producing final consumer goods, agree at the 
lowest level to this challenge. The same is true for their assessment of large patent owners not 
joining pools of ICT patents.  
Finally, the risk that many ICT patented technologies are not used or commercialized is particularly 
supported both by the independent software developers and by the semi-public and public research 
institutes. The latter are afraid that the technologies they are developing are eventually not 
commercialised. In contrast, companies supplying components consider this challenge – also among 
the other challenges – as one of the least relevant ones.     
In summary, almost all challenges considered to be relevant are reflected by the level of agreement 
from the experts. However, the valuations are significantly lower by the patent owners and higher 
by the SMEs with a few exceptions. Furthermore, not only the use of patents and the company size, 
but also the various business models lead to different assessments. In general, the independent 
software developers have more serious concerns related to the challenges generated by ICT patents. 
The differentiation between various business models provides further insights and has policy 
implications. 
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Figure 7 Assessment of the challenges for ICT patents regarding patent enforcement and application ranging from totally 
disagree (1) to totally agree (5)  
1.? The cost/risk to enforce granted ICT patents is high 
2.? The likelihood of litigation (infringement) of ICT patents is high 
3.? The likelihood of courts granting an injunction to prevent 
infringement of ICT patents is high 
4.? Expected legal cost for resolution of conflicts regarding ICT patents 
are high 
5.? The legal uncertainty for companies creating or implementing ICT 
patents is high 
6.? Licensors are not willing to license ICT patents covering their 
technologies (hold-up) 
7.? Implementers of ICT patents are not willing to licensing in the third-
party ICT patents covering their implemented technologies (hold-out) 
8.? Agreeing on licensing agreements for standard-essential ICT patents 
(SEPs) is challenging 
9.? Large patent owners not joining pools of ICT patents challenge the 
implementation of ICT-related technologies 
10.? ICT patents owned by Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs) increases legal 
uncertainty for implementers of ICT related technologies 
11.? Many technologies protected by ICT patents are not used or 
commercialised 
12.? Patents on computer-implemented inventions (CII) or software 
patents challenges innovation of ICT-related technologies 
13.? The use of ICT patents protected technology generate problems for 
the use of Open Source Software 
14.? The use of Open Source Software generates problems for the use and 
protection of ICT patents 
 
 
 
   
Figure 8 Assessment of the challenges for ICT patents regarding patent enforcement and application ranging from totally 
disagree (1) to totally agree (5) (patent owners (yes) vs non-patent owners (no))   
1.? The cost/risk to enforce granted ICT patents is high 
2.? The likelihood of litigation (infringement) of ICT patents is high 
3.? The likelihood of courts granting an injunction to prevent 
infringement of ICT patents is high 
4.? Expected legal cost for resolution of conflicts regarding ICT patents 
are high 
5.? The legal uncertainty for companies creating or implementing ICT 
patents is high 
6.? Licensors are not willing to license ICT patents covering their 
technologies (hold-up) 
7.? Implementers of ICT patents are not willing to licensing in the third-
party ICT patents covering their implemented technologies (hold-out) 
8.? Agreeing on licensing agreements for standard-essential ICT patents 
(SEPs) is challenging 
9.? Large patent owners not joining pools of ICT patents challenge the 
implementation of ICT-related technologies 
10.? ICT patents owned by Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs) increases legal 
uncertainty for implementers of ICT related technologies 
11.? Many technologies protected by ICT patents are not used or 
commercialised 
12.? Patents on computer-implemented inventions (CII) or software 
patents challenges innovation of ICT-related technologies 
13.? The use of ICT patents protected technology generate problems for 
the use of Open Source Software 
14.? The use of Open Source Software generates problems for the use and 
protection of ICT patents 
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4.3.3 Solutions 
Based on the review of the literature and the proposals mentioned in the interviews to improve the 
present framework for ICT patents (including options), which run counter to the current legal 
framework (internationally, within the European Union, or nationally), we developed a set of 
possible solutions. These are divided into those related to successful patent application on the one 
hand and the enforcement and implementation of patents on the other hand.  
4.3.3.1 Solutions related to patent application and granting  
In contrast to the high agreement to almost all proposed challenges for ICT patents, the 
effectiveness of some of the suggested approaches aimed at making the framework for ICT patents 
more conducive to innovation are questioned by the majority of the respondents. However, major 
new insight from the stakeholder survey is the high level of agreement to almost all proposed 
solutions between the patent owners and the other respondents despite the rather different 
assessment of the challenges.   
However, we start with the most significant result. The vast majority of the respondents assess the 
exclusion of software from patenting “both for the program listing and the technical content 
underlying the software” as very effective. This extremely positive assessment is particularly driven 
by the valuations of the independent software developers and SMEs. However, the respondents 
representing the other business models also support this proposal. In line with the broad support of 
the exclusion of “software a such” from patenting, is the strong backing of the proposal of raising 
and specifying (e.g. related to technicality) the bar for patents on computer-implemented inventions 
by both patenting and non-patenting respondents, in particular active in SMEs.  This proposal was 
already supported in the early days of the discussions about software patents (Blind et al. 2005). In 
contrast, but very consistent with the previous assessment is the strict denial of patents for 
“software as such”, i.e. program listing is not patentable. Here, we observe even a greater 
homogeneity among all respondents. Although the sample is slightly different, there are interesting 
differences to the findings of Blind et al. (2005), who investigated the options on patenting software 
and computer-implemented inventions at the very beginning of the discussion about possible 
changes of the European Patent Convention. More than fifteen years later, the position of the 
independent software developers has not changed at all. However, we can observe that the 
representatives of both the software suppliers and of the non-patenting companies of the 
manufacturing sectors have recently started to follow closely the position of the independent 
software developers.    
Besides the specific aspects of software patents, the other proposal rated as effective focuses on the 
quality of granted ICT patents, which is identified to be challenging. Whereas not all stakeholders 
consider raising the application and renewal fees as being effective, the patent scope as the most 
supported challenge should be narrowed. This proposal is especially endorsed by the non-patenting 
respondents, but questioned by the companies providing IPR services, because patent attorneys are 
interested in getting patents granted that have a large scope. This high level of correspondence 
between the most relevant challenge and the most effective solution confirms the consistency of the 
answers and therefore the selected approach in conducting an impact assessment. Besides 
narrowing the patent scope, the required degree of novelty and the required inventive step are 
evaluated as being effective in making the framework for ICT patents more conducive to innovation.  
In contrast to these rather traditional proposals, the idea of crowd-sourced validity checks 
supporting patent offices and the requirement of implementing an invention before granting an ICT 
patent receives less support, in particular the latter by patenting respondents. They are also not in 
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favor of reducing the protection period for ICT patents to ten years, which is considered to be more 
effective by the independent software developers. However, the requirement to grant ICT patents 
within five years is supported by the patent-owning respondents, in particular by the network 
operators.  
In summary, the proposals related to successful patent application are considered to be effective in 
restricting patenting for “software as such” by the majority of the respondents. In addition to this 
specific topic suggestions focusing on raising the quality of ICT patents are considered to be less 
effective both by patent owners and by non-patenting respondents. In particular, raising the costs 
for patent applications or renewals of granted patents are not perceived to be very effective nor 
speeding up the granting process of ICT patents or halving their protection period. In general, it will 
be challenging to effectively implement these proposals either due to legal restrictions set by TRIPS 
or limited resources for investing in patent examinations, e.g. to reduce the scope of patent 
applications.  
Figure 9 Assessment of solutions for ICT patents promoting innovation regarding patent application and granting ranging 
from not effective (1) to very effective (4)  
1.? The application fees for ICT patents are raised 
2.? The quality of granted ICT patents is improved by 
raising the required degree of novelty 
3.? The quality of granted ICT patents is improved by 
raising the required inventive step 
4.? The quality of granted ICT patents is improved by 
narrowing their scope 
5.? Crowd-sourced validity checks support the patent 
validity checks by patent offices 
6.? Granting an ICT patent requires already the 
implementation of the invention 
7.? Raising and specifying (e.g. related to technicality) the 
bar for patents on computer-implemented inventions 
8.? Software is excluded from patenting both for the 
program listing and the technical content underlying 
the software 
9.? Patents for “Software as such” are granted, i.e. the 
program listing is patentable 
10.? ICT patents are granted within five years 
11.? The renewal fees for granted ICT patents are 
increased during all the protection period 
12.? The protection period for ICT patents is shortened to 
10 years 
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Figure 10 Assessment of solutions for ICT patents promoting innovation regarding patent application and granting ranging 
from not effective (1) to very effective (4) (patent owners (yes) vs non-patent owners (no))   
1.? The application fees for ICT patents are raised 
2.? The quality of granted ICT patents is improved by 
raising the required degree of novelty 
3.? The quality of granted ICT patents is improved by 
raising the required inventive step 
4.? The quality of granted ICT patents is improved by 
narrowing their scope 
5.? Crowd-sourced validity checks support the patent 
validity checks by patent offices 
6.? Granting an ICT patent requires already the 
implementation of the invention 
7.? Raising and specifying (e.g. related to technicality) the 
bar for patents on computer-implemented inventions 
8.? Software is excluded from patenting both for the 
program listing and the technical content underlying 
the software 
9.? Patents for “Software as such” are granted, i.e. the 
program listing is patentable 
10.? ICT patents are granted within five years 
11.? The renewal fees for granted ICT patents are 
increased during all the protection period 
12.? The protection period for ICT patents is shortened to 
10 years 
 
 
  
4.3.3.2? Solutions related to enforcing and implementing patents 
In addition to the solutions related to applying and granting patents, even more proposals are being 
discussed in the literature and by the interviewed experts to improve the present framework for ICT 
patents related to enforcing and implementing patents in order to make the framework for ICT 
patents more conducive for innovation.  
In the first part, we focus on solutions and institutions facilitating the licensing of patents. The 
second part deals with proposals to solve conflicts both within and outside courts easier. 
Compared to the assessment of the relevance of the challenges the valuation of the effectiveness of 
the various proposals never reach on average the level “effective”. The majority of the respondents 
consider the challenges as rather demanding, but on average, the proposed solutions are not 
expected to be effective. This general observation justifies research, including our project in this area 
to identify effective solutions, but even further research including both deepening the existing 
insights, but also applying further approaches to test the effectiveness of the most promising 
proposals in practice, e.g. via experiments.    
Reflecting the high assessment of the relevance of threats generated by Patent Assertion Entities 
(PAEs), regulations restricting their activities are considered effective at least by the majority of 
patent-owning companies. The other intensively debated topic of licensing conditions for standard-
essential patents (SEPs) is leading to at least a limited support to the proposal of incentivizing the 
publication of information including product specifications and licensing fees for Standard-Essential 
ICT patents. Surprisingly, both proposals receive slightly more support from the patent owners than 
from the non-patent owning organizations. 
The suggestion that a declaration of willingness to grant a license for commercial use to anyone 
(license of right L.O.R.) is required to receive the maximum of twenty years of protection for ICT 
patents is only rated as ambivalent related to its effectiveness to promote innovation evaluated 
slightly higher, in particular by the patent-owning companies is, the idea of defining a set of well-
known and trusted patent pledges, i.e. voluntary commitments by patent holders to give up some of 
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the rights associated to the patent (e.g. grant permission for commercial use without any direct 
compensation, no injunctions, FRAND, etc.). In contrast, the public support for technology exchange 
clearing houses to support bilateral licensing negotiations is considered as being the least effective 
measure for promoting ICT-related innovative technologies, which is consistent with the skeptical 
comments from several interviews.  
Public policies supporting the formation and development of ICT patent pools, especially of SEPs, or 
of bilateral or joint licensing programs are also not positively rated regarding their effectiveness in 
promoting ICT innovations. However, the network operators, companies producing final consumer 
goods, component suppliers and companies providing IPR services endorse these solutions slightly 
more, whereas the SMEs are rather unconvinced. Defensive ICT patent aggregators, as a specific 
type of patent pools, receive slightly stronger support particularly, from the non-patenting 
respondents and the SMEs. Surprisingly based on the critical discussions in the interviews, the 
publication of the licensing terms of bilateral licensing agreements receives a stronger support, in 
particular from the non-patenting respondents and the SMEs. In addition, the network operators 
and the software developers are – at least partly – convinced about the effectiveness of this 
measure to promote innovation in ICT.  
Finally, the development of compatible licensing solutions for Open Source Software and ICT patents 
is considered partly effective in promoting ICT innovations.  Particularly, from the non-patenting 
respondents as well as from the network operators and public and semi-public research institutes. 
The proposal of integrating only Royalty-Free ICT patents into Open Source Software is less 
convincing, notably for the non-patenting respondents. Here, the concerns already raised in several 
interviews are confirmed. 
Besides the – at least partly endorsed – suggested regulations related to PAEs and SEPs, the other 
two proposals related to the court system received a positive evaluation from the patent-owners 
regarding their effectiveness in promoting innovation. On the one hand, infringement and validity 
issues regarding ICT patents should be tried together before the same court, which is in particularly 
supported by companies providing IPR services. On the other hand, specialised courts instead of 
general courts should deal with ICT patent disputes. This is supported by the patent owners and 
especially, the network operators. This is consistent with their statements in the interviews.  
The other proposed solutions related to ICT patents disputes in courts are evaluated with 
ambivalence. In addition to increasing the court fees for patent disputes, patent owners -in 
particular the companies supplying components- are more inclined to favour the losing parties being 
responsible for all legal costs and the restoration of the financial situation of the winning party 
before the court case. The other respondents, in particular the SMEs, are very skeptical regarding 
the efficiency of these ideas. The skepticisms among the patent owners even increases related to the 
proposal of introducing caps on ICT patent court case costs, which are recoverable by the winning 
party. The same is true for restricting plaintiffs by only challenging one ICT patent of one defendant 
in any given court case. In particular, companies providing IPR services and companies supplying 
components doubt the effectiveness of this restriction. However, the non-patenting respondents 
had even slightly better evaluate these two suggestions. 
In order to avoid court cases, the support of mediation and arbitration processes to reach a mutually 
satisfactory settlement of ICT patent disputes is significantly more appreciated by patent owners and 
in particular by the network operators compared to the other respondents. It is very likely, that they 
have already had positive experience with arbitration and mediation, which is also reported by some 
interviewees. In contrast, they are not at all convinced about the effectiveness of publicly supported 
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insurances against ICT patent litigations, which are slightly more positively considered by the other 
respondents and the SMEs.  
Finally, the influence of the European trade secret regulations on the incentives to file ICT patents is 
quite ambivalent and difficult to assess, as one third of the respondents were not able to provide an 
evaluation. However, the SMEs traditionally relying on this instrument are slightly more confident 
regarding the effectiveness of this instrument in promoting innovation in ICT. 
In general, the proposed solutions derived from the literature, the interviews and partly from the 
statistical analysis of WP 2 were perceived by the majority of the respondents of the stakeholder 
survey not to be effective in promoting ICT innovation.  This is contradictory to the high agreement 
on the relevance of most challenges. However, the assessment of the challenges differ depending on 
patent ownership and company size, because patent owners perceived less and SMEs more 
relevance of the challenges. In addition, even within organisations, management perceives the 
challenges more severely compared to legal or IT experts. However, these differences do not exist in 
their assessment of the effectiveness of almost all proposals. Therefore, the consequence of this 
comprehensive impact assessment covering all relevant challenges and all possible solutions is not 
to stick to the status quo, but rather to prioritize the most convincing solutions (especially from the 
perspective of those who do not own ICT patents as well as SMEs).  
Not surprisingly, the respondents put the focus within the patent application and granting phase on 
the various approaches improving patent quality. The other more specific proposal being considered 
to be effective for promoting innovation is raising and specifying the bar for patents on computer-
implemented inventions and excluding the patentability of “software as such”, which is in line with 
the current regulations of the European Patent Convention.  Another observation, which supports 
the status quo of the existing regulation, is the skepticism towards the effectiveness of changing 
patent application, but also of renewal and even court fees. The impact of these cost components on 
the behavior of the various stakeholders is limited. Reducing the protection period and the time to 
grant ICT patents is though a slightly more convincing argument. However, the protection period is 
regulated by TRIPS and therefore difficult to change.  
The option of the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court  (UPC) allowing for the separation of 
infringement and validity issues to be treated in different courts, i.e. bifurcation, is perceived 
critically, especially by the patent owners. However, the specialized courts to be implemented within 
the UPC reflect the expressed needs of the stakeholders. Besides these institutional aspects, experts 
perceive the need to address the possible challenges caused by Patent Assertion Entities with 
regulations. However, based on the interviews, the details remain open as to how these regulations 
would be shaped in order to be effective. The second challenge is increasing the transparency of the 
licensing agreements related to Standard-Essential Patents (SEPs), which is assumed to be effectively 
achieved by providing more information, including product specifications and licensing fees. 
The recently published EC Working Paper “Putting intellectual property at the service of SMEs to 
foster innovation and growth in the Single Market Strategy” (EC 2016) proposes some support 
measures focusing on start-ups and  SMEs “…addressing sub-optimal use of IPR by them across the 
EU”. On the one hand, the results of our survey support the streamlining of European IPR awareness 
schemes for SMEs. This is attributed to SMEs responses often revealing that they are not able to 
assess both the relevance of the challenges and the effectiveness of the proposed measures. On the 
other hand, the support for developing an EU IPR mediation and arbitration network for SMEs has to 
be considered carefully as its effectiveness in promoting innovation has only been evaluated with 
ambivalence by the respondents to our survey. The same degree of skepticism exists for publicly 
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supported insurance schemes for litigation. However, SMEs are more positive. Therefore, the  
creation  of  European-level  insurance  schemes  for  litigation  and  IPR theft can be justified by the 
results of our survey, but the critical assessments raised by some interviewees should be taken into 
account. Finally, expanding the support of funding  schemes to support IPR use by SMEs might be 
not so effective, because the application costs are no major challenge and changing costs structures 
are not considered to be very effective.   
Figure 11 Assessment of solutions for ICT patents promoting innovation regarding enforcing and implementing patents 
ranging from not effective (1) to very effective (4)  
1.? A declaration of willingness to grant a license for commercial use to anyone (license of right L.O.R.) 
is required to receive the maximum of 20 years of protection for ICT patents 
2.? A set of well-known and trustable patent pledges, i.e. voluntary commitments by patent holders to 
give up some of the rights associated to the patent (e.g. grant permission for commercial use 
without any direct compensation, no injunctions, FRAND, etc.), is defined 
3.? Technology exchange clearing houses are publicly supported to support bilateral licensing 
negotiations 
4.? Regulations to restrict the activities for Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs) are established 
5.? Publication of information incl. product specifications and licensing fees for Standard-Essential ICT 
patents should be encouraged 
6.? Public policies support the formation and development of ICT patent pools, especially of SEPs, incl. 
providing incentives for organisations to join 
7.? Public policies support the formation and development of bilateral or joint licensing programs, incl. 
providing incentives for organisations to develop these 
8.? Compatible licensing solutions for Open Source Software and ICT patents are developed 
9.? Only Royalty-Free ICT patents shall be integrated into Open Source Software 
10.? Licensing terms of bilateral licensing agreements should be published 
11.? Defensive ICT patent aggregators are publicly supported 
12.? Insurances against ICT patent litigations are publicly supported (incl. provided by state insurance) 
13.? Trade secret regulations reduce the incentive to file ICT patents 
14.? Mediation and arbitration processes to reach a mutually satisfactory settlement of ICT patent 
disputes outside of court are further publicly supported 
15.? Court fees for ICT patent disputes are increased 
16.? Legal costs for ICT patent disputes in courts are covered by the losing party 
17.? Financial situation in an ICT patent dispute of the winning party before the court case is reasonably 
restored 
18.? Caps on ICT patent court case costs that are recoverable by the winning party are introduced 
19.? A plaintiff can only challenge one ICT patent of one defendant in any given court case 
20.? Infringement and validity issues regarding ICT patents are tried together before the same court 
21.? Specialised courts instead of general courts should deal with ICT patent disputes 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12 Assessment of solutions for ICT patents promoting innovation regarding enforcing and implementing patents 
ranging from not effective (1) to very effective (4) (patent owners (yes) vs non-patent owners (no))   
1.? A declaration of willingness to grant a license for commercial use to anyone 
(license of right L.O.R.) is required to receive the maximum of 20 years of 
protection for ICT patents 
2.? A set of well-known and trustable patent pledges, i.e. voluntary commitments by 
patent holders to give up some of the rights associated to the patent (e.g. grant 
permission for commercial use without any direct compensation, no injunctions, 
FRAND, etc.), is defined 
3.? Technology exchange clearing houses are publicly supported to support bilateral 
licensing negotiations 
4.? Regulations to restrict the activities for Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs) are 
established 
5.? Publication of information incl. product specifications and licensing fees for 
Standard-Essential ICT patents should be encouraged 
6.? Public policies support the formation and development of ICT patent pools, 
especially of SEPs, incl. providing incentives for organisations to join 
7.? Public policies support the formation and development of bilateral or joint 
licensing programs, incl. providing incentives for organisations to develop these 
8.? Compatible licensing solutions for Open Source Software and ICT patents are 
developed 
9.? Only Royalty-Free ICT patents shall be integrated into Open Source Software 
10.? Licensing terms of bilateral licensing agreements should be published 
11.? Defensive ICT patent aggregators are publicly supported 
12.? Insurances against ICT patent litigations are publicly supported (incl. provided by 
state insurance) 
13.? Trade secret regulations reduce the incentive to file ICT patents 
14.? Mediation and arbitration processes to reach a mutually satisfactory settlement of 
ICT patent disputes outside of court are further publicly supported 
15.? Court fees for ICT patent disputes are increased 
16.? Legal costs for ICT patent disputes in courts are covered by the losing party 
17.? Financial situation in an ICT patent dispute of the winning party before the court 
case is reasonably restored 
18.? Caps on ICT patent court case costs that are recoverable by the winning party are 
introduced 
19.? A plaintiff can only challenge one ICT patent of one defendant in any given court 
case 
20.? Infringement and validity issues regarding ICT patents are tried together before 
the same court
21.? Specialised courts instead of general courts should deal with ICT patent disputes 
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4.3.3.3 Correlation of the feasibility of solutions and their assessment 
 
Although the feasibility of selected options will be discussed in the chapter about the impact 
assessment, we provide a general overview of the solutions targeting the application and granting of 
patents on the one hand and enforcing and implementing patents on the other hand. The following 
tables give an indication in whose responsibility the possible changes are, what specific steps have to 
be taken and how the likelihood of such changes might be. 
Table 10 Proposed solutions related to application and granting of patents and assessment of their feasibility 
Solutions Responsible Effort Likelihood 
The application fees for ICT 
patents are raised 
National 
governments or 
European Patent 
Convention 
Raising application fees Feasible, but unlikely 
because of reduced 
revenues 
The quality of granted ICT 
patents is improved by raising 
the required degree of novelty 
Patent offices Increasing effort in 
examination 
Feasible, but unlikely 
because of higher costs 
and less revenues 
The quality of granted ICT 
patents is improved by raising 
the required inventive step 
Patent offices Increasing effort in 
examination 
Feasible, but unlikely 
because of higher costs 
and less revenues 
The quality of granted ICT 
patents is improved by 
narrowing their scope 
Patent offices Increasing effort in 
examination 
Feasible, but unlikely 
because of higher costs 
and less revenues 
Crowd-sourced validity checks 
support the patent validity 
checks by patent offices 
National 
governments or 
European Patent 
Convention; patent 
offices 
Investment in crowd-
sourcing tools and 
providing incentives 
Feasible, but unlikely 
because of higher costs, 
less revenues and loss of 
reputation 
Granting an ICT patent 
requires already the 
implementation of the 
invention 
National 
governments or 
European Patent 
Convention; patent 
offices 
Increasing effort in 
examination 
Feasible, but unlikely 
because of higher costs 
and less revenues 
Raising and specifying (e.g. 
related to technicality) the bar 
for patents on computer-
implemented inventions 
National 
governments or 
European Patent 
Convention; patent 
offices 
Initially increasing 
effort in examination, 
in the long run in case 
of simplifications lower 
effort possible  
Feasible, but unlikely 
because of higher costs 
and less revenues 
Software is excluded from 
patenting both for the 
program listing and the 
technical content underlying 
the software 
National 
governments or 
European Patent 
Convention; patent 
offices 
Less effort in 
examination 
Feasible, but unlikely 
because of barriers to 
change current practice 
Patents for “Software as such” 
are granted, i.e. the program 
listing is patentable 
National 
governments or 
European Patent 
Convention; patent 
offices 
Less effort in 
examination 
Feasible, but unlikely 
because of previous 
discussions and of 
barriers to change 
current practice 
ICT patents are granted within 
five years 
National 
governments or 
European Patent 
Convention; patent 
offices 
Increasing effort in 
examination 
Feasible, but unlikely 
because of higher costs 
and less revenues 
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The renewal fees for granted 
ICT patents are increased 
during all the protection 
period 
National 
governments or 
European Patent 
Convention; 
Raising application fees Feasible, but unlikely 
because of uncertain 
impacts on revenues 
The protection period for ICT 
patents is shortened to 10 
years 
WTO based on 
majority of national 
governments 
No effort Feasible, but very 
unlikely because of 
missing consensus to 
changes TRIPS and 
uncertain impacts on 
revenues 
 
If we compare the feasibility to change the current framings in the application and granting phase of 
patenting with the assessment of their effectiveness to promote innovation by the stakeholders, it 
strikes that easy achievable, but disputable changes, like raising the patent applications fees or 
granting patents for “software as such” are perceived at least effective. In contrast, excluding 
software in general from patenting does not require specific financial efforts and only changes in the 
legal framework, but is evaluated a being quite effective by those stakeholders not owning patents, 
in particular the members of the OSS community. Furthermore, the solutions to raise patent quality 
need significant investments into the patent examination process, but no changes in the legal 
framework. They are evaluated just below “effective”. In summary, the assessment of the 
effectiveness of proposed solutions by the stakeholders does not really correlate positively with the 
feasibility of their implementation, i.e. the more difficult the solutions to implement does not 
necessarily lead to a higher assessment of their effectiveness by the stakeholders.  
       
Table 11 Proposed solutions regarding enforcing and implementing patents and assessment of their 
feasibility 
Solutions Responsible Effort Likelihood 
A declaration of 
willingness to grant a 
license for commercial 
use to anyone (license of 
right L.O.R.) is required 
to receive the maximum 
of 20 years of protection 
for ICT patents 
WTO based on majority 
of national governments 
Change of Art. 33 of 
TRIPS Agreement 
Feasible, but very 
unlikely because of 
missing consensus to 
changes TRIPS and 
uncertain impacts on 
revenues 
A set of well-known and 
trustable patent pledges, 
i.e. voluntary 
commitments by patent 
holders to give up some 
of the rights associated 
to the patent (e.g. grant 
permission for 
commercial use without 
any direct compensation, 
National governments or 
European Patent 
Convention 
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no injunctions, FRAND, 
etc.), is defined 
Technology exchange 
clearing houses are 
publicly supported to 
support bilateral 
licensing negotiations 
National governments or 
European Patent 
Convention 
Investment in the 
establishment and 
maintenance of 
clearing houses 
Feasible, but unlikely 
because of higher 
costs and missing 
incentives; 
demonstrator needed 
Regulations to restrict 
the activities for Patent 
Assertion Entities (PAEs) 
are established 
National governments 
or European Union 
Effort to develop 
and implement 
national or 
European 
regulations 
Feasible, but unlikely 
due to missing 
information about 
extent of damages 
caused and concrete 
solutions 
Publication of 
information incl. product 
specifications and 
licensing fees for 
Standard-Essential ICT 
patents should be 
encouraged 
Patent offices, 
standardization body, 
national governments 
or European Union 
Effort to develop 
and maintain a 
scheme 
Feasible, but unlikely 
because of unclear 
responsibilities and 
missing incentives 
Public policies support 
the formation and 
development of ICT 
patent pools, especially 
of SEPs, incl. providing 
incentives for 
organizations to join 
National governments 
or European Union 
Effort to develop 
and maintain public 
policies 
Feasible, but unlikely 
because of missing 
evidence about 
positive impacts and 
missing incentives 
Public policies support 
the formation and 
development of bilateral 
or joint licensing 
programs, incl. providing 
incentives for 
organizations to develop 
these 
National governments 
or European Union 
Effort to develop 
and maintain public 
policies 
Feasible, but unlikely 
because of missing 
evidence about 
positive impacts and 
missing incentives 
Compatible licensing 
solutions for Open 
Source Software and ICT 
patents are developed 
Industry and OSS 
community 
Effort to develop 
and implement 
licensing solutions 
Feasible, but unlikely 
because of missing 
evidence about 
positive impacts and 
missing incentives 
Only Royalty-Free ICT 
patents shall be 
Industry and OSS 
community 
Little effort, 
because in general 
implemented 
Very likely 
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integrated into Open 
Source Software 
Licensing terms of 
bilateral licensing 
agreements should be 
published 
National governments 
or European Union 
Effort to develop 
and implement 
national or 
European 
regulations 
Feasible, but unlikely 
due to missing 
information about 
extent of benefit 
caused and options to 
circumvent such a 
regulation 
Defensive ICT patent 
aggregators are publicly 
supported 
National governments 
or European Union 
Effort to develop 
and maintain public 
policies 
Feasible, but unlikely 
because of missing 
evidence about 
positive impacts and 
missing incentives 
Insurances against ICT 
patent litigations are 
publicly supported (incl. 
provided by state 
insurance) 
National governments 
or European Union 
Effort to develop 
and maintain public 
policies 
Feasible, but unlikely 
because of missing 
evidence about 
positive impacts and 
missing incentives 
Trade secret regulations 
reduce the incentive to 
file ICT patents 
Trade Secret Directive 
has been adopted; 
Implementation by 
the EU Member States 
Effort to implement 
the Trade Secret 
Directive by 
Member States 
Very likely, but 
impact  on ICT 
patents is unclear 
Mediation and 
arbitration processes to 
reach a mutually 
satisfactory settlement 
of ICT patent disputes 
outside of court are 
further publicly 
supported 
National governments 
or European Union or 
WIPO 
Effort to develop 
and maintain public 
policies 
Feasible, but unlikely 
because of missing 
evidence about 
positive impacts and 
missing incentives 
Court fees for ICT patent 
disputes are increased 
National governments Little effort Feasible, but unlikely 
because of missing 
incentives 
Legal costs for ICT patent 
disputes in courts are 
covered by the losing 
party 
National governments Little effort Already realized in 
patents laws of some 
countries 
Financial situation in an 
ICT patent dispute of the 
winning party before the 
National governments Effort to perform 
analyses by the 
courts 
Already realized in 
patents laws of some 
countries 
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court case is reasonably 
restored 
Caps on ICT patent court 
case costs that are 
recoverable by the 
winning party are 
introduced 
National governments Little effort In some countries 
realized, but 
harmonized solution is 
unlikely 
A plaintiff can only 
challenge one ICT patent 
of one defendant in any 
given court case 
National governments Little effort In some countries 
realized, but 
harmonized solution is 
unlikely 
Infringement and validity 
issues regarding ICT 
patents are tried 
together before the 
same court 
National governments, 
European Patent 
Convention, Unified 
Patent Court 
Significant changes 
required 
In some countries 
realized, but 
harmonized solution is 
unlikely 
Specialized courts 
instead of general courts 
should deal with ICT 
patent disputes 
National governments, 
European Patent 
Convention, Unified 
Patent Court 
Significant changes 
required 
In some countries 
realized, but 
harmonized solution is 
unlikely 
 
If we compare the feasibility to change the current framings regarding enforcing and implementing 
patents with the assessment of their effectiveness to promote innovation by the stakeholders, we 
observe different patterns. On the one hand, the establishment of specialized courts or the 
treatment of infringement and validity issues before the same court, which are quite challenging 
changes in general, but could be achieved within the current the implementation of the Unified 
Patent Court at the European level, are assessed to be between low and medium effective. One the 
other hand, the challenging solutions of establishing regulations for PAEs and the publication of 
licensing fees for Standard-Essential ICT patents reach the same level of assessment. Obviously, 
there is no linear correlation between the likelihood of implementing changes and the assessment of 
their effectiveness. However, the “easy” solution of just raising the court fees for ICT patent disputes 
is not convincing for the majority of the stakeholders. Overall, the more convincing solutions are 
obviously – despite some exceptions – more difficult to accomplish.    
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4.3.4 Assessment of RRI dimensions regarding ICT patents 
 
In the last section of the survey, the respondents have been asked to assess the relevance of the five 
dimensions of implementing Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) regarding ICT patents. 
According to the European Commission, “Responsible research and innovation (RRI) is an approach 
that anticipates and assesses potential implications and societal expectations with regard to 
research and innovation, with the aim to foster the design of inclusive and sustainable research and 
innovation.” In practice, RRI is implemented as a package that includes diverse actors and public 
engagement in research and innovation, enabling easier access to scientific results, the integration  
of gender and ethics in the research and innovation content and process, and formal and informal 
science education (https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/h2020-section/responsible-
research-innovation). 
Overall, the respondents assess the relevance of the five dimensions as only medium relevant. 
Furthermore, around one quarter of them indicate that they are not able to provide an assessment. 
Overall, this result reflects the limited awareness of the interviewed experts of the RRI dimensions 
and also their low evaluation of its relevance, which is confirmed by other studies, e.g. Stahl et al. 
(2017).  
However, there are some particularities to be considered. Firstly, the facilitation of access to 
scientific results is considered the most relevant dimension of RRI, which corresponds to the insights 
from the interviews stressing – at least partly – the importance of open access. Second, multi-actor 
and public engagement in research and innovation still achieves a medium relevance by the 
assessment of the experts. This dimension has been marginally touched on in the interviews by 
referring to open innovation processes. Third, formal and informal science education is similarly 
evaluated, although almost never mentioned in the interviews. Fourth, the ethical dimension in 
research and innovation receives slightly lower support by the experts. In contrast to the discussions 
regarding the pharmaceutical and biotechnological industries, limited discussions about the ethics of 
ICT patents took place. This has been already been revealed by the literature review, but – as 
outlined above – also supported both by the statements and the constrained awareness of the 
interviewees, who are obviously not aware of the meanwhile broad discourse on the ethics of ICT 
(Rogerson 2011) or computer (Stahl et al. 2016). Finally, the gender issues of the research and 
innovation content and process are considered of low relevance for RRI. One third of the 
respondents are even not able to assess the relevance of this dimension. This result of the survey 
corresponds to the interviewees being aware of the gender bias in ICT, but seeing little necessity to 
intervene.  
In general, the patent owner and the large companies attribute a slightly, but not significantly higher 
relevance to all five dimensions of RRI. However, the representatives of public and semi-public 
research institutes and the OSS community attribute even a high relevance in enabling an easier 
access to scientific results via ICT patents. However, most written comments in the open answer 
section are provided to this dimension. A majority of responses point to patents as hindering the 
easy access to scientific results – in contrast to scientific publications. Others consider them to be 
irrelevant and even a few stressing that patents can promote – in particular in comparison to trade 
secrets – the access to scientific results by the disclosure of the inventions. Although, multi-actor 
and public engagement in research and innovation is considered to be relevant for ICT patents, their 
proprietary character is perceived as being rather critical for involving other players. Finally, the 
independent software developers attribute almost a medium relevance to the gender dimension 
related to ICT patents in contrast to the representatives of all other business models.  
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Figure 13 Assessment of relevance of RRI dimensions regarding ICT patents ranging from very low (1) to very high (5)  
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5 IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
5.1 METHODOLOGY 
In contrast to traditional impact assessments, which focus on one specific problem (e.g. EC  2010) or 
a set of closely linked problems (EC  2011), our literature review and consultation of stakeholders 
has revealed a broad set of problems ranging from patent application over licensing to litigation. 
Consequently, we deviate from the Impact Assessment guideline of the European Commission (EC 
2009) and concentrate our impact assessment on several topics of high relevance. The problem 
description is based on the literature, including the ethics of ICT, reviewed in WP 2, the empirical 
analysis of ICT patents in WP3 and the insights from the interviews and  the stakeholder 
consultation. The selection of the options, which are not necessarily focused on the EU and can be 
implemented – in contrast to traditional impact assessments – in parallel, as well as the assessment 
of their impact on innovation in general, ethical issues and open access within the context of 
responsible research and innovation in particular, and further evaluation criteria are based on the 
review of the literature, but especially on the assessment of the stakeholders. Due to the focus on 
three very generic topics, we are not able to perform a quantitative impact assessment, like in the 
case of the translation of patents  (EC 2010), but rely on already available empirical evidence and 
scientific studies. Wright (2011) proposes ethical impact assessments for ICT not only for specific 
areas of ICT, but also for policy-makers and regulatory authorities when they are considering a new 
ICT-related policy or regulation. However, changes in the patent regime are so generic that no 
specific ethical implications can be derived confirming the need for context-specific analysis argued 
by Stahl et al. (2017). Therefore, we consider the ethical dimensions on a rather generic level within 
the impact assessment focusing on innovation.      
The presented policy options are chosen to solve the identified problems without prejudice to their 
legal feasibility. The policy options are discussed and measured against the following pre-defined 
criteria: 
Effectiveness related to innovation in general: The extent to which the measure fulfils the objective 
of promoting innovation in general. 
Effectiveness related to ethics within responsible research and innovation: The extent to which the 
measure fulfils the objective of considering ethical aspects in the context of promoting responsible 
research and innovation. 
Effectiveness related to open access within responsible research and innovation: The extent to 
which the measure fulfils the objective of promoting open access as one dimension of responsible 
research and innovation. 
Cost reduction: The estimated cost reduction for the users of the patent system, in particular, the 
level of potential cost savings per patent and, more generally, for the whole patent system. 
Simplification: The extent of foreseeable simplification of the legal and administrative complexity of 
the current patent system. 
Legally security: The proposed measure arrangements must ensure or at least increase legal 
certainty related to patenting and patents.  
Political feasibility: The possibility to reach an agreement on each of the options must be assessed. 
If numerous attempts to address the problems identified have already taken place in the past, the 
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assessment of the past failures and in particular the reasons for these failures will take into account 
in evaluating the political feasibility of each option. 
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5.2 MAJOR PROBLEMS, OPTIONS AND IMPACTS 
Based on the insights of the literature, the empirical analysis and the stakeholder consultation, we 
have identified and selected three topics to focus on, i.e. patent quality, the patent protection 
period and litigation, for conducting the impact assessment. The selection is based on the relevance 
of the problem, but considers also the options governments have to change the system. Therefore, 
approaches crucially depending on industry initiatives and support are not selected. Furthermore, 
the definition of the problems is a broader compared to the specific challenges discussed in the 
interviews and addressed in the survey, because this allows to match each problem with several 
possible options.      
5.2.1 Patent quality 
5.2.1.1 Problem description 
One of the main challenges addressed in many publications is achieving a satisfactory level of patent 
quality. The patent quality which is defined as “the degree to which a patent satisfies the statutory 
patentability requirements, leaves little doubt as to its breadth and discloses information that 
enables a person skilled in the art to implement that protected invention” (EPO 2012, p. 8). Patent 
offices around the world have been focusing on quality. One example is the so-called EPO “Raising 
the bar on patent quality” programme (EPO 2007) aiming to achieve better patent applications from 
the very beginning. In detail, the EPO increased its fees and required  applicants to restrict the scope 
of  subject  matter  considered  in  prior  art  search and  examination.  Consequently, in patents 
granted by the EPO, the number and length of claims started to decline, when new claims fees 
became effective (Harhoff 2016). In addition, the grant rate, which started to decline in the 1990s 
(Frietsch et al. 2010), remained below 50% (EPO 2017). 
However, the majority of the respondents to the survey complains about the low level of quality of 
granted patents, in particular their rather large scope. In addition, the empirical analysis of WP2 
revealed the decreasing number of forward citations as one indicator of patent quality, although 
citations being questioned as good quality indicator, e.g. by Bessen (2008). 
In particular, the quality of patents on computer-implemented inventions (CII) or software patents 
are perceived by the majority of the stakeholders to challenge innovation of ICT-related 
technologies. In particular, the OSS community complains that the use of ICT patents protected 
technology generates problems for the use of Open Source Software. Consequently, this challenge 
has to be tackled by an effective solution. The relevance of this challenge might increase, because 
the number of patent applications on IT methods for management has more than doubled in the last 
ten years (EPO 2017), although the number of granted patents remained below one hundred per 
year.  
5.2.1.2 Option 1: Baseline scenario 
Under this scenario, the current patent system in Europe would work in the same way as in the past. 
In detail, we would observe an increasing number of patent applications in ICT assuming an 
extrapolation of previous trends. Related to patent quality, we can also assume a continuation of 
sticking to the objective of keeping the grant rate below 50%. However, in absolute terms we have 
then to expect an increasing number of granted patents. In addition, patents on CII accounted 
according to Frietsch et al. (2015) for around one third of all applications at the EPO since the year 
2000. This share can be assumed to be stable or even increasing. However, due to general increase 
in patent applications, the absolute number of patents on CII is expected to increase.   
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Under this option, the identified challenges of the current European patent system would not be 
addressed and the costs and the complexity of the current system would stay unchanged or even 
increase. Based on the assessment of the stakeholders, the exploitation of the full innovation 
potential in Europe would be hindered. Therefore, this solution is not effective for promoting 
innovation. In terms of cost reduction and simplification, the expected increase in litigation would 
not be stopped and the complexity of the patent landscape will tend to increase. Therefore, this 
option would provide no additional benefit to the active and passive users of the patent system. 
However, the costs would increase for the applicants due to the increasing number of patents 
applied by the other applicants. Finally, this option is also not in line with the political engagement of 
the Commission in promoting RRI.  
5.2.1.3 Option 2: Raising application fees 
Under this option, the patent offices would raise the application fees significantly.However, it 
remains ambivalent whether the objective to promote innovation would be achieved. De 
Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2012) show that the reduction of fees by the EPO 
in the late 1990s increased the demand for patents, i.e. patent applications in Europe. The 
interviewees, but also the majority of the stakeholders responding to the survey consider raising the 
application fees as being not effective to reduce the applications, in particular of patents of low 
quality. In addition, the negative impact on SMEs is mentioned. This is in line with the another 
survey (EC  2015b). Here, the respondents indicated that the cost of patents was a relevant factor, 
but also the relevance of  many other factors, that impact on innovative behaviour. 
Although according to some interviewees, higher application fees would distract patents of low 
quality, the majority of the experts perceive this instrument as not being effective in raising patent 
quality, because other costs associated with attorneys are much more relevant.  In contrast, higher 
applications fees would generate higher costs especially for SMEs, whereas for large companies they 
do not matter so severely. Overall, this instrument would further disadvantage SMEs. Therefore, 
some experts propose to reduce the application fees for this type of applicant. However, it was 
suggested that the increased revenues are could be used by the patent offices to increase their 
efforts in the examination processes and eventually patent quality. 
Whereas the patenting entities of the patent system incur higher costs, which might be negative for 
their investment in innovation, the innovators not using patents might benefit because they are 
confronted with a lower number of patent applications and less patent thickets. According to  
Cockburn and MacGarvie (2011) and Hall et al. (2017), patent thickets reduce entry into new 
technologies and markets.  
Overall, the innovators in ICT, including the OSS, not using patents may benefit from higher 
application fees for patents and consequently less patent applications, whereas the applicants might 
reduce their patent applications and eventually research and innovation efforts. Although the latter 
are fewer actors in numbers, their R&D investments are significant for the whole ICT sector. 
Therefore, the overall impact on innovation is ambivalent. 
5.2.1.4 Option 3: Raising patent quality 
Patent quality can be raised by appropriate examination procedure of the patent offices to 
discourage trivial, insufficient or unelaborated patent applications (EC JRC 2015a). The measures to 
be taken in order to improve patent quality should be cost efficient and should not extend the 
patent granting process (EC 2015a).  
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In contrast to the limited effectiveness of raising the application fees, the quality of ICT patents can 
more effectively be increased by raising the required degree of novelty. Here, this requirement is – 
according to the majority of the interviewees active in patenting – satisfactory fulfilled by the 
European Patent Office. However, the representatives of the OSS community suggest significantly 
increasing the novelty requirements. 
Raising the required inventive step is certainly another option. However, the proof of the inventive 
steps is rather challenging. Therefore, most of the interviewees did not comment on this measure. 
However, the representatives of the OSS suggest that patent offices require more information from 
the applicants to make better decisions regarding the inventive steps eventually, leading to a much 
lower number of granted patents.  
Narrowing the scope of patents is another measue to raise their quality. However, the majority of 
the interviewees either is satisfied with the current scope of patents or sees no possibility to narrow 
it further without utilizing heavy investments. Obviously, the new policies introduced by the EPO in 
2008 have been effective. However, the respondents to the survey not owning patents are more 
convinced about this approach. 
Crowd-sourced validity checks could support the patent validity checks by patent offices, but several 
initiatives initiated in the past failed. Therefore, this approach is not supported.  
Raising the patent quality would certainly contribute to the objective of promoting innovation. First, 
the grant rate is expected to be reduced further. Consequently, applicants of patents will invest 
more in the quality of their patents, which requires higher investment into R&D. Second, a higher 
quality of the patents will reduce the risk of patents to become invalid, i.e. legal insecurity will be 
lower for both patent owner and patent implementers. Third, a higher quality of patents will also 
increase their value as a source of information for non-patenting actors. Overall, we observe several 
innovation-driving forces of a higher patent quality, especially for the innovators without patents. 
5.2.1.5 Option 4: Specifying the criteria for patents on CII 
A specific dimension of raising the patent quality is related to patents on computer-implemented 
inventions. Since the statutory patentability standards for ICT patents (e.g. technicality, etc.) differ 
among patent offices, the specification of the criteria for patents on CII seems to be an adequate 
solution also by the majority patent owners. The other extreme option of granting “Software as 
such”, i.e. the program listing is patentable, is completely denied by all responding stakeholders, i.e. 
also by the patent holders. Although the exclusion of software from patenting both for the program 
listing and the technical content underlying the software is endorsed by the majority of the non-
patenting organisations, it is not accepted by the patent owners. Furthermore, Frietsch et al. (2015) 
show that around one third of the patent applications at the European Patent Office is already 
related to CII and might be difficult to abolish. Consequently, specifying the criteria for patents on CII 
is the proposed feasible option. 
The impact on the patent applicants will be positive, because the transparency regarding the 
patentability of CII will be increased and the risk in the granting process reduced. Overall, the 
specification of the criteria also addressing the inventive step 
(http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/09/12/grant-philpott-patenting-computer-implemented-
inventions-europe/id=87865/) is expected to reduce the number of granted patents on CII. 
Consequently, the impact of the innovators without patents, including the OSS, is expected to be 
positive, as already identified via a survey among German software companies during the 
discussions of an opening of the EPC to software patents (Blind et al. 2005). In contrast, Eberhardt et 
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al. (2016) report a positive impact of a proposed broadening of patent eligibility to include software, 
but for software companies active in India.  
5.2.1.6 Comparing the options 
Overall, the patent quality related option is expected to have a positive impact on innovation in ICT, 
but specifying the criteria for patents on CII is even more positive for innovation.   
Table 10 Expected impact of options on innovation 
Policy Option Patenting entities 
(Overall) 
Patenting entities 
(SMEs) 
Innovators in 
general without 
patents 
Baseline scenario 
Option 1 
0 0 0 
Option 2: Raising 
application fees  
- -- + 
Option 3: 
Raising patent quality 
+ + ++ 
Option 4:  Specifying 
the criteria for patents 
on CII 
++ ++ ++ 
"0": no change "+": positive impact "-": negative impact 
 
In a second step, we also look at the impact of the options on the other five criteria of the impact 
assessment. Regarding responsible research and innovation, we explicitly differentiate between the 
dimension of ethical concerns and open access to research results and even research data. The 
ethics of ICT has already been focused in the literature review and addressed in the interviews. 
Raising the application fees has a two-sided effect on the open access to research results. On the 
one hand, the expected reduction of patent applications reduces the access to scientific results, if 
the inventions are eventually kept secret. On the other hand, avoiding trivial patents reduces the 
search costs and ICT patents with possible negative ethicalimplications. If raising the patent quality 
includes also the consideration of ethical aspects, then this will have certainly a positive impact on 
RRI, whereas open access is not influenced because of the publication of the patent application. 
Finally, specifying the criteria for patents on CII does not address specific ethical issues, but would 
satisfy the expressed needs of the Open Source communities, if this specification facilitates the open 
access to scientific results.   
Whereas raising the application fees certainly increases the cost for the applicants at least in the 
short term, raising the patent quality might even create further costs, because the likelihood of 
granting patents will decrease, which requires higher investments for the applicants in patent 
quality, i.e. not only in the application, but also in research and innovation. The further specification 
of the criteria for patents on CII should create no significant additional costs.  
Raising patent application fees and patent quality might contribute indirectly to the simplification of 
the patent system by reducing the number of applications and grants. However, if specifying the 
criteria for patents on CII is successful, it will have the highest immediate impact on simplifying the 
ICT patent system.  
Legal security is certainly increased by raising the patent quality, because litigations might be 
reduced. This could be even the case, if raising the application fees will reduce the number of patent 
applications. However, specifying the criteria for patents on CII will certainly contribute most to legal 
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security, because it will have an impact both on patent applications, because the applicant has more 
transparency about the requirements for an application on CII, and the examination process, 
because the examiner has a clearer guideline for his decision making process. Finally, all other 
stakeholders influenced by patents on CII also benefit regarding legal security.  
The feasibility of the baseline scenario is high, because the feasibility of the other three option is 
low. First, after the successful reduction of application fees in Europe in order to promote the 
competitiveness of the European industry, an abolishment of this approach is almost unfeasible. 
Second, raising the patent quality is asked for by all stakeholders. However, further heavy 
investments in patent examination is necessary, which is – taking into account the budget 
restrictions – rather unlikely. Third, specifying the criteria for patents on CII is not costly. However, 
the willingness to change Article 52 EPC after the intensive debates at the beginning of the century is 
certainly not high. Overall, changes related to patent quality cannot be expected despite the positive 
impacts to be expected in various dimensions. 
Table 11 Comparing the impacts of the options 
Policy 
Option 
Effective-
ness rela-
ted to inno-
vation in 
general 
Effective-
ness related 
to ethical 
issues 
within RRI 
Effective-
ness 
related 
to open 
access 
within 
RRI 
Cost 
reduction 
Simplification Legal 
security 
Feasibility 
Baseline 
scenario 
Option 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 High 
Option 2: 
Raising 
application 
fees  
0 + 0 - + 0 Low  
Option 3: 
Raising 
patent 
quality 
+ + 0 -- + + Low 
Option 4:  
Specifying 
the criteria 
for patents 
on CII 
++ 0 ++ 0 ++ ++ Low 
 "0": no change "+": positive impact "-": negative impact 
 
5.2.2 Patent protection period 
5.2.2.1 Problem description 
Despite the higher dynamics in the ICT technologies and markets, patents are still a very attractive 
instrument for companies. This is not only supported by the high and still increasing number of 
patent applications, but also by the fact that many of them are renewed to the maximum protection 
period and even further prolonged via follow-up patents. However, critical voices question the 
effectiveness of patents if they are valid for only a few years due to very dynamic technological 
progress. In practice, patent protection is only asked for around 10 years on average (Frietsch et al. 
2010), i.e. the de facto protection period is already only half of the maximum of 20 years. Therefore, 
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the concerns raised related to the lengthy decision processes in the patent offices becoming even 
more relevant, i.e. the increase from first application to granting a patent identified in WP2 is a 
severe problem. Consequently, the majority of the respondents to our survey – in particular the 
independent software developers – agrees that 20 years of protection are long 
Therefore, we consider two options to tackle the problem. On the one hand raising the renewal fees 
will make keeping patents valid to the maximum of the protection period more expensive. On the 
other hand, we consider the reduction of the maximum protection period to 10 years. Speeding up 
the granting process to a maximum of five years would have been a third option, but here the 
behavior of the applicants, e.g. asking for amendments, has to be considered influential on achieving 
this objective. Therefore, we focus just on two options in addition the baseline scenario.  
5.2.2.2 Option 1: Baseline scenario 
Under this scenario, the current patent system in Europe would work in the same way as in the past. 
The observed trend of an increasing number of patent applications in ICT would continue and the 
renewal decisions will not change. However, Frietsch et al. (2010) observe in the 1990s a reduced 
average protection period compared to the 1980s. Extrapolating this trend would mean that the 
patent owners will keep their patents not as long as in the past. However, recent empirical evidence 
is missing. 
5.2.2.3 Option 2: Raising renewal fees 
In contrast to the ineffectiveness of raising the application fees for patents, higher renewal fees 
towards the end of the protection period are perceived as being effective by a significant share of 
the experts. The current structure of the renewal fees allows even SMEs to enter the patent system 
and in case of success provides them with the resources to pay the higher fees in later periods. 
However, some experts also argue that the commercial exploitation of patents takes – even in ICT – 
time. Therefore, higher renewal fees might lead companies to give up patents, which turn out to be 
valuable only later. However, this false decision of the patent owner is benefitting all other 
innovators. 
Overall, raising renewal fees will not harm the innovation activities of patenting companies, except 
to a limit extend SMEs, but will make more originally patented technologies available to all other 
innovators in the market, which is promoting innovation in general. The increased revenues for the 
patent offices might allow them to invest in improving the patent quality by hiring more and better 
trained examiners. 
5.2.2.4 Option 3: Reducing maximum protection period 
The more drastic intervention would be the reduction of the maximum protection to ten instead of 
twenty years. Overall, the respondents perceive this option as more effective as raising the renewal 
fees. In particular, the representatives of the OSS would favor a drastic reduction of the protection 
period for ICT patents corresponding to the lifecycle of technologies and markets in ICT, because 
they perceive granted patents as long-lasting barriers for innovation. Representatives of patent 
owning and commercializing organizations argue even for a longer protection period due to the 
extended time needed from research to the final commercialization, especially of hardware-based 
technologies.  
The impact of such a drastic change on the innovation activities of patenting companies might be 
negative especially for valuable hardware based technologies, because their patent owners are not 
able to exploit the full innovation rent. In contrast, the reduction will benefit all other innovators, 
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because patented technology will be available earlier and cannot be serve as a barrier for their 
innovation activities. 
5.2.2.5 Comparing the options 
If we compare the options, we expect that the reduction of the maximum protection period will 
benefit technological companies relying on third party inventions in general most, but will be 
negative for the patenting entities of the patent system. The net impact cannot be determined. In 
the short run, it might be positive; in the end, the reduced incentives to invest in research and 
innovation might lead to a negative impact. Raising the renewal fees is only increasing the price of 
patents probably leading to a positive selection effect that only the commercially valuable invention 
will be patented and less patents just used for blocking competitors.  
Table 12 Expected impact of options on innovation 
Policy Option Patenting entities 
(Overall) 
Patenting entities 
(SMEs) 
Innovators in general 
without patents 
Baseline scenario  
Option 1 
0 0 0 
Option 2: Raising 
renewal fees  
0 - + 
Option 3: 
Reducing maximum 
protection period 
- - ++ 
"0": no change "+": positive impact "-": negative impact 
 
Looking at the impact of the options on the other fivecriteria, we would expect – in contrast to 
raising the application fees – a positive impact on open access as one dimension of responsible 
research and innovation, because the access, in the sense of usage to patented scientific results will 
be available earlier in case of the reduction of the protection period. If raising the renewal fees leads 
to a de facto reduction of patent protection period of technologies, which are for the patentees not 
commercially interesting anymore, the other innovators might be able to use these technologies for 
their innovation activities. Ethical issues are also affected, if the earlier disposable patent protected 
technologies have implications on the well-being of human beings in general and on the digital 
divides in particular. The other dimensions of RRI are not influenced. 
Whereas raising the renewal fees certainly increases the cost for the patent owners, the revenues 
for the patent offices could be used for further decreasing the application costs or even better for 
improving the patent quality. Overall, we might even expect a cost reduction for the patent offices 
due to the higher payments of the patent owners. The shortage of the protection period will reduce 
the revenues of the patent offices, which have to be compensated by higher application or renewal 
fees. However, these income sources might not sufficient, which requires higher costs for the 
governments. Overall, both option are likely to increase the costs for the patenting entities. 
Raising renewal fees and reducing patent protection might contribute indirectly to the simplification 
of the patent system by reducing the number of valid patents, which might reduce e.g. the patent 
thickets for all other innovators.  
Legal security is certainly increased by raising the renewal fees and reducing the protection period, 
because litigation risk will be reduced. In particular, PAEs are litigating other producing companies, 
when patents are more than ten years old, whereas producing companies start litigating from the 
very beginning (Love 2013).  
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The continuation of the baseline scenario is high, because the feasibility of the raising the renewal 
fees is low and the reduction of the protection period even very low. The competition between the 
patent offices will make – like in the case of raising the application fees – the increase of the renewal 
fees unlikely. Finally, it will be almost impossible to restrict the patent protection period to ten years 
due to the long tradition of the twenty years as maximum period and the requirement to change 
TRIPS. 
Table 13 Comparing the impacts of the options 
Policy 
Option 
Effectiveness 
related to 
innovation in 
general 
Effective-
ness related 
to ethical 
issues 
within RRI 
Effective-
ness 
related 
to open 
access 
within 
RRI 
Cost re-
duction 
Simplificat-
ion 
Legal 
security 
Feasibility 
Baseline 
scenario 
Option 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 High 
Option 2: 
Raising 
renewal 
fees  
0 + + - + + Low  
Option 3: 
Reducing 
maximum 
protec-
tion period 
- ++ ++ - + ++ Very low 
 "0": no change "+": positive impact "-": negative impact 
 
5.2.3 Litigation 
5.2.3.1 Problem description 
The last, but probably most important problem we address in our impact assessment is litigation. 
Both the interviews, but also the stakeholder survey reveal that both the likelihood of litigation 
(infringement) of ICT patents, but also the expected legal cost for resolution of conflicts are high. 
These subjective perceptions are confirmed by the recent study of Marco et al. (2017), which reveals 
a significant increase, i.e. almost a doubling, of patent litigation at US courts after 2010. The 
increasing trend of litigations is confirmed for SEPs, which overall are stagnating (Pohlmann and 
Blind 2016). Finally, PWC (2016) report also a stagnation of granted patents, but an increase of 
litigation. They find in particular an increasing role of Non-Practicing Entities (NPEs), which are 
comparable to PAEs. This fits to the high relevance of an increased legal uncertainty generated by 
ICT patents owned by Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs) expressed by the majority of the respondents 
to our survey. In addition to the number of litigation cases, Bessen et al. (2015) report an increase of 
litigation costs from the year 2000 to around 40 billion $ in 2010. This trend is going to continue 
according to PWC (2016). Again, both Bessen et al. (2015) and PWC (2016) reveal the increasing 
relevance of PAEs to the rise of litigation costs. In addition to the costs, the risk of litigation has to be 
mentioned. PWC (2016) reveals that NPEs have only a success rate of 25% compared to 35% of 
practicing entities, but the damages awards for NPEs almost three times greater than practicing 
entities. In summary, litigations involving NPEs or PAEs are characterized by a high level of risk 
compared to practicing entities. The high risk is confirmed for Europe by a recent  Darts-IP report – 
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‘The Rise of Non-practising Entity Cases Outside the United States’ (Darts-IP 2017),  showing the 
increasing number of litigation cases initiated by NPEs (see also Lemley and Feldman 2016 and 
Patent Dispute Report 2016). The win rate of NPE plaintiffs are far above 50% in China and Germany 
and therefore even higher than in the United States. Finally and very important for our focus on ICT 
patents, telecommunication, digital communication and computer technology dominate are 
responsible for the majority of the cases initiated by NPEs or PAEs (FTC 2016). Lemley and Melamed 
(2017) explain this phenomenon in particular in ICT by an overabundance of patents that are 
interpreted too broadly, a legal system that allows patent holders to obtain excessive settlements, 
and an important royalty-stacking problem.  
Regarding the impact of litigations in information technology, we cannot assume a zero-sum-game 
between the plaintiff and the defendants, because Raghu et al. (2008) find that patent litigation has 
a significant negative impact on the defendants, whereas the effect is significantly positive for 
plaintiffs leading to a negative-sum-game. According to Bessen et al. (2011), non-practicing entities 
may have caused a loss of half a trillion dollars in market value between 1990 and 2008 reducing 
R&D incentives and eventually in social welfare.  
5.2.3.2 Option 1: Baseline scenario 
Under this scenario, the current patent system in Europe is unlikely to work in the same way as in 
the past. The observed trend of an increasing number of litigations in ICT would continue and the 
NPEs or PAEs activities are expected to increase due to their high likelihood of winning the cases. 
Consequently, the whole system, but especially the defendants, i.e. the practicing entities are 
expected to suffer. Therefore, the investments in research and innovation might decline, leading to a 
reduced competitiveness and growth in the future. 
5.2.3.3 Option 2: Support of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 
The first option is trying to avoid litigation in general by supporting alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) methods as already provided by the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center. However, the 
limited number of collaboration with its member states Intellectual Property Offices in order to raise 
awareness among users of the services provided of the advantages of ADR methods to prevent and 
resolve intellectual property and technology disputes provides evidence that there is further effort 
needed. This assessment is also shared by the insights of the interviews and the survey, because only 
a small fraction of the actors are aware of these options and even fewer has used them. Therefore, 
both patent owners, in particular SMEs, and the implementers of patents would benefits by ADR in 
case of conflicts, because solving of conflicts via litigation is not a zero-sum-game, but a negative-
sum-game. However, in addition of raising awareness possibilities to share also the outcome of ADR 
have to be investigated to convince possible users about their benefits in comparison to litigation.  
5.2.3.4 Option 3: Specialised courts dealing with infringement and validity 
Since ADR methods are certainly not sufficient, changes within the court system have to be 
considered. The survey has revealed that the most effective measures endorsed by a broad majority 
of the expert asking for specialised courts dealing both with infringement and validity issues. 
Cremers et al. (2016) show that bifurcation, where claims of infringement and validity of a patent 
are decided independently of each other in separate court proceedings at different courts, creates 
situations in which a patent is held infringed that is subsequently invalidated. In Germany, for 
example, the patent owner files an infringement lawsuit before a district court. In order to challenge 
the validity of the patent, the alleged infringer has to file a nullity action before the 
Bundespatentgericht. If the district court judge finds infringement without considering validity, the 
patent owner is usually granted an injunction even before the decision on validity is rendered. 
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Consequently, the establishment of specialised courts unifying the decisions about validity and 
infringement is certainly beneficial for the implementers of technology and innovation. Large patent 
owners have less resource problems, but for SMEs, this is a significant reduction of costs.   
5.2.3.5 Option 4: Regulation of PAEs 
ICT patents owned by Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs) increase the legal uncertainty for 
implementers of ICT related technologies in such a way, that this challenge is the most agreed upon 
among all other challenges by the respondents to our survey. Furthermore, the above mentioned 
trends towards more and more costly litigations driven by NPEs or PAEs is endorsing the individual 
perception of the respondents to the surveys and of many interviewees. Consequently, regulations 
to restrict the activities for PAEs is considered to be one of the most effective solutions among all 
the proposed ideas.  
Restricting PAEs might benefit both all other patent owners and all the other innovators without 
patents. The justification of PAEs by their role in facilitating innovation and bringing new technology 
from inventors to those who can implement it cannot be supported by the survey of Feldman and 
Lemley (2015) finding that very few patent license demands actually lead to innovation. Therefore, 
the restriction of their activities is contributing to innovation of both patent owners and 
implementers without patents.  
5.2.3.6 Comparing the options 
If we compare the options, we expect that the restriction of PAEs will benefit all innovators most. 
However, specialised courts are also very positive. In addition, there improved capacities might also 
restrict the strategic opportunities for PAEs. The expected impact of supporting ADR on innovation is 
in general positive, but less compared to the other two options.   
Table 14 Expected impact of options on innovation 
Policy Option Patenting entities 
(Overall) 
Patenting entities 
(SMEs) 
Innovators in 
general without 
patents 
Baseline scenario 
Option 1 
- -- -- 
Option 2: Support of 
Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) 
+ + + 
Option 3: Specialised 
courts dealing with 
infringement and 
validity 
+ ++ ++ 
Option 4:  Regulation 
of PAEs 
++ ++ ++ 
"0": no change "+": positive impact "-": negative impact 
 
Looking at the impact of the options on the other five criteria, we would expect no real impact on 
responsible research and innovation.. However, the options may have ethical implications, if they 
promote an earlier implementation of the disputed patent protected technologies, which may have 
implications on the well-being of human beings in general or aspects of inclusiveness. The same line 
of argument applies to open access to scientific results, i.e. if the implementation of the options lead 
to an earlier settlement of the disputes and therefore the usage of the contained knowledge and 
related technologies. The other dimensions of RRI are not influenced,. 
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Whereas further support of ADR certainly increases the costs for the governments, the costs for the 
patenting entities and alleged infringers will be reduced, because the cost they incur in courts cases 
will be higher. Specialized courts instead of the bifurcation system reduce the costs both for the 
government and those involved in courts cases also argued by Cremers et al. (2016). The regulation 
of PAEs will generate significant costs in the development phase, because an internationally 
coordinated approach is necessary. Even more cost will be required for the effective implementation 
of the regulation. However, an effective regulation of PAEs will reduce the cost for all other actors in 
the patent system. 
ADR will not necessarily reduce the complexity, but the establishment of specialized courts dealing 
both with infringement and validity issues is certainly a simplification. Whether the regulation of 
PAEs will lead to simplifications remains open, because identifying illegal activities and effectively 
enforcing the regulations is certainly a complex task. 
Legal security is certainly increased by raising the establishment of specialized courts, as Cremers et 
al (2016) argue that the uncertainty over the scope and validity of patents may be higher under a 
bifurcated system, which may lead to a higher litigation intensity. If the activities of PAEs are 
effectively restricted, their contribution to the massive increase in litigation will be reduced leading 
to higher legal security.  
The continuation of the baseline scenario is medium, because during the implementation of the 
Agreement of a Unified Patent Court the establishment of specialised patent courts in Europe is 
indeed feasible and is not contradicting TRIPS. The limited success of ADR by WIPO is an indication 
that a further support is rather unlikely. Although needed and positive for innovation, the feasibility 
of a regulation of PAEs is limited due to the need of an international agreement, because national, 
but also European initiatives are uneffective. 
Table 15 Comparing the impacts of the options 
Policy 
Option 
Effectiveness 
related to 
innovation in 
general 
Effective-ness 
related to 
ethical issues 
within RRI 
Effective-
ness 
related 
to open 
access 
within 
RRI 
Cost 
reduc-
tion 
Simplification Legal 
security 
Feasibility 
Baseline 
scenario 
Option 1 
- - - - 0 - Medium 
Option 2: 
Support of 
Alternative 
Dispute 
Resolution 
(ADR) 
+ 0 + + 0 0 Low  
Option 3: 
Specialised 
courts 
dealing with 
infringe-
ment and 
validity 
++ 0 + ++ + ++ Medium 
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Option 4:  
Regula-tion 
of PAEs 
++ + + ++ 0 ++ Low 
 "0": no change "+": positive impact "-": negative impact 
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5.3 SUMMARY 
The assessment of the impacts of the various options to address the three problems of patent quality, 
a long patent protection period and litigation revealed that the majority of them have potentially high 
impacts to promote innovation in general and especially related to the accessibility of scientific results 
in the context of RRI. The ethical implications of the proposed changes are in general rather vague. 
However, if they promote the accessibility and diffusion of patented technologies, which foster the 
well-being of humans, then they have also strong ethical implications. Consequently, the open 
accessibility to scientific results as one dimension of RRI has also an explicit ethical dimension, because 
it might eventually influence ethical issues, like digital divide in particular (e.g. Stahl et al. 2014) or 
inclusion in general (e.g. Rogerson 2011). However, the link between the dimension of open access 
within the five dimension of RRI and the ethical dimensions has not explicitly addressed in previous 
studies, e.g. by Stahl et al. (2017) or De Keersmaecker (2017). Here, the study about challenges for ICT 
patents and possible solutions mainly within the current legal framework and of incremental character 
considering the various dimensions of RRI has revealed some new and interesting links, which should 
be investigated further in improving the RRI framework. Due to the rather comprehensive relevance 
of ethics for ICT for society (Rogerson 2011, Stahl et al. 2014), it should be further considered to 
integrate components of an ethical impact assessment for ICT (Wright 2011) into the guidelines for 
performing impact assessments (EC 2009), which contain so far only an explicit link to “(bio) ethical 
issues”.     
Some of the options, like specifying the criteria for patents on CII, would also generate no or little costs 
for the patenting entities, but also not for the system as a whole. However, the feasibility of almost all 
of the options is low, because it is difficult to change the status quo. The implementation of the 
Agreement on a UPC provides some opportunity to realize in particular the option of specialized 
courts, which would also beneficial for addressing the challenging increase in litigation.  
© CIFRA Consortium 2016-2018                                                                    Page 80 of 138 
6 CONCLUSIVE REMARKS 
The objective of this report was the identification of current challenges for patents in ICT related 
technologies in a first step and finding solutions to tackle them in a second step. Based on the insights 
of the literature review and the empirical analysis performed in WP2, we identified the existing impact 
and future studies also dealing with future challenges and possible solutions.  
These already existing insights were the basis for guiding us through interviews with stakeholders, 
which cover the whole value chain in ICT from research, over software developers to producers of 
consumer products, but also experts of organizations setting the regulatory framework. Due to the 
broad coverage of stakeholders, a huge variety of challenges and proposals for solutions could be 
identified. The specific focus on Responsible Research and Innovation revealed that the majority of 
the experts were not aware of RRI. Consequently, only a few links to patents in ICT related 
technologies could be identified in contrast to the intensive ethical debate in bio- and pharmaceutical 
technologies. 
Despite the broad variety of challenges and solutions discussed with the experts, an online 
questionnaire was developed, intensively tested and widely distributed to all stakeholder groups. The 
feedback was quite positive in the sense to be interested in identifying the most relevant problems 
and the solutions most likely to be effective. However, the received responses also allowed 
recognizing the differences between the stakeholders, e.g. the patenting entities and the 
organizations not owning patents or large and small companies. Overall, the assessment of the 
challenges varies significantly between these groups, but in general, they tend to agree more on 
effectiveness of the solutions, which is a first promising result. Finally, the responses on the relevance 
of the dimensions of RRI for ICT patents confirm the limited awareness already revealed in the 
interviews. However, the closest link exists obviously related to the access to scientific results, but 
ethical issues are also relevant. Overall, there is a high consistency between the insights from the 
interviews and the results of the survey. The comparison between the assessed effectiveness of the 
solutions and the requirements to make the necessary changes in the framework including an 
evaluation of their likelihood did not necessarily reveal a clear correlation. However, obviously easy 
changes, like changing fees and cost, are perceived not be very effective.  
In a final step, the most relevant problems, which can potentially solved by interventions of the 
government, were used to perform an impact assessment of the available options to solve the 
problems. In detail, we addressed the problem of patent quality, the patent protection period and 
litigation and possible solutions. Although, most options would promote innovation in general, but 
also the specific aspects of open access and ethics as two dimensions of RRI in particular, their 
feasibility is limited. This is alarming, because some problems are rather urgent, e.g. the increasing 
number of litigations, in particular initiated by PAEs, despite a stagnating number of patents, at least 
in the Western world.  
From a methodological perspective, this first impact assessment focusing on the patent system 
including the aspect of RRI should be seen as a starting point to consider and elaborate RRI, in 
particular the ethical issues, not only of ICT, in future impact assessments. 
  
© CIFRA Consortium 2016-2018                                                                    Page 81 of 138 
 
  
© CIFRA Consortium 2016-2018                                                                    Page 82 of 138 
7 REFERENCES 
AVANCI (2016). Accelerating IoT Connectivity – Report. Available at  
http://avanci.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/2016-Avanci-WP-Final-_-Jan-24.pdf 
Bessen J, Neuhäusler P, Turner J, Williams J. (2015). Trends in Private Patent Costs and Rents for 
Publicly-Traded United States Firms. Boston Univ. School of Law, Law and Economics Research 
Paper, (13–24).  
Bessen JE, Meurer MJ, Ford JL. (2011). The private and social costs of patent trolls. Boston Univ. 
School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper, (11–45).  
Bessen J. (2008). The Value of U.S. Patents by Owner and Patent Characteristics. Research Policy 37: 
932–945. 
Blind K, Bekkers R, Dietrich Y, Iversen E, Müller B, Pohlmann T, Verweijen J. (2011). EU Study on the 
Interplay between Standards and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), commissioned by the DG 
Enterprise and Industry.  
Blind K, Edler J, Frietsch R, Schmoch U. (2006). Motives to patent: empirical evidence from Germany, 
Research Policy 35(5): 655–672.  
Blind K, Edler J, Friedewald M. (2005). Software Patents: Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications. 
Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, USA: Edward Elgar.  
CRA (2016) Transparency, Predictability and Efficiency of SSO-Based Standardization and SEP 
Licensing. A Report for the European Commission. 
Cremers K, Gaessler, F, Harhoff D, Helmers C, Lefouilida Y. (2016). Invalid but infringed? An analysis 
of the bifurcated patentlitigation system, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 131: 218–
242. 
Cockburn IM, MacGarvie M. (2011). Entry and patenting in the software industry. Management 
Science 57(5): 915–933.  
Cohen WM, Nelson R, Walsh JP. (2000). Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability 
Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not). NBER Working Paper (7552): 50.  
Conrad DB. (2007). Mining the Patent Thicket: The Supreme Court's Rejection of the Automatic 
Injunction Rule in eBay v. MercExchange. Rev. Litig. 26: 119.  
Darts-IP (2017). The Rise of Non-Practicing Entity (NPE) Cases Outside the United States. Available at 
https://www.darts-ip.com/the-rise-of-non-practicing-entity-npe-cases-outside-the-united-states/ 
De Keersmaecker, R. (2017). Responsible Research & Innovation in Nanoelectronics and ICT, Expert 
Paper, www.innovation-compass.eu.  
De Rassenfosse, G. & van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, B. (2012). On the price elasticity of demand 
for patents. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 74(1), 58-77. 
DG GROW (2016). Modernizing the enforcement of intellectual property rights.  Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/roadmaps/docs/2016_grow_009_modernising_ipr_enforcement_en.pdf 
© CIFRA Consortium 2016-2018                                                                    Page 83 of 138 
EARTO (2015). EARTO Answer to EC Consultation on Patent & Standards. Available at 
http://www.earto.eu/fileadmin/content/Website/EARTO_Answer_to_EC_Consultation_on_Pate
nts__Standards_-_Final_26012015.pdf 
EARTO (2017). For Globally Competitive Standardization in the Digital Single Market: EARTO Voting 
Recommendations to Support Innovation in Europe. Available at 
http://www.earto.eu/news/detail/article/earto-voting-recommendations-for-globally-
competitive-standardisation-in-the-digital-single-market.html 
Eberhardt M, Fafchamps M, Helmers C, Patnam M. (2016). The heterogeneous effect of software 
patents on expected returns: Evidence from India. Economics Letters Volume 145: 73-78. 
EC (2009). IMPACT ASSESSMENT GUIDELINES SEC(2009) 92. 
EC (2015a). Report of the expert group on patent aggregation. Directorate-General for Research and 
Innovation. 
EC (2015b). Patent costs and impact on innovation: International comparison and analysis of the 
impact on the exploitation of R&D results by SMEs, Universities and Public Research 
Organisations, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2015). 
EC (2010). COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying 
document to the Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION on the translation arrangements for the 
European Union patent {COM(2010) 350 final} {SEC(2010) 797}. 
EC (2011). COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying document to 
the Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 
implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection and 
Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the 
creation of unitary patent protection with regard to the applicable translation arrangements 
{COM(2011) 215 final} {COM(2011) 216 final} {SEC(2011) 483 final}. 
EC (2016). Putting intellectual property at the service of SMEs to foster innovation and growth 
{COM(2016) 733 final}.   
ECSIP (2014). Patents and Standards: A modern framework for IPR-based standardization. A study 
prepared for the European Commission Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry. 
EC JRC (2014a). International Protection of ICT Intellectual Property and the Internationalization of 
ICT R&D.  
EC JRC (2014b). How will standards facilitate new production systems in the context of EU innovation 
and competitiveness in 2025? 
EC JRC (2015a). Innovation in the European Digital Single Market: The Role of Patents.  
EC JRC (2015b). Intellectual Property and Innovation in Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT).  
EC JRC (2016) Patent Assertion Entities in Europe. 
EPO (2007). SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE: How might IP regimes evolve by 2025? What global 
legitimacy might such regimes have? 
© CIFRA Consortium 2016-2018                                                                    Page 84 of 138 
EPO (2012). EPO Report Workshop on Patent Quality, 2012. Available at 
http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponot.nsf/0/bbc8744dd3ff80b8c1257a690046953
d/$FILE/workshop_patent_quality_en.pdf 
 
EPO (2017): European patent applications filed with the EPO European patent applications 2007-
2016 per field of technology (XLS, 13 KB) Available at https://www.epo.org/about-us/annual-
reports-statistics/statistics.html 
 
EPO and OHIM (2013). Intellectual Property Rights Intensive Industries: Contribution to Economic 
Performance and Employment in the European Union.  
 EPO and EUIPO (2016). Intellectual property rights intensive industries and economic performance 
in the European Union Industry-Level Analysis Report, Oct. 2016 Second edition.  
Farre-Mensa J, Hegde D, Ljungqvist A. (2016). The bright side of patents (No. w21959). National 
Bureau of Economic Research.  
Feldman R, Lemley MA. (2015). Do Patent Licensing Demands Mean Innovation? Iowa Law Review 
Vol. 101, 2015. 
Frietsch R, Neuhäusler P, Melullis K-J, Rothengatter O, Conchi S. (2015). The economic impacts of 
computer-implemented inventions at the European Patent Office. 
Frietsch R. et al. (2010). The Value and Indicator Function of Patents. Fraunhofer Institute for 
Systems and Innovation Research.  
FTC (2016). Patent Assertion Entity Activity – A Report of the Federal Trade Commission, Oct. 2016. 
Fusco S. (2016). TRIPS Non-Discrimination Principle: Are Alice and Bilski Really the End of NPEs. Tex. 
Intell. Prop. LJ, 24, p.131.  
GAO (2013). Report to Congressional Committees. Intellectual Property: Assessing Factors That 
Affect Patent Infringement Litigation Could Help Improve Patent Quality. 
Hall B, Helmers C, von Graevenitz G. (2017). Technology Entry in the Presence of Patent Thickets. 
NBER Working Paper No. 21455.  
Halbert DJ. (2001). Intellectual Property in the Year 2025. Journal of Futures Studies Vol. 6, No. 1: 25–
60. 
Harhoff D. (2016). Patent Quality and Examination in Europe. American Economic Review 106(5): 
193–197. 
Helmers C, Love B, McDonagh L. (2013). Is there a Patent Troll Problem in the UK? Fordham 
Intellectual Property Media and Entertainment Law Journal, 24: 509. 
Inaba T, Squicciarini M. (2017). ICT: A new taxonomy based on the international patent classification. 
OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers, No. 2017/01, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
Lamoreaux NR, Sokoloff KL. (2003). Intermediaries in the U.S. Market for Technology, 1870–1920. 
Finance, Intermediaries and Economic Development: 209–246.  
Lemley MA. (2015). IP in a world without scarcity. New York University Law Review: 460–515. 
Lemley MA, Feldman R. (2016). Patent Licensing, Technology Transfer, and Innovation. The American 
Economic Review 106(5): 188–192.  
© CIFRA Consortium 2016-2018                                                                    Page 85 of 138 
Lemley MA, Melamed A.D. (2013). Missing the Forest for the Trolls. Available at 
http://columbialawreview.org/content/missing-the-forest-for-the-trolls/ 
Love BJ. (2013). An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could a Patent Term Reduction 
Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators? 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1354.  
Marco AC, Tesfayesus A, Toole AA. (2017). Patent Litigation Data from US District Court Electronic 
Records (1963-2015) (March 2017). USPTO Economic Working Paper No. 2017-06. 
Maxwell A, Riker D. (2014). The Economic Implications of Strengthening Intellectual Property Rights 
in Developing Countries. Journal of International Commerce and Economics. Published 
electronically November 2014. Available at http://www.usitc.gov/journals  
OECD (2008). The Economic Impact of Counterfeiting and Piracy, OECD, Paris.         
OECD (2016). OECD Science, Technology and Innovation Outlook 2016, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
OECD/EUIPO (2016). Trade in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods: Mapping the Economic Impact, OECD 
Publishing, Paris. 
Oppenheimer, M., LaVan, H., & Martin, W. F. (2015). A Framework for Understanding Ethical and 
Efficiency Issues in Pharmaceutical Intellectual Property Litigation. Journal of Business Ethics, 
132(3), 505–524. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-014-2365-7 
Patent Dispute Report (2016). Available at 
https://www.unifiedpatents.com/news/2016/12/28/2016-annual-patent-dispute-report 
Pohlmann T, Blind K. (2016). Landscaping study on Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) commissioned 
by DG GROW.  
PWC (2016). PwC Patent Litigation Study. Available at https://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-
services/publications/assets/2016-pwc-patent-litigation-study.pdf  
Raghu TS, Woo W, Mohan SB, Rao HR. (2008). Market reaction to patent infringement litigations in 
the information technology industry. Information Systems Frontiers 10(1): 61-75.  
Rammer C, Schubert T, Hünermund P, Köhler M, Iferd Y, Peters B. (2016). Dokumentation zur 
Innovationserhebung 2015, Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Mannheim 
and Karlsruhe. 
Rogerson, S. (2011). Ethics and ICT, in: The Oxford Handbook of Management Information Systems: 
Critical Perspectives and New Directions edited by Robert D. Galliers and Wendy L. Currie 
Stahl, B.C.; Timmermans, J.; Flick, C. (2017). Ethics of Emerging Information and Communication 
Technologies: On the implementation of responsible research and innovation. Science and Public 
Policy, 44(3), 2017, 369–381. 
Stahl, B.C.; Timmermans, J.; Mittelstadt, B. D. (2016): The ethics of computing: A survey of the 
computing-oriented literature. ACM Comput. Surv. 48, 4, Article 55, 38 pages. 
Stallman, R. (1992). Why software should be free, in: Bynum, T.W., Maner, W. and Fodor J.L., eds. 
Software Ownership and Intellectual Property Rights, Research Center on Computing and Society, 
Southern Connecticut State University, 35-52. 
© CIFRA Consortium 2016-2018                                                                    Page 86 of 138 
Van Zimmeren E, Verbreure B, Matthijs G, Van Overwalle, G. (2006). A clearing house for diagnostic 
testing: the solution to ensure access to and use of patented genetic inventions? Bull World 
Health Organ [online] vol.84, n.5. 
Wright D. (2011). A framework for the ethical impact assessment of information technology, Ethics 
Inf. Technol. 13 (3), 199–226. 
 
  
© CIFRA Consortium 2016-2017                                                                    Page 87 of 138 
 
ANNEX 1: RELEVANT PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS IDENTIFIED IN THE LITERATURE 
Table 6 Overview of relevant problems identified from literature 
 EPO (2007), 
SCENARIOS 
OF THE 
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MIGHT IPR 
REGIMES 
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2025? 
WHAT 
GLOBAL 
LEGITIMACY 
MIGHT 
SUCH 
REGIMES 
HAVE? 
EPO AND 
OHIM 
(2013), 
INTELLECTU
AL 
PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 
INTENSIVE 
INDUSTRIES
: 
CONTRIBUT
ION TO 
ECONOMIC 
PERFORMA
NCE AND 
EMPLOYME
NT IN THE 
EUROPEAN 
UNION.  
EC JRC 
(2014A), 
INTERNATI
ONAL 
PROTECTIO
N OF ICT 
INTELLECTU
AL 
PROPERTY 
AND THE 
INTERNATI
ONALIZATI
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ECSIP 
(2014), 
PATENTS 
AND 
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S: A 
MODERN 
FRAMEWO
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ZATION 
EC (2015), 
REPORT OF 
THE EXPERT 
GROUP ON 
PATENT 
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EC JRC 
(2015A), 
INNOVATIO
N IN THE 
EUROPEAN 
DIGITAL 
SINGLE 
MARKET: 
THE ROLE 
OF 
PATENTS  
EC JRC 
(2015B), 
INTELLECTU
AL 
PROPERTY 
AND 
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N IN 
INFORMATI
ON AND 
COMMUNIC
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TECHNOLO
GY (ICT)  
EPO AND 
EUIPO 
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INTELLECTU
AL 
PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 
INTENSIVE 
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AND 
ECONOMIC 
PERFORMA
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EUROPEAN 
UNION 
INDUSTRY-
LEVEL 
ANALYSIS 
REPORT 
DG GROW 
(2016), 
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ENT OF 
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RIGHTS 
EC JRC 
(2016), 
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AVANCI 
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NG IOT 
CONNECTIV
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REPORT 
CRA (2016), 
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NCY, 
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LITY AND 
EFFICIENCY 
OF SSO-
BASED 
STANDARDI
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AND SEP 
LICENSING 
EARTO 
(2017), FOR 
GLOBALLY 
COMPETITI
VE 
STANDARDI
ZATION IN 
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DIGITAL 
SINGLE 
MARKET: 
EARTO 
VOTING 
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NDATIONS 
TO 
SUPPORT 
INNOVATIO
N IN 
EUROPE 
PATENT 
APPLICATION AND 
GRANTING  
               
BACKLOG OF PATENT 
OFFICES REDUCED PRODUCT 
CYCLE 
X         X      
FRAGMENTATION OF 
PATENTS 
      X         
ICT INDUSTRIES USE IPRS 
INTENSIVELY 
      X   X      
LOW QUALITY OF PATENTS 
(E.G. DUE DIFFICULTIES ON 
PATENT EXAMINATION; 
LOW QUALITY 
APPLICATIONS) 
X   X X X X   X X     
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SHORT PRODUCT CYCLES IN 
ICT FOR CURRENT PATENT 
LENGTH  
X               
TECHNOLOGICAL 
COMPLEXITY / 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY 
X    X X X         
THE INCREASED NUMBER 
OF SOURCES GENERATING 
IPR (VARIETY OF 
TECHNOLOGIES)  
X               
LARGE AMOUNT OF PATENT 
APPLICATIONS (HIGH 
VOLUMES LEAD TO 
BACKLOGS, CREATES 
UNCERTAINTY, AND 
INCREASE PROBABILITY OF 
GRANT) 
X X   X   X        
INCREASE OF THE TIME-TO-
MARKET (THE TIME IT 
TAKES TO DETERMINE THE 
FATE OF AN APPLICATION) 
X   X            
THE ASSESSMENT OF THE 
INVENTIVE MERIT OF AN 
APPLICATION 
X               
THE PATENTABILITY OF NEW 
FIELDS, NOTABLY 
SOFTWARE, BUSINESS 
METHODS AND 
BIOTECHNOLOGY. 
X     X          
LIMITED ACCESS PATENT 
INFORMATION 
 X   X X X X  X      
LACK OF MARKET 
TRANSPARENCY  
    X X X  X X X   X  
SOFTWARE AND THE 
INTERPLAY OF IPR WITH 
OPEN INNOVATION 
     X X         
CAPITALIZING GLOBALLY ON 
INNOVATION REQUIRES ITS 
GLOBAL PROTECTION 
  X             
SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZED 
ENTERPRISES (SMES) FIND 
X    X X      X    
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THAT PROCEDURES ARE 
TOO COSTLY 
SMES MAY LACK OF 
AWARENESS ABOUT THE 
BENEFITS OF PATENTS 
    X       X    
SMES LACK THE NECESSARY 
EXPERTISE 
X    X       X    
HIGH TRANSACTION COSTS  X   X X    X     X  
A LACK OF FINANCE FOR 
LEGALLY PROTECTING THEIR 
IPR  
    X           
INTERPLAY BETWEEN IPRS 
AND OPEN INNOVATION 
MODELS 
     X X         
PATENTS IN THE FACTO 
STANDARDS 
              X 
UNCLEAR ROLE OF IPRS IN 
CUMULATIVENESS 
INNOVATION 
      X         
                
ENFORCING AND 
IMPLEMENTING 
PATENTS  
               
HIGH LITIGATION RATES       X  X       
PATENT HOLD-UP X   X  X        X  
ICT SECURITY RISKS, 
PROTECTIONISM, DUA USE 
(E.G. BIOTERRORISM) 
X               
INCREASE PATENT 
PROPENSITY 
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PATENT PROSECUTION 
COSTS 
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LANGUAGE PROFUSION, 
DATA VOLUMES, 
INFORMATION COMPLEXITY 
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DISRUPTIVE OR LITIGIOUS 
ACTIVITIES OF PATENT 
ASSERTION ENTITIES (PAE) 
(LITIGATIONS, PORTFOLIOS, 
TARGETS) 
     X X   X X     
PATENT TROLLS X   X            
TRUE OWNERS ARE NOT 
EASILY IDENTIFIABLE 
DURING THE DISCOVERY 
PROCESS DUE TO THE 
PRACTICE OF ESTABLISHING 
SHELL PAE COMPANIES IN 
DIFFERENT JURISDICTIONS. 
         X      
LICENSE STACKING OR 
HOLD-UP 
(INTEROPERABILITY 
TECHNICAL 
STANDARDIZATION) 
X               
NO COMMERCIALIZATION, 
NO DIFFUSION 
X    X           
PATENT THICKETS 
(INCREASE, WITH 
COMPLEXITY OF 
TECHNOLOGIES) 
X      X   X      
RESTRICTIONS ON 
RESEARCH EXCEPTION, 
PATENT BLOCKAGE OF 
RESEARCH TOOLS, SOCIETAL 
FEARS / NOVEL RISKS 
X               
SHORT PRODUCT CYCLES IN 
ICT FOR CURRENT PATENT 
LENGTH 
X               
STRATEGIC PATENTING X               
PATENT AMBUSH OR 
PATENT BLOCKING 
   X            
ROYALTY STACKING (TOO 
HIGH CUMULATIVE 
LICENSING FEES) 
X   X  X    X    X  
PATENT BUNDLES       X         
DIFFICULTY FOR PATENT 
HOLDERS IN GETTING 
   X            
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IMPLEMENTERS TO LICENSE 
THEIR SEPS 
UNTRUTHFUL 
DECLARATIONS (PARTIES 
DECLARE PATENTS AS SEPS 
WHILE THEY KNOW – OR 
SHOULD HAVE KNOWN 
THAT THESE ARE NOT) 
   X            
BLANKET DISCLOSURES     X            
OVER-DISCLOSURE    X            
GROWING NUMBER OF 
STANDARD ESSENTIAL 
PATENTS (SEP) 
   X X X          
LACK OF TRANSPARENCY 
REGARDING SEPS (E.G. 
UNCERTAINTY ABOUT SEP 
OWNERSHIP) 
   X  X    X      
UNCLEAR DEFINITION OF 
SEP 
   X  X          
LACK OF AVAILABILITY OF 
LICENSES FOR (SEPS) 
   X            
FRAND CONDITIONS NOT 
CLEAR; TRANSFER OF 
FRAND CONDITIONS (FROM 
OLD TO NEW SEP OWNER) 
   X  X X         
DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN 
IMPLEMENTERS (PATENT 
OWNERS ARE FREE TO 
DISCRIMINATE BETWEEN 
LICENSEES) 
   X            
PROBLEMS DUE TO PATENT 
OWNERS’ TECHNOLOGY 
BEING INCOMPLETE OR 
“IMMATURE” 
    X           
DIFFICULTIES IN PATENT 
VALUATION 
    X           
DIFFICULTIES IN ENFORCING 
PATENTS 
    X           
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Table 7 Overview of potential solutions identified in literature 
 EPO (2007), 
SCENARIOS 
OF THE 
FUTURE: 
HOW MIGHT 
IP REGIMES 
EVOLVE BY 
2025? WHAT 
GLOBAL 
LEGITIMACY 
MIGHT SUCH 
REGIMES 
HAVE? 
ECSIP (2014), 
PATENTS AND 
STANDARDS: A 
MODERN 
FRAMEWORK FOR 
IPR-BASED 
STANDARDIZATION 
 
 
EC (2015), 
REPORT OF 
THE EXPERT 
GROUP ON 
PATENT 
AGGREGATION 
EC JRC 
(2015A), 
INNOVATION 
IN THE 
EUROPEAN 
DIGITAL 
SINGLE 
MARKET: THE 
ROLE OF 
PATENTS  
 
DG GROW 
(2016), 
MODERNISING 
THE 
ENFORCEMENT 
OF 
INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 
EC JRC 
(2016), 
PATENT 
ASSERTION 
ENTITIES IN 
EUROPE 
FTC (2016), 
PATENT 
ASSERTION 
ENTITIES 
ACTIVITY 
EC (2016), 
PUTTING 
INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AT 
THE SERVICE 
OF SMES TO 
FOSTER 
INNOVATION 
AND GROWTH 
{COM(2016) 
733 FINAL} 
AVANCI (2016), 
ACCELERATING 
IOT 
CONNECTIVITY 
- REPORT 
CRA (2016), 
TRANSPARENCY, 
PREDICTABILITY 
AND EFFICIENCY 
OF SSO-BASED 
STANDARDIZATION 
AND SEP 
LICENSING 
EARTO (2017), FOR 
GLOBALLY 
COMPETITIVE 
STANDARDIZATION 
IN THE DIGITAL 
SINGLE MARKET: 
EARTO VOTING 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
TO SUPPORT 
INNOVATION IN 
EUROPE 
PATENT APPLICATION 
AND GRANTING  
           
IMPROVEMENT OF QUALITY OF 
PATENTS (E.G. TO LIMIT LARGE-
SCALE ASSERTION OF LOW 
QUALITY PATENTS TO ENSURE 
THAT THE STANDARDS 
MAINTAINED IN PATENT 
GRANTING PROCEDURES ARE 
ALSO OF THE HIGHEST QUALITY)  
X X X X  X X     
IMPROVEMENT ON THE 
TRANSPARENCY  OF PATENT 
AVAILABILITY AND OWNERSHIP 
X X X 
 
X X X X     
EU-LEVEL MEASURES TO 
SUPPORT THE USE OF IPR BY 
START-UPS AND SMES 
(IMPROVING AWARENESS; 
CREATION OF EUROPEAN-LEVEL 
INSURANCE SCHEMES FOR 
LITIGATION AND IPR THEFT; 
IMPROVING COORDINATION OF 
IPR SUPPORT FUNDING 
SCHEMES; INCLUDE PATENTS IN 
SMES BUSINESS STRATEGIES ) 
   
 
 
 
 
 
X 
X    X    
AUGMENTED DATABASE  X          
CROWD-SOURCED VALIDITY 
CHECK 
 X          
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ENFORCING AND 
IMPLEMENTING 
PATENTS  
           
REDUCTION OF TRANSACTION 
COSTS AND BARRIERS TO ENTRY 
         X  
NON-PROFIT INTERMEDIARY 
POOLS, OPEN ACCESS CLEARING 
HOUSE 
 X          
PATENT POOLS AND 
COLLABORATIVE PRACTICES 
 X X X      X  
CLEARINGHOUSE  X  X        
PATENT SUPERMARKET  X          
OPEN SOURCE/OPEN SCIENCE X           
SECRECY X           
CREATION OF A DATABASE OF 
ROYALTY RATES (ANONYMOUS) 
FOR BENCHMARKING 
PURPOSES. 
 X          
PROMOTING OR MANDATING 
COORDINATION MECHANISMS 
BETWEEN LICENSORS, SUCH AS 
EX-ANTE DISCLOSURE OF THE 
HIGHEST ROYALTY RATES OR 
OTHER MECHANISMS THAT 
MODERATE CUMULATIVE 
DEMAND. 
 X          
DEFINE OR STRENGTHEN SSO 
RULES THAT BIND FUTURE 
OWNERS OF SEPS TO EXISTING 
COMMITMENTS 
 X X         
IMPROVEMENTS TO THE 
PATENT DECLARATION SYSTEM 
FOR SEP 
 X          
CONCRETE LICENSING 
PRACTICES OF SEPS 
     X      
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EFFICIENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
MECHANISMS FOR SEP 
  X         
IMPROVEMENT OF THE 
GUIDANCE ON THE INCLUSION 
OF PATENTED TECHNOLOGIES 
 X  X        
SETTING RULES ON 
NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFER OF 
ENCUMBERED PATENTS 
(‘RECORDATION’) 
 X          
 STANDARD UPDATES AND 
COLLABORATION WITH PATENT 
OFFICES 
         X  
EX ANTE AND EX POST 
DISCLOSURE  
(E.G. SSO PARTICIPANTS 
SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO MAKE 
AN EX ANTE DECLARATION OF 
THEIR PATENTS AND PATENT 
APPLICATIONS, WITH THE 
UNDERSTANDING THAT ALL 
IPRS WHICH ARE NOT SINGLED 
OUT FOR EXCEPTION ARE 
AVAILABLE ON FRAND TERMS) 
  X X  X    X  
ROYALTIES RATES ARE 
DIFFERENTIATED FOR 
DIFFERENT APPLICATIONS (TO 
ENSURE FAIRNESS) 
        X   
ROYALTY CAPS COMMITMENTS  X        X  
PORTFOLIO LICENSING           X  
LICENSE OF RIGHTS (LIABILITY 
REGIMES) 
X X       X   
PATENT TRANSFER RULES          X  
CONFLICT RESOLUTION RULES          X  
DEVELOP DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
MECHANISMS OR ARBITRATION 
(E.G. IN SSOS) AS A POTENTIAL 
ATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVE TO 
COURTS. 
 X          
FRAND LICENSING TERMS AND 
THE OPAQUENESS OF THE 
   X  X      
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STANDARDIZATION PROCESS 
INCREASE SUPPORT TO FRAND 
LICENSING 
          X 
SSO-BASED FRAND POLICIES          X  
CLARIFY FRAND CONDITIONS BY 
DEVELOPING PRINCIPLES ON 
THE DETERMINATION OF THE 
ROYALTY RATE AND ROYALTY 
 X  
 
X 
X        
CLARIFY THE SCOPE OF THE 
RECIPROCITY ELEMENT OF 
FRAND. 
 X X X  X    X  
POLICY COULD BE DIRECTED 
TOWARDS MINIMIZING LEGAL 
UNCERTAINTY, AT THE SAME 
TIME, THE BEHAVIOR OF SOME 
PAES THAT EXPLOIT THIS EXACT 
TYPE OF UNCERTAINTY WOULD 
BE REDUCED. 
     X      
PAE LITIGATION ASYMMETRIES 
SHOULD BE ADDRESSED BY 
POLICYMAKERS THROUGH 
PROCEDURAL AND 
SUBSTANTIVE REFORM 
      X     
TO MINIMIZE PAES 
QUESTIONABLE ACTIVITIES (E.G. 
TO MINIMIZE LEGAL 
UNCERTAINTY IN THE SYSTEM) 
  X X  X X     
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ANNEX 2: INTERVIEW GUIDELINE 
Horizon 2020 Project CIFRA: Challenging the ICT Patent Framework for Responsible Innovation 
Abstract  
The aim of the project is to provide a structured review of the role of the Patent System on the 
innovation process and how it impacts the social development with specific focus on the 
particularities of ICT research and innovation. The project will identify and thoroughly characterize 
the imperfections of the current system and propose alternatives that provide better alignment 
between ICT Research & Innovation, human needs and societal expectations. 
Therefore the project will propose alternative framings that result in a more effective and efficient 
tool for collaborative innovation and real technical and social development. These alternative 
framings may comprise suggestions to adapt existing tools (such as the patent system), or defining 
new mechanisms (such as new innovative licensing schemes). 
An specific area of study will be the open source software model, which currently seems to work 
well for software development, to assess its pros and cons as a collaborative innovation scheme and 
to what extent the advantages of the open source ‘philosophy’ could be extrapolated to the patent 
system. The analysis and outcomes of the project will not just be theoretical but, whenever 
applicable, it will be based on a thorough data analysis of the patent landscape in the ICT sector. 
Interview Questions 
1. Arguments for the Patent System for ICT  
 
 
2. Critique of the Patent System for ICT  
 
3. Possible Solutions /Alternative Framings in General (e.g. Open Source) 
 
 
4. Possible Solutions /Alternative Framings in Particular 
 
 
5. Facilitating the Access to Scientific Results via Patents in General and ICT in Particular 
 
 
6. Major Aspects of Responsible Research and Innovation: Ethical Dimension of Patents in 
General and ICT in Particular 
 
 
7. Other Aspects of Responsible Research and Innovation: engaging society (public 
engagement), gender dimension, promoting (in)formal science education  
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ANNEX 3: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
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ANNEX 4: ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS OF STAKEHOLDER SURVEY 
ANALYSIS DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN CEO AND OTHER POSITIONS 
 
Figure A1 Effectiveness of ICT patents ranging from very low (1) to very high (5) (CEO vs other positions) 
 
1.? Preventing imitation of inventions, e.g. for 
securing the means to obtain a return on 
the R&D investment 
2.? Securing own freedom to operate by 
disclosing prior art (e.g. to prevent legal 
conflicts) 
3.? Blocking competitors 
4.? Using the coordination function in 
research processes and collaborations incl. 
open innovation 
5.? Using as asset in negotiations (incl. cross 
licensing) 
6.? Generating licensing revenues 
7.? Enhancing reputation 
8.? Measuring performance of research and 
development 
9.? Rewarding employees 
50
50
50
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47
47
48
48
46
132
126
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1.
2.
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4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
1 1,5 2 2,5 3 3,5 4 4,5 5
Score
CEO Other
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Figure A2 Assessment of the challenges for ICT patents regarding patent application and granting ranging from totally 
disagree (1) to totally agree (5)  (CEO vs other positions) 
 
1.? Due to the technological dynamics in the 
ICT sector, patents are not effective to 
protect innovation 
2.? Due to technological convergence and 
fragmentation in the ICT sector, patents 
are not effective to protect innovation 
3.? Patent examination practices do not 
adequately consider relevant existing prior 
art 
4.? The cost for applying for ICT patents is too 
high 
5.? The granting process for ICT patents is too 
slow 
6.? The language of ICT patents is too 
complicated to qualify as a good source of 
information 
7.? The quality of ICT patents granted is low 
8.? The statutory patentability standards for 
ICT patents (e.g. technicality, etc.) differ 
among patent offices 
9.? The maximum protection period of 20 
years is long for ICT patents 
10.?The scope of granted ICT patents is too 
broad 
11.?Implementations cannot be effectively 
protected by patents because they include 
code under an Open Source license that 
includes patent licenses 
47
46
44
38
32
42
41
28
44
44
42
125
121
123
109
104
114
120
100
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
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9.
10.
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1 1,5 2 2,5 3 3,5 4 4,5 5
Score
CEO Other
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Figure A3 Assessment of the challenges for ICT patents regarding patent enforcement and application ranging from totally 
disagree (1) to totally agree (5) (CEO vs other positions) 
 
1.? The cost/risk to enforce granted ICT patents is 
high 
2.? The likelihood of litigation (infringement) of ICT 
patents is high 
3.? The likelihood of courts granting an injunction 
to prevent infringement of ICT patents is high 
4.? Expected legal cost for resolution of conflicts 
regarding ICT patents are high 
5.? The legal uncertainty for companies creating or 
implementing ICT patents is high 
6.? Licensors are not willing to license ICT patents 
covering their technologies (hold-up) 
7.? Implementers of ICT patents are not willing to 
licensing in the third-party ICT patents covering 
their implemented technologies (hold-out) 
8.? Agreeing on licensing agreements for standard-
essential ICT patents (SEPs) is challenging 
9.? Large patent owners not joining pools of ICT 
patents challenge the implementation of ICT-
related technologies 
10.?ICT patents owned by Patent Assertion Entities 
(PAEs) increases legal uncertainty for 
implementers of ICT related technologies 
11.?Many technologies protected by ICT patents are 
not used or commercialised 
12.?Patents on computer-implemented inventions 
(CII) or software patents challenges innovation 
of ICT-related technologies 
13.?The use of ICT patents protected technology 
generate problems for the use of Open Source 
Software 
14.?The use of Open Source Software generates 
problems for the use and protection of ICT 
patents 
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Figure A4 Assessment of solutions for ICT patents promoting innovation regarding patent application and granting ranging 
from not effective (1) to very effective (4) (CEO vs other positions) 
 
1.? The application fees for ICT patents are raised 
2.? The quality of granted ICT patents is improved 
by raising the required degree of novelty 
3.? The quality of granted ICT patents is improved 
by raising the required inventive step 
4.? The quality of granted ICT patents is improved 
by narrowing their scope 
5.? Crowd-sourced validity checks support the 
patent validity checks by patent offices 
6.? Granting an ICT patent requires already the 
implementation of the invention 
7.? Raising and specifying (e.g. related to 
technicality) the bar for patents on computer-
implemented inventions 
8.? Software is excluded from patenting both for 
the program listing and the technical content 
underlying the software 
9.? Patents for “Software as such” are granted, i.e. 
the program listing is patentable 
10.?ICT patents are granted within five years 
11.?The renewal fees for granted ICT patents are 
increased during all the protection period 
12.?The protection period for ICT patents is 
shortened to 10 years 
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Figure A5 Assessment of solutions for ICT patents promoting innovation regarding enforcing and implementing patents 
ranging from not effective (1) to very effective (4) (CEO vs other positions) 
 
1.? A declaration of willingness to grant a license for 
commercial use to anyone (license of right L.O.R.) is 
required to receive the maximum of 20 years of 
protection for ICT patents 
2.? A set of well-known and trustable patent pledges, i.e. 
voluntary commitments by patent holders to give up 
some of the rights associated to the patent (e.g. grant 
permission for commercial use without any direct 
compensation, no injunctions, FRAND, etc.), is 
defined 
3.? Technology exchange clearing houses are publicly 
supported to support bilateral licensing negotiations 
4.? Regulations to restrict the activities for Patent 
Assertion Entities (PAEs) are established 
5.? Publication of information incl. product specifications 
and licensing fees for Standard-Essential ICT patents 
should be encouraged 
6.? Public policies support the formation and 
development of ICT patent pools, especially of SEPs, 
incl. providing incentives for organisations to join 
7.? Public policies support the formation and 
development of bilateral or joint licensing programs, 
incl. providing incentives for organisations to develop 
these 
8.? Compatible licensing solutions for Open Source 
Software and ICT patents are developed 
9.? Only Royalty-Free ICT patents shall be integrated into 
Open Source Software 
10.? Licensing terms of bilateral licensing agreements 
should be published 
11.? Defensive ICT patent aggregators are publicly 
supported 
12.? Insurances against ICT patent litigations are publicly 
supported (incl. provided by state insurance) 
13.? Trade secret regulations reduce the incentive to file 
ICT patents 
14.?Mediation and arbitration processes to reach a 
mutually satisfactory settlement of ICT patent 
disputes outside of court are further publicly 
supported 
15.? Court fees for ICT patent disputes are increased 
16.? Legal costs for ICT patent disputes in courts are 
covered by the losing party 
17.? Financial situation in an ICT patent dispute of the 
winning party before the court case is reasonably 
restored 
18.? Caps on ICT patent court case costs that are 
recoverable by the winning party are introduced 
19.? A plaintiff can only challenge one ICT patent of one 
defendant in any given court case 
20.? Infringement and validity issues regarding ICT patents 
are tried together before the same court 
21.? Specialised courts instead of general courts should 
deal with ICT patent disputes 
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Figure A6 Assessment of RRI dimensions regarding ICT patents from very low (1) to very high (5) (CEO vs other positions) 
 
  
1.?Multi-actor and public engagement in 
research and innovation 
2.? Enabling easier access to scientific 
results 
3.? Gender issues in the research and 
innovation content and process 
4.? Ethics in the research and innovation 
content and process: 
5.? Formal and informal science education 
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ANALYSIS DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN SMALL AND LARGE COMPANIES 
 
Figure A7 Effectiveness of ICT patents ranging from very low (1) to very high (5) (large companies vs SMEs) 
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1.? Preventing imitation of inventions, e.g. for 
securing the means to obtain a return on 
the R&D investment 
2.? Securing own freedom to operate by 
disclosing prior art (e.g. to prevent legal 
conflicts) 
3.? Blocking competitors 
4.? Using the coordination function in 
research processes and collaborations incl. 
open innovation 
5.? Using as asset in negotiations (incl. cross 
licensing) 
6.? Generating licensing revenues 
7.? Enhancing reputation 
8.? Measuring performance of research and 
development 
9.? Rewarding employees 
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Figure A8 Assessment of the challenges for ICT patents regarding patent application and granting ranging from totally 
disagree (1) to totally agree (5)  (large company vs SME) 
 
1.? Due to the technological dynamics in the 
ICT sector, patents are not effective to 
protect innovation 
2.? Due to technological convergence and 
fragmentation in the ICT sector, patents 
are not effective to protect innovation 
3.? Patent examination practices do not 
adequately consider relevant existing prior 
art 
4.? The cost for applying for ICT patents is too 
high 
5.? The granting process for ICT patents is too 
slow 
6.? The language of ICT patents is too 
complicated to qualify as a good source of 
information 
7.? The quality of ICT patents granted is low 
8.? The statutory patentability standards for 
ICT patents (e.g. technicality, etc.) differ 
among patent offices 
9.? The maximum protection period of 20 
years is long for ICT patents 
10.?The scope of granted ICT patents is too 
broad 
11.?Implementations cannot be effectively 
protected by patents because they include 
code under an Open Source license that 
includes patent licenses 
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Figure A9 Assessment of the challenges for ICT patents regarding patent enforcement and application ranging from totally 
disagree (1) to totally agree (5) (large company vs SME) 
 
1.? The cost/risk to enforce granted ICT patents is 
high 
2.? The likelihood of litigation (infringement) of ICT 
patents is high 
3.? The likelihood of courts granting an injunction 
to prevent infringement of ICT patents is high 
4.? Expected legal cost for resolution of conflicts 
regarding ICT patents are high 
5.? The legal uncertainty for companies creating or 
implementing ICT patents is high 
6.? Licensors are not willing to license ICT patents 
covering their technologies (hold-up) 
7.? Implementers of ICT patents are not willing to 
licensing in the third-party ICT patents covering 
their implemented technologies (hold-out) 
8.? Agreeing on licensing agreements for standard-
essential ICT patents (SEPs) is challenging 
9.? Large patent owners not joining pools of ICT 
patents challenge the implementation of ICT-
related technologies 
10.?ICT patents owned by Patent Assertion Entities 
(PAEs) increases legal uncertainty for 
implementers of ICT related technologies 
11.?Many technologies protected by ICT patents are 
not used or commercialised 
12.?Patents on computer-implemented inventions 
(CII) or software patents challenges innovation 
of ICT-related technologies 
13.?The use of ICT patents protected technology 
generate problems for the use of Open Source 
Software 
14.?The use of Open Source Software generates 
problems for the use and protection of ICT 
patents 
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Figure A10 Assessment of solutions for ICT patents promoting innovation regarding patent application and granting ranging 
from not effective (1) to very effective (4) (large company vs SME) 
 
1.? The application fees for ICT patents are raised 
2.? The quality of granted ICT patents is improved 
by raising the required degree of novelty 
3.? The quality of granted ICT patents is improved 
by raising the required inventive step 
4.? The quality of granted ICT patents is improved 
by narrowing their scope 
5.? Crowd-sourced validity checks support the 
patent validity checks by patent offices 
6.? Granting an ICT patent requires already the 
implementation of the invention 
7.? Raising and specifying (e.g. related to 
technicality) the bar for patents on computer-
implemented inventions 
8.? Software is excluded from patenting both for 
the program listing and the technical content 
underlying the software 
9.? Patents for “Software as such” are granted, i.e. 
the program listing is patentable 
10.?ICT patents are granted within five years 
11.?The renewal fees for granted ICT patents are 
increased during all the protection period 
12.?The protection period for ICT patents is 
shortened to 10 years 
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Figure A11 Assessment of solutions for ICT patents promoting innovation regarding enforcing and implementing patents 
ranging from not effective (1) to very effective (4) (large company vs SME) 
 
1.? A declaration of willingness to grant a license for 
commercial use to anyone (license of right L.O.R.) is 
required to receive the maximum of 20 years of 
protection for ICT patents 
2.? A set of well-known and trustable patent pledges, i.e. 
voluntary commitments by patent holders to give up 
some of the rights associated to the patent (e.g. grant 
permission for commercial use without any direct 
compensation, no injunctions, FRAND, etc.), is 
defined 
3.? Technology exchange clearing houses are publicly 
supported to support bilateral licensing negotiations 
4.? Regulations to restrict the activities for Patent 
Assertion Entities (PAEs) are established 
5.? Publication of information incl. product specifications 
and licensing fees for Standard-Essential ICT patents 
should be encouraged 
6.? Public policies support the formation and 
development of ICT patent pools, especially of SEPs, 
incl. providing incentives for organisations to join 
7.? Public policies support the formation and 
development of bilateral or joint licensing programs, 
incl. providing incentives for organisations to develop 
these 
8.? Compatible licensing solutions for Open Source 
Software and ICT patents are developed 
9.? Only Royalty-Free ICT patents shall be integrated into 
Open Source Software 
10.? Licensing terms of bilateral licensing agreements 
should be published 
11.? Defensive ICT patent aggregators are publicly 
supported 
12.? Insurances against ICT patent litigations are publicly 
supported (incl. provided by state insurance) 
13.? Trade secret regulations reduce the incentive to file 
ICT patents 
14.?Mediation and arbitration processes to reach a 
mutually satisfactory settlement of ICT patent 
disputes outside of court are further publicly 
supported 
15.? Court fees for ICT patent disputes are increased 
16.? Legal costs for ICT patent disputes in courts are 
covered by the losing party 
17.? Financial situation in an ICT patent dispute of the 
winning party before the court case is reasonably 
restored 
18.? Caps on ICT patent court case costs that are 
recoverable by the winning party are introduced 
19.? A plaintiff can only challenge one ICT patent of one 
defendant in any given court case 
20.? Infringement and validity issues regarding ICT patents 
are tried together before the same court 
21.? Specialised courts instead of general courts should 
deal with ICT patent disputes 
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Figure A12 Assessment of RRI dimensions regarding ICT patents from very low (1) to very high (5) (large company vs SME) 
 
 
  
1.?Multi-actor and public engagement in 
research and innovation 
2.? Enabling easier access to scientific 
results 
3.? Gender issues in the research and 
innovation content and process 
4.? Ethics in the research and innovation 
content and process: 
5.? Formal and informal science education 
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ANALYSIS DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN BUSINESS MODELS 
Figure A13 Effectiveness of ICT patents ranging from very low (1) to very high (5) (different business models)  
1. Preventing imitation of inventions, e.g. for securing the means to obtain a return on the R&D investment; 2. Securing own freedom to 
operate by disclosing prior art (e.g. to prevent legal conflicts); 3. Blocking competitors; 4. Using the coordination function in research 
processes and collaborations incl. open innovation; 5. Using as asset in negotiations (incl. cross licensing); 6. Generating licensing revenues 
7. Enhancing reputation; 8. Measuring performance of research and development; 9. Rewarding employees 
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Figure A14 Assessment of the challenges for ICT patents regarding patent application and granting ranging from totally 
disagree (1) to totally agree (5)  (different business models) 
1. Due to the technological dynamics in the ICT sector, patents are not effective to protect innovation; 2. Due to technological 
convergence and fragmentation in the ICT sector, patents are not effective to protect innovation; 3. Patent examination practices do not 
adequately consider relevant existing prior art; 4. The cost for applying for ICT patents is too high; 5. The granting process for ICT patents is 
too slow; 6. The language of ICT patents is too complicated to qualify as a good source of information; 7. The quality of ICT patents granted 
is low; 8. The statutory patentability standards for ICT patents (e.g. technicality, etc.) differ among patent offices; 9. The maximum 
protection period of 20 years is long for ICT patents; 10. The scope of granted ICT patents is too broad; 11. Implementations cannot be 
effectively protected by patents because they include code under an Open Source license that includes patent licenses 
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N – Table 
47 36 18 90 32 13 15 70 13 
46 35 18 86 30 12 14 67 13 
45 36 19 86 30 13 15 69 14 
43 32 18 77 27 13 14 60 14 
40 30 18 72 25 11 13 53 13 
43 36 19 84 29 12 15 66 14 
44 35 18 82 27 13 15 65 13 
35 27 15 64 20 11 12 47 14 
46 36 19 89 32 13 15 69 14 
44 35 19 88 31 12 14 69 14 
41 32 18 79 28 12 14 60 11 
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Figure A15 Assessment of the challenges for ICT patents regarding patent enforcement and application ranging from totally 
disagree (1) to totally agree (5) (different business models) 
1. The cost/risk to enforce granted ICT patents is high; 2. The likelihood of litigation (infringement) of ICT patents is high; 3. The likelihood 
of courts granting an injunction to prevent infringement of ICT patents is high; 4. Expected legal cost for resolution of conflicts regarding 
ICT patents are high; 5. The legal uncertainty for companies creating or implementing ICT patents is high; 6. Licensors are not willing to 
license ICT patents covering their technologies (hold-up); 7. Implementers of ICT patents are not willing to licensing in the third-party ICT 
patents covering their implemented technologies (hold-out); 8. Agreeing on licensing agreements for standard-essential ICT patents (SEPs) 
is challenging; 9. Large patent owners not joining pools of ICT patents challenge the implementation of ICT-related technologies; 10. ICT 
patents owned by Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs) increases legal uncertainty for implementers of ICT related technologies; 11. Many 
technologies protected by ICT patents are not used or commercialised; 12. Patents on computer-implemented inventions (CII) or software 
patents challenges innovation of ICT-related technologies; 13. The use of ICT patents protected technology generate problems for the use 
of Open Source Software; 14. The use of Open Source Software generates problems for the use and protection of ICT patents 
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N – Table 
36 31 18 73 23 11 14 61 13 
39 33 17 73 26 12 14 61 12 
33 29 17 65 21 8 11 54 13 
43 34 19 79 29 13 14 67 13 
41 33 18 75 26 12 15 59 12 
34 27 18 70 21 10 11 51 13 
36 27 18 62 22 8 13 50 12 
39 33 18 74 27 12 14 60 13 
36 30 18 71 24 9 15 55 13 
38 32 19 78 27 12 15 63 12 
36 30 19 73 26 11 14 60 12 
42 32 19 78 31 13 15 64 13 
45 34 18 83 31 13 14 65 12 
44 32 17 80 26 12 12 60 12 
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Figure A16 Assessment of solutions for ICT patents promoting innovation regarding patent application and granting ranging 
from not effective (1) to very effective (4) (different business models) 
1. The application fees for ICT patents are raised; 2. The quality of granted ICT patents is improved by raising the required degree of 
novelty; 3. The quality of granted ICT patents is improved by raising the required inventive step; 4. The quality of granted ICT patents is 
improved by narrowing their scope; 5. Crowd-sourced validity checks support the patent validity checks by patent offices; 6. Granting an 
ICT patent requires already the implementation of the invention; 7. Raising and specifying (e.g. related to technicality) the bar for patents 
on computer-implemented inventions; 8. Software is excluded from patenting both for the program listing and the technical content 
underlying the software; 9. Patents for “Software as such” are granted, i.e. the program listing is patentable; 10. ICT patents are granted 
within five years; 11. The renewal fees for granted ICT patents are increased during all the protection period; 12. The protection period for 
ICT patents is shortened to 10 years 
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36 28 17 67 23 11 15 54 12 
38 32 17 73 23 11 15 58 15 
40 32 18 76 26 11 15 60 14 
40 32 18 75 27 11 15 62 13 
39 28 17 71 25 10 13 58 13 
38 33 17 75 28 11 15 60 12 
37 31 17 75 26 10 15 59 13 
43 33 17 81 30 12 14 65 13 
40 32 17 77 28 12 15 60 12 
35 29 17 70 24 9 14 54 13 
36 30 17 67 25 10 15 53 12 
41 33 18 74 28 11 15 60 14 
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Figure A17 Assessment of solutions for ICT patents promoting innovation regarding enforcing and implementing patents 
ranging from not effective (1) to very effective (4) (different business models) 
1. A declaration of willingness to grant a license for commercial use to anyone (license of right L.O.R.) is required to receive the maximum 
of 20 years of protection for ICT patents; 2. A set of well-known and trustable patent pledges, i.e. voluntary commitments by patent 
holders to give up some of the rights associated to the patent (e.g. grant permission for commercial use without any direct compensation, 
no injunctions, FRAND, etc.), is defined; 3. Technology exchange clearing houses are publicly supported to support bilateral licensing 
negotiations; 4. Regulations to restrict the activities for Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs) are established; 5. Publication of information incl. 
product specifications and licensing fees for Standard-Essential ICT patents should be encouraged; 6. Public policies support the formation 
and development of ICT patent pools, especially of SEPs, incl. providing incentives for organisations to join; 7. Public policies support the 
formation and development of bilateral or joint licensing programs, incl. providing incentives for organisations to develop these; 8. 
Compatible licensing solutions for Open Source Software and ICT patents are developed; 9. Only Royalty-Free ICT patents shall be 
integrated into Open Source Software; 10. Licensing terms of bilateral licensing agreements should be published; 11. Defensive ICT patent 
aggregators are publicly supported; 12. Insurances against ICT patent litigations are publicly supported (incl. provided by state insurance); 
13. Trade secret regulations reduce the incentive to file ICT patents; 14. Mediation and arbitration processes to reach a mutually 
satisfactory settlement of ICT patent disputes outside of court are further publicly supported; 15. Court fees for ICT patent disputes are 
increased; 16. Legal costs for ICT patent disputes in courts are covered by the losing party; 17. Financial situation in an ICT patent dispute 
of the winning party before the court case is reasonably restored; 18. Caps on ICT patent court case costs that are recoverable by the 
winning party are introduced; 19. A plaintiff can only challenge one ICT patent of one defendant in any given court case; 20. Infringement 
and validity issues regarding ICT patents are tried together before the same court; 21. Specialised courts instead of general courts should 
deal with ICT patent disputes 
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39 31 14 69 24 11 11 57 10 
38 30 15 65 24 10 13 54 9 
34 28 15 65 24 8 12 52 11 
33 28 15 66 23 9 12 54 10 
37 30 14 66 24 10 12 52 11 
33 26 14 60 19 8 12 48 10 
32 27 13 58 18 8 12 46 10 
40 33 13 72 25 10 13 53 9 
37 31 15 66 25 9 12 54 9 
40 31 15 68 25 9 13 55 11 
36 29 13 65 20 9 11 51 9 
41 31 14 67 23 11 12 51 10 
28 26 14 59 19 9 9 43 8 
35 29 14 64 22 10 13 44 9 
34 26 15 66 22 9 13 49 10 
37 30 15 68 24 11 13 52 9 
29 26 15 62 20 10 11 47 9 
34 28 14 61 21 10 10 46 9 
32 28 15 59 21 9 11 47 8 
35 31 15 65 23 10 12 51 11 
38 30 15 68 24 11 12 53 10 
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Figure A18 Assessment of RRI dimensions regarding ICT patents from very low (1) to very high (5) (different business 
models) 
1. Multi-actor and public engagement in research and innovation; 2. Enabling easier access to scientific results; 3. Gender issues in the 
research and innovation content and process; 4. Ethics in the research and innovation content and process; 5. Formal and informal science 
education 
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ANALYSIS DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN GERMANY AND OTHER COUNTRIES 
Figure A19 Effectiveness of ICT patents ranging from very low (1) to very high (5) (Germany vs other Countries (other))  
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Figure A20 Assessment of the challenges for ICT patents regarding patent application and granting ranging from totally 
disagree (1) to totally agree (5)  (Germany vs other Countries (other)) 
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1.? Due to the technological dynamics in the 
ICT sector, patents are not effective to 
protect innovation 
2.? Due to technological convergence and 
fragmentation in the ICT sector, patents 
are not effective to protect innovation 
3.? Patent examination practices do not 
adequately consider relevant existing prior 
art 
4.? The cost for applying for ICT patents is too 
high 
5.? The granting process for ICT patents is too 
slow 
6.? The language of ICT patents is too 
complicated to qualify as a good source of 
information 
7.? The quality of ICT patents granted is low 
8.? The statutory patentability standards for 
ICT patents (e.g. technicality, etc.) differ 
among patent offices 
9.? The maximum protection period of 20 
years is long for ICT patents 
10.?The scope of granted ICT patents is too 
broad 
11.?Implementations cannot be effectively 
protected by patents because they include 
code under an Open Source license that 
includes patent licenses 
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Figure A21 Assessment of the challenges for ICT patents regarding patent enforcement and application ranging from totally 
disagree (1) to totally agree (5) (Germany vs other Countries (other)) 
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Figure A22 Assessment of solutions for ICT patents promoting innovation regarding patent application and granting ranging 
from not effective (1) to very effective (4) (Germany vs other Countries (other)) 
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Figure A23 Assessment of solutions for ICT patents promoting innovation regarding enforcing and implementing patents 
ranging from not effective (1) to very effective (4) (Germany vs other Countries (other)) 
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Figure A24 Assessment of RRI dimensions regarding ICT patents from very low (1) to very high (5) (Germany vs other 
Countries (other)) 
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ANALYSIS DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN GERMANY AND OTHER COUNTRIES AND BETWEEN 
PATENT OWNERS AND NON-PATENT OWNERS 
 
Figure A25 Effectiveness of ICT patents ranging from very low (1) to very high (5) (patent owners Germany (Ger - Patent) vs 
non-patent owners Germany (Ger - No patent) vs patent owners other Countries (Oth – Patent) vs non-patent owners other 
Countries (Oth – No patent))  
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Figure A26 Assessment of the challenges for ICT patents regarding patent application and granting ranging from totally 
disagree (1) to totally agree (5)  (patent owners Germany (Ger - Patent) vs non-patent owners Germany (Ger - No patent) vs 
patent owners other Countries (Oth – Patent) vs non-patent owners other Countries (Oth – No patent)) 
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slow 
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9.? The maximum protection period of 20 
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10.?The scope of granted ICT patents is too 
broad 
11.?Implementations cannot be effectively 
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code under an Open Source license that 
includes patent licenses 
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Figure A27 Assessment of the challenges for ICT patents regarding patent enforcement and application ranging from totally 
disagree (1) to totally agree (5) (patent owners Germany (Ger - Patent) vs non-patent owners Germany (Ger - No patent) vs 
patent owners other Countries (Oth – Patent) vs non-patent owners other Countries (Oth – No patent)) 
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Figure A28 Assessment of solutions for ICT patents promoting innovation regarding patent application and granting ranging 
from not effective (1) to very effective (4) (patent owners Germany (Ger - Patent) vs non-patent owners Germany (Ger - No 
patent) vs patent owners other Countries (Oth – Patent) vs non-patent owners other Countries (Oth – No patent)) 
 
1.? The application fees for ICT patents are raised 
2.? The quality of granted ICT patents is improved 
by raising the required degree of novelty 
3.? The quality of granted ICT patents is improved 
by raising the required inventive step 
4.? The quality of granted ICT patents is improved 
by narrowing their scope 
5.? Crowd-sourced validity checks support the 
patent validity checks by patent offices 
6.? Granting an ICT patent requires already the 
implementation of the invention 
7.? Raising and specifying (e.g. related to 
technicality) the bar for patents on computer-
implemented inventions 
8.? Software is excluded from patenting both for 
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underlying the software 
9.? Patents for “Software as such” are granted, i.e. 
the program listing is patentable 
10.?ICT patents are granted within five years 
11.?The renewal fees for granted ICT patents are 
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Figure A29 Assessment of solutions for ICT patents promoting innovation regarding enforcing and implementing patents 
ranging from not effective (1) to very effective (4) (patent owners Germany (Ger - Patent) vs non-patent owners Germany 
(Ger - No patent) vs patent owners other Countries (Oth – Patent) vs non-patent owners other Countries (Oth – No patent)) 
 
1.? A declaration of willingness to grant a license for 
commercial use to anyone (license of right L.O.R.) is 
required to receive the maximum of 20 years of 
protection for ICT patents 
2.? A set of well-known and trustable patent pledges, i.e. 
voluntary commitments by patent holders to give up 
some of the rights associated to the patent (e.g. grant 
permission for commercial use without any direct 
compensation, no injunctions, FRAND, etc.), is 
defined 
3.? Technology exchange clearing houses are publicly 
supported to support bilateral licensing negotiations 
4.? Regulations to restrict the activities for Patent 
Assertion Entities (PAEs) are established 
5.? Publication of information incl. product specifications 
and licensing fees for Standard-Essential ICT patents 
should be encouraged 
6.? Public policies support the formation and 
development of ICT patent pools, especially of SEPs, 
incl. providing incentives for organisations to join 
7.? Public policies support the formation and 
development of bilateral or joint licensing programs, 
incl. providing incentives for organisations to develop 
these 
8.? Compatible licensing solutions for Open Source 
Software and ICT patents are developed 
9.? Only Royalty-Free ICT patents shall be integrated into 
Open Source Software 
10.? Licensing terms of bilateral licensing agreements 
should be published 
11.? Defensive ICT patent aggregators are publicly 
supported 
12.? Insurances against ICT patent litigations are publicly 
supported (incl. provided by state insurance) 
13.? Trade secret regulations reduce the incentive to file 
ICT patents 
14.?Mediation and arbitration processes to reach a 
mutually satisfactory settlement of ICT patent 
disputes outside of court are further publicly 
supported 
15.? Court fees for ICT patent disputes are increased 
16.? Legal costs for ICT patent disputes in courts are 
covered by the losing party 
17.? Financial situation in an ICT patent dispute of the 
winning party before the court case is reasonably 
restored 
18.? Caps on ICT patent court case costs that are 
recoverable by the winning party are introduced 
19.? A plaintiff can only challenge one ICT patent of one 
defendant in any given court case 
20.? Infringement and validity issues regarding ICT patents 
are tried together before the same court 
21.? Specialised courts instead of general courts should 
deal with ICT patent disputes 
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Figure A30 Assessment of RRI dimensions regarding ICT patents from very low (1) to very high (5) (patent owners Germany 
(Ger - Patent) vs non-patent owners Germany (Ger - No patent) vs patent owners other Countries (Oth – Patent) vs non-
patent owners other Countries (Oth – No patent)) 
 
1.?Multi-actor and public engagement in 
research and innovation 
2.? Enabling easier access to scientific 
results 
3.? Gender issues in the research and 
innovation content and process 
4.? Ethics in the research and innovation 
content and process: 
5.? Formal and informal science education 
18
19
18
19
20
33
33
30
32
33
21
22
18
20
18
42
4
33
37
38
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
1 1,5 2 2,5 3 3,5 4 4,5 5
Score
Ger - Patent Ger - No patent
Oth - Patent Oth - No patent
